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ABSTRACT 
 
The Legislative Politics of Party Competition: 
 
An Analysis of Internal Organization in Eight Mexican State Assemblies, 2001 – 2008 
 
 
by 
 
 
Raul Cipriano Gonzalez 
 
With the rise of electoral competition in Mexico, the country’s state legislatures have 
gained greater legal and political relevance.  Drawing from theories of legislative organization 
originally developed to explain the U.S. Congress, this project contributes to the comparative 
study of legislative institutions by providing the first large-scale analysis of Mexico's emerging 
assemblies.  It adopts both qualitative (e.g., elite interviews, procedural details, etc.) and 
quantitative (e.g., multi-level modeling, Bayesian estimation of legislative preferences, etc.) 
approaches to explore the rules guiding legislative processes and study their impact. The goal is 
to not only improve scholarly understanding of Mexico’s evolving democracy but also 
demonstrate the generalizability of established political theory.
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1 Introduction 
 
Mexico finds itself at an interesting point in its history.  No longer is it a one-party state where 
political competition is only tolerated to preserve the illusion of democratic governance.   Nor is 
it still gripped by the electoral uncertainty of the late 20th century when the ruling party 
suffered major losses throughout the country.  Instead, Mexico is entering a period of 
democratic stability in which the bitterness of one-party rule and the excitement of political 
transition have been replaced by a general acceptance of a new multiparty reality.  As one 
political observer put it, “there is no going back to the old way; and if the parties do not accept 
that, they will surely disappear.”1  
 With that in mind, it behooves us as researchers to investigate the inner workings of 
Mexico’s new political system.  That is, within this new environment, how exactly are 
government institutions organized and why; who are the actors who now have say over policy-
making; and has the relationship between federal and local government changed?  Although 
the literature has a well-developed understanding of both one-party rule and the country’s 
democratic transition, what the status quo is today and how it is expected to proceed remains 
largely unexplored.  This is especially the case for state-level government, a relatively dormant 
set of institutions that has only recently gained in relevance. 
 Under one-party rule, states were largely subordinate to the dictates of the federal 
government.  Not only did they have little say over their fiscal situation – as all tax revenue was 
collected by federal authorities – but they were also under the control of individuals whose 
                                                                 
1
 Interview: Belmonte (Michoacán), Spanish translation, “no se puede regresar a la hegemonía; si los partidos no 
admiten eso, te juro que desaparecerán.” Information on interviews cited for this project is listed in the Appendix. 
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political careers depended exclusively on presidential patronage.  The result was a situation in 
which institutions like the judiciary and the local legislature enjoyed little in the way of 
autonomy. Instead they were stacked with gubernatorial supporters charged with legitimizing 
federally-mandated legislation.  Although every state constitution stipulates a separation-of-
powers system where each branch serves as a check on the rest, the reality was that no such 
separation existed under one-party hegemony.   
 This, however, has changed in recent years as growing electoral competition weakened 
the links between federal and state politics.  Moreover, competition has improved the situation 
of institutions like local legislatures as they are now no longer just way-stations for ambitious 
party members en route to higher office.  In fact, legislative deputies have emerged as political 
leaders in their right, more than just proxies of the state party organization.  And while this 
should not suggest a level of legislative autonomy similar to what we observe in the United 
States, local deputies have nevertheless advanced considerably relative to their situation during 
the hegemonic period.   
 In terms of academic research, these emerging institutions have certainly received their 
fair share of attention (Hernández Norzagaray and Vivero Ávila 2005; Balkin 2004; Cortina 2004; 
Solt 2004; Beer 2003; Hernández Rodriguez 2003; López Lara and Loza Otera 2003). 
Nevertheless, the literature suffers from two main weaknesses.  The first is a lack of detail: 
most analyses are descriptive summaries focused on what parliamentary bodies can and cannot 
do; unfortunately, they often neglect the details essential to internal decision-making.  What 
these institutions is usually well-documented (Balkin 2004) – e.g., committees draft floor 
proposals, governing bodies set the agenda, etc. – but how they accomplish it and why is 
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unfortunately not.  Second, because most research is concerned with description, there exists a 
chronic shortage of theoretical development.  Without a firm foundation on which to generate 
exact predictions about state legislatures, two situations will result: first, it will be difficult to 
determine the exact relationship between institutions and political behavior without some 
indication as to what ‘matters’ and what does not; second, without the logical rigor of a well-
developed theory, it is nearly impossible to generalize beyond the Mexican case and extend our 
conclusions to settings elsewhere in the world.  This second point is particularly troubling since 
the central goal of all scientific research is to build upon previous knowledge so as to better 
inform the circumstances we face today. 
 To address these two weaknesses, I present the following chapters on legislative 
organization in Mexican states.  Not only do they provide significant detail about committee 
deliberation and plenary approval – information which before now was unavailable – but they 
also couch the discussion within the context of established theory.  In this way, the results I 
obtain are not exclusive to Mexico alone and can help inform us of political systems across time 
and space.  Given the dense nature of the material, the remainder of this introductory chapter 
maps out the specific topics I plan to address. 
 In Chapter 2 I discuss the particulars of Mexican state legislatures, beginning with an 
outline of one-party rule under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional, PRI).2  In short, the hyper-presidentialism of the era created a situation in which 
state legislatures were largely irrelevant bodies, no more than rubber stamps subordinate to 
gubernatorial imposition (Hernández Rodriguez 2003).  That is, because the PRI offered the only 
                                                                 
2
 Names and acronyms for all state parties active between 1999 and 2008 are listed in the Appendix. 
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path to political office – and deputies are prohibited from seeking reelection – ambitious party 
members strictly adhered to the governor’s agenda.  However, if deputies had no voice then, 
why study these assemblies now?  This is an especially important question to answer because if 
assemblies do not matter, then there is little reason in going any further with this project. 
I provide five distinct reasons why Mexican state legislatures now merit greater 
attention, all of them revolving around the recent rise of electoral pluralism.  The first is that 
the high level of competition compels vote-hungry parties to decentralize candidate selection, 
leading to nominees who enjoy support independent of the party (Langston 2003).  
Additionally, if an aspirant is denied one party’s nomination then there are as many as six other 
groups that might be willing to offer her theirs.  In this situation, deputies enjoy a much higher 
level of autonomy from the party organization than they did during one-party rule.  Second, 
competition ultimately results in diverse legislatures such that governors are unlikely to belong 
to the same party as the legislative majority.  Unlike the hegemonic period, when governors 
and legislative majorities shared the same preferences – i.e., were both PRI – legislatures could 
depend on the executive to draft policy while all deputies had to do was approve it.  Today, 
however, what with competition and decentralized nomination, even unified government is not 
enough to guarantee similar preferences.  To head-off a potentially hostile executive, 
legislatures now have an incentive to fortify their institutional position with greater resources 
and expertise.  In this way, they can stand on an even-footing with the governor (Cortina 2004). 
Third, Mexico serves as a ‘natural laboratory’ where a variety of factors can be held 
constant at the sub-national level (Balkin 2004).  Obviously, while no two states are identical, 
they can be assumed to be reasonably similar in terms of history, culture, language – all of 
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which can have an effect on the relationships between institutions and political behavior.  
Furthermore, the federal constitution requires all 31 state governments to adopt the same 
system of government, further reducing any possible distortion.  So with parties enjoying 
varying levels of support throughout the country, the relative similarities across states allows 
researchers to focus exclusively on differences like the style of governance parties employ.  
Fourth, many national legislators start and end their political careers at the local level (Langston 
and Aparicio 2008).  Given that electoral pluralism has also increased the profile of the federal 
assembly, knowing how local experiences shape legislative behavior at this level will prove 
critical to understanding the institution as a whole.  Fifth, there is the normative value of 
improving what we know about state legislatures: as they assert their constitutional 
prerogatives and assume greater authority, citizens should have a better understanding of how 
they are governed. 
Having answered why it is worth studying state legislatures, I next proceed with a 
detailed discussion of legislative life in Mexico, with a specific focus on strong party politics, the 
centralized committee system, and the premium on consensus.   In this section, I argue that 
party control manifests itself in how these assemblies are organized.  Not only are leaders of 
the party delegation endowed with tremendous authority over both the group and the 
assembly, they are also in a position to monopolize legislative production what with their 
power to distribute committee assignments.  Committees themselves are highly centralized in 
that only the president (i.e., the chairperson) has control over the panel agenda, effectively 
dictating which and when proposals are considered; additionally, only committees have the 
right to modify floor proposals.  This gate-keeping authority is compounded by the fact that 
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only a small number of committees consider the vast majority of approved legislation.  
Consequently, parties need only control the presidencies of select committees to control policy.   
Elites have an even greater incentive to use committees due to the current premium on 
consensus.  Parties and legislatures alike are not well-respected in the country with many 
questioning the legitimacy of their decisions.  To counter this negative opinion, party leaders 
seek unanimous passage of their proposals, something which they can only do if they first 
negotiate the terms of agreement in committee, away from the public eye.  This strategy helps 
minimize public debate and ensures approval by large broad coalitions of support. 
 Currently, no other study provides a similar level of detail about the legislative process.  
This, in and of itself, makes Chapter 2 a significant contribution to our general understanding of 
Mexican politics.  Within the context of this analysis, however, the importance of this 
information is in correcting the second weakness of the Mexican states literature: a lack of 
theoretical development.   
In Chapter 3 I consider the two principal stages of the legislative process, committee 
deliberation and plenary approval.  With respect to the first, I describe three competing models 
of committee selection: the distributive, which predicts committees consist of preference 
outliers, i.e., deputies with preferences unrepresentative of the chamber (Weingast and 
Marshall 1988); the informational, which generally predicts committee inliers (Krehbiel 1991); 
and the partisan approach, which naturally claims that party agents dominate, particularly on 
important panels (Cox and McCubbins 2007).   
Additionally – while the partisan approach likely holds for the Mexican case – l argue the 
other two may help explain committee assignment because of the effect electoral competition 
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has had on legislative autonomy.  Specifically, divergent preferences create a need for 
informative committees while politically ambitious deputies use committees to provide future 
constituents with public benefits. 
Moving on to the second stage of the legislative process – plenary approval – I once 
again consider three competing models: the median voter theorem predicts legislators are 
likely to vote with the majority the closer they are to the median position (Black 1948; Downs 
1957); the party inducement approach expects members of the ruling party to experience a 
high level of legislative success (Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith 2006); and the procedural 
cartel model, which predicts a high level of success for those whose preferences lay close to the 
party’s median voter (Cox and McCubbins 2005). 
Whereas the committee-based hypotheses focus on identifying those with the most 
influence over gate-keeping offices, the plenary-based hypotheses explore the strategies 
parties use to compel legislative support.  That is, with the premium on consensus, party 
leaders seek unanimous approval of their policies; unfortunately, the literature provides little 
about how they actually achieve this support.  I hypothesize there are at least two ways – 
inducements and agenda control, both of which are plausible for the Mexican case given the 
control parties have over both resources and gate-keepers.  However, I also argue that growing 
legislative autonomy may result in a more median voter dynamic where legislators are free to 
vote as they wish on certain votes.   
The contribution here is that I use established theoretical models – originally developed 
for the U.S. Congress – to explain legislative behavior in Mexico, something which is rarely done 
particularly when state legislatures are considered.  In fact, taking the information from 
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Chapter 2 to tailor these models to the Mexican case is a prime example of building on previous 
research to inform our expectations about very different settings.   Moreover, the logical rigor 
and generalizability of these theories allow us to apply the results obtained here to inform even 
more cases, constituting a natural progression of knowledge building.   
The question now becomes: how do I measure legislative preferences?  In other words, 
the hypotheses I derive are all based on spatial models of voting where outcomes depend on 
ideological proximity within some defined policy space.  Given that, it becomes critical to 
generate valid measures of legislative preference in order to calculate distances from the 
various median positions.  In Chapter 4, I first discuss the literature on this topic, highlighting 
the diversity of methods and their level of sophistication.  However, just as each method 
naturally has its own set of advantages, each one also has its disadvantages vis-à-vis the data 
limitations inherent to the Mexican case.  That is, while roll call data – my main data source – is 
available in over half of Mexican states, their assemblies (1) do not make them readily 
available; (2) have only recently started recording them and lack a representative sample of 
votes; or (3) they produce a low volume of recorded votes.  Although it is difficult to statistically 
correct for the first two limitations, the third limitations poses no problem for ideal point 
estimation via Bayesian simulation (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004).  The rest of the chapter 
explains the specific steps needed calculate ideal points in eight state legislatures and reports 
the diagnostics evaluating their validity. 
Once again, the value of this particular chapter is as motivation for an analysis of 
committee selection and plenary approval; at the same time however, it also serves as a stand-
alone contribution to the study of Mexican legislatures.  Despite the growing availability of 
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legislative information, no analyst has yet used this information to generate specific ideal points 
for each individual deputy.  And while there are certainly issues with roll call-based methods, 
my treatment here simply demonstrates that such approaches can be informative and easily 
adaptable to the Mexican case. 
In Chapter 5, I build several statistical models to evaluate the predictions from Chapter 3 
using the ideal point estimates generated in Chapter 4.  Although the previous chapters each 
constitute a separate contribution to Mexican scholarship, they all lead up to this one where I 
finally fit the data to the predictions.  In short, the results clearly indicate how committee 
assignments are distributed and why legislators vote a certain way (preference v. party).   
Although I prefer to save a discussion of these results for Chapter 5, I can say they are a 
product of a clear and systematically designed test of competing models of social organization.  
In this way, we can be very certain about the direction and magnitude of certain relationships 
under a variety of conditions, something more anecdotal/descriptive analyses are unable to do.  
Moreover, I supplement my discussion throughout all four chapters with elite level interviews 
and other contextual information obtained during the data collection process.  So in addition to 
using the objective records of ‘yea’ and ‘nay’ votes, I also have access to information about a 
deputy’s perceptions as well as concrete examples of  the concepts I describe here, grounding 
the analysis in the substantive realities of the legislative decision-making. 
I summarize the results in Chapter 9, providing some additional analysis as well as 
several avenues for future research. 
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2 MEXICAN STATE LEGISLATURES 
 
Politics in Mexico is defined by a unique combination of both progressive and outdated 
institutions.  As the country continues its transition away from one-party rule, many governing 
bodies remain colored by strong authoritarian tendencies.  The electoral system, for example, 
provides opposition groups with unprecedented access to public resources and is considered a 
model of transparency throughout the world (Carrillo 2006).  Yet, as participatory and as 
inclusive as this system is, it is constrained by a set of term limits many find incompatible with 
democratic progress.  Once well-meaning products of the Mexican Revolution, these 
constraints have since become a source of public dissatisfaction and are prompting many to 
reevaluate the effect incumbency has on accountability (Hamm 2006).  
This combination of institutions produces a system paradoxically marked by record 
participation and centralized decision-making.  The purpose of this chapter then is to improve 
our understanding of Mexican politics by studying how the interaction between the old and the 
new affects the internal organization of state government.  Specifically, I look to decision-
making in Mexico’s state legislatures, institutions which have only just emerged from the 
obscurity of one-party rule. 
 
Marginalized for most of the 20th century, sub-national institutions in Mexico were 
strictly subordinated to the dictates of the federal government.  However, as PRI hegemony lost 
out to electoral pluralism of the late 1980s, local entities began to exercise greater autonomy 
over decision-making.  This chapter builds on the underlying assumption that changes in 
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electoral competition have greatly affected the internal organization of state institutions like 
legislative assemblies, allowing for a more egalitarian approach to government to take hold.  
And yet while Mexico continues to liberalize its institutions and provide citizens with more 
opportunities to participate, political parties still maintain significant control over the 
distribution of public resources much like the PRI did at the height of its power.  
This chapter focuses on decision-making bodies in the Mexican state legislature, an 
institution widely considered a rubber stamp lacking the incentives to assert its constitutional 
authority.  However, I argue these incentives now exist and are largely a function of intense 
political competition.  For example at the individual level, legislative deputies are in a position 
to use the electoral support they build during the campaign as leverage over vote-hungry 
parties. As a result, deputies today, unlike their predecessors, have a say over the policies their 
groups pursue.  At the institutional level, the potential for divided government compels entire 
legislatures to fortify themselves against hostile executives.  Rather than submit blindly to the 
governor’s position, legislatures are now acquiring the resources and staff to assert their role as 
counterweights to the executive.  
But aside from the effect competition has on legislative autonomy, I provide three 
additional reasons why state assemblies merit greater interest.  First, Mexico is effectively a 
‘natural laboratory’ because of its centralized federal arrangement and relatively durable 
institutions.  Against this fixed institutional setting, researchers can compare variation across a 
range of states without having to make unrealistic assumptions of equivalence.  Second, the 
extant literature finds most national politicians today not only began their careers in sub-
national office, many also return.  This movement suggests that future research on national 
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political careers will require a better understanding of local conditions and the rules that govern 
them.  Third, there are the normative benefits associated with government transparency.  That 
is, as states in Mexico begin to shoulder more legal authority and assume a more prominent 
role in everyday lives, it becomes imperative that citizens have access to concise and objective 
information about how these institutions operate.  With it, citizens can better evaluate 
government performance and compel stricter accountability. 
The chapter on Mexican state politics is organized as follows.  First, I briefly discuss the 
one-party rule, highlighting presidential power and the virtual irrelevance of state government.  
Second, I lay out five reasons why state government – particularly the legislative branch – 
merits greater attention.  Next, I outline the three defining features of legislative life in Mexico:  
strong parties, a centralized committee system, and a premium on consensus.  In describing 
these features, I use a combination of constitutional detail and elite-level interviews to 
compare decision-making across a diverse sample of state assemblies.  A distinct contribution 
to the study of Mexican politics, the analysis introduces new information about the procedural 
rules which define the legislative process.  Few analyses, if any, provide a similar degree of 
detail.  Fourth, I argue legislative policy remains under strict partisan control despite Mexico’s 
democratic advances; the difference is the PRI must now share its power with two other 
parties.  That is, while more interests today have a say over legislative decision-making, the 
power structure within congresos locales remains as party-centric as it was under PRI 
hegemony.  If true, then what future does an emerging democracy like Mexico have if its 
institutions remain subject to the same internal rules the PRI used to preserve its one-party 
state?  I hope this and later chapters will help answer that critical question. 
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2.1 One-Party Rule and the Rise of Political Competition 
Before discussing the newfound relevance of state government, I first describe one-
party rule in Mexico and how it gave way to multiparty competition.  What is interesting about 
the following is the durability of key political institutions.  Ranging from a weak executive to the 
constraints on reelection, many of these institutions have not seen change since the PRI first 
assumed power in the 1930s.3  In this way, parties continue to profit from the same 
arrangements which helped the PRI uphold the primacy of party government. 
2.1.1 Presidential Government under PRI Hegemony 
 Effective February 1917, the Political Constitution of the Mexican United States 
(CPEUM)4 established a formal separation of government branches that divided power into a 
chief executive, a legislative assembly, and an independent judiciary (CPEUM: Article 49).  This 
arrangement was meant to tame the country’s authoritarian tendencies by pitting the branches 
of government against one another.  However, under one-party rule, there was no such 
competition as the executive enjoyed a distinct advantage.  
The executive, consisting of the president and his cabinet appointees,5 is elected every 
six years to a single term and is prohibited from ever seeking a second one (CPEUM: Article 83).  
                                                                 
3
 I, of course, exclude the electoral reforms that were responsible for driving much of the country’s democratic 
transition. 
4
 Spanish translation: Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. 
5
 No woman has yet won the presidency.  And while many lament the lack of female representation in Mexico, it 
does rank comparatively well – 44
th
 out of 188 countries – whereby women hold 23.2% of the seats in Chamber of 
Deputies (as opposed to a global average of 18.4%; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2009).  Moreover, Mexico 
outperforms a number of affluent Western democracies such as the United Kingdom (#60, 19.5%), the United 
States (#72, 16.8%), and Japan (#105, 9.4%).  In fact, many of the country’s most influential politicians are women: 
governors Amalia García Medina (Zacatecas) and Ivonne Ortega Pacheco (Yucatán); Beatriz Paredes Rangel, 
current PRI president and former governor of Tlaxcala; and Elba Esther Gordillo, president of the largest trade 
union in Latin America, the National Educational Workers Syndicate.  Similarly, women hold a multitude of sub-
national offices, ranging from municipal presidents (i.e., mayors) to top positions within the local legislature. 
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And while unquestionably the most powerful individual during the Priato,6 the president was – 
and continues to be – a very weak actor in terms of formal constitutional power.  Not only are 
his electoral prospects severely constrained by the office’s limited tenure, but the president 
also lacks many of the tools other leaders have to influence policy, e.g., amendatory 
observations, partial vetoes, decree powers (Alemán 2006; Alemán and Tsebelis 2005).  
Without these tools, Mexican presidents appear to be at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
assembly as they have no legal authority to shape legislation or compel plenary support.  Yet 
despite this seemingly tenuous position, presidents still found themselves at the center of 
hegemonic politics, deriving meta-constitutional authority from their control over the vast PRI 
organization.  According to Weldon (1997), this species of presidentialism was only possible 
because of (1) unified government, (2) strict party discipline and (3) a president-as-party-leader. 
Between 1929 and 1989,7 the PRI controlled the presidency, the governors, and a 
legislative super-majority in every federal/state assembly.8  A product of electoral engineering, 
tampering, and outright fraud, unified government  assured the PRI had enough votes to 
overcome the thresholds it needed to reform the Constitution and stay in power – thus fulfilling 
Weldon’s first condition. 9  However, this says nothing about how the PRI or the president 
compelled party discipline to approve these reforms.  That is, how did a supposedly ‘weak’ 
                                                                 
6
 A popular Mexican nickname for the one-party era, it is a take on “Porfiriato”, a word originally coined to name 
the period of strong-man governance under Porfirio Díaz (1876 – 1910). 
7
 It was not until 1946 when the hegemonic party in Mexico officially assumed the PRI moniker.  Originally known 
as the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, PNR), the name was later changed to the 
Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, PMR) in 1938 (Barrón 2006: fn. 3).  Although 
now a minor point, these changes reflected early struggles to preserve the party’s claim that it was the only true 
heir to the Revolution. 
8
 In 1988, the PRI lost its super-majority in the federal legislature and the governorship of Baja California.  Although 
it would partly recoup its losses, the PRI would no longer command the electoral support at the height of its 
hegemonic rule. 
9
 Constitutional reforms require a 2/3 majority in the bicameral Congress of the Union and a simple majority of 
state legislatures (CPEUM: Article 135). 
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president control large legislative coalitions of like-minded, albeit self-interested, individuals?  
The Mexican solution was simple: by prohibiting consecutive reelection (CPEUM: Article 59).10   
Prior to 1932, only the president was prohibited from running for reelection; legislators, 
on the other hand, were free to pursue as many consecutive terms as they possibly could.  In 
fact, reelection rates after the ‘No Reelección Revolution’ were often as high as rates during the 
Porfiriato (Weldon 2004). 11  Naturally, many rejected the proposals restricting legislative 
tenure because they limited an incumbent’s ability to independently build a personal 
constituency.  However, because of the threat independent deputies posed to a unified party, 
its leaders persisted: “[a]t the time, the main threat to the party was geographical 
decentralization”, with centrifugal forces like local strong men, secessionist movements, and 
counter-revolutionaries threatening to pull apart the PRI (Weldon 2004: 574).  Permitting 
reelection would further exacerbate this problem because it would encourage political careers 
based on local support rather than on loyalty to PRI oligarchs.  Article 59 of CPEUM – which 
banned consecutive reelection – helped the party remedy this situation by forcing career 
politicians to depend on the president/party for advancement.  More specifically, a 
combination of term limits, a short three-year term, and the lack of a viable opposition drove 
most ambitious deputies during one-party rule to rely exclusively on the president – who had 
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 Unlike the president, legislators can serve multiple terms; the catch, however, is that politicians must sit out a 
term before they are eligible to run for reelection.  
11
 The Mexican Revolution was a bloody conflict stemming from the presidential excesses of the Diaz regime and 
the large economic disparity between landed interests and the poor.  Resulting in more than 2 million deaths, the 
revolutionary period was defined by a series of military putsches operating under the populist banner of ‘Effective 
Suffrage, No Reelection’ (Sufragio Efectivo, No Reeleción), and was inflamed further by regional conflicts 
throughout the country (McCaa 2003).  While many debate the official end of the Revolution, most armed violence 
subsided by the time President Lázaro Cárdenas took office in 1934. 
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both the tenure and the resources to guarantee their followers public office. 12  If deputies 
failed to maintain presidential support, they quickly found themselves back in the private 
sector.13  Moreover, Article 59 weakened the legislature’s constitutional prominence because, 
despite their broad powers, deputies could not extend their time in office and develop the 
expertise assemblies need to remain autonomous.  Deputies instead had to rely on executive 
secretariats whose staff was better paid, better trained, and relatively free of short mandates. 
Ultimately, presidents used the leverage gained from these restrictions – in conjunction 
with their access to bureaucratic resources (e.g., money, jobs, materiel) – to buy support at all 
levels of government.  In this way, the president did not need special legislative powers to 
enact his agenda.  He simply benefited from the lack of political opportunity and the 
persuasiveness of patronage to sit atop the PRI apparatus, thus satisfying Weldon’s remaining 
conditions.14  Note, the legislative branch was not the only one to suffer from this skewed 
vision of separated-powers as even the judiciary found itself vulnerable to executive imposition.  
That is, presidents were virtually unchecked in their power to appoint judges, enforce court 
decisions, and circumvent unfavorable rulings (Beer 2003: 6 – 7).  Compounded by a judge’s 
own ambitions, the president was well-positioned to stack the bench full with supporters and 
relegate the judiciary to the same ‘rubber stamp’ status as the legislature (Domingo 2000). 
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 Presidents and senators each serve a six-year term. 
13
 For most people, private businesses in Mexico during this period were neither secure nor particularly profitable 
when compared with government service.  That is, until the 1980s, most major industries were nationalized 
entities – e.g., communications, transportation, resource production, etc – so anything worth earning was usually 
earned while working for the State.  Interview: Abarca Salvatori (Puebla); Posadas Hernández (Guanajuato). 
14
 To clarify, the presidents were the undisputed leaders of the party in that all major decisions (e.g., nominations, 
the budget, etc.) had to receive their approval first.  Presidents, however, were not officially the leaders of the 
party; this position was formally held by the party president and the other members of the National Executive 
Committee (Comité Ejecutivo Nacional, CEN).  Nevertheless, because these positions were stacked with the 
presidents’ most loyal allies, any power the CEN had was largely symbolic. 
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 With respect to sub-national institutions, the power of the federal presidency was as 
ever-present as it was when dealing with its fellow branches; yet there is some misconception 
about the specific relationship between national and local authorities.  However, before 
venturing into that discussion, a general introduction to Mexican federalism is in order: the 
country is organized into 31 states and a single Federal District (CPEUM: Articles 43 – 44); 15  
states are, in turn, divided into 2440 municipalities (CPEUM: Article 115; INAFED 2008).16  These 
territorial divisions – and the limits of their legal authority – are explicitly outlined in the 
Constitution, creating a clear hierarchy of political authority dominated by the federal 
government in Mexico City.  What is important to remember is that Mexican federalism is quite 
different from its American counterpart (Ward and Rodriguez 1999: 674).  In the United States, 
the federal system was originally a product of ‘bottom-up’ forces in which colonial governments 
reluctantly ceded their autonomy to a central authority in exchange for a common defense.  
And while the nature of this arrangement has evolved considerably over the last 220 years, U.S. 
federalism continues to be defined by the tension between state and federal governments. 
Mexican federalism, on the other hand, developed according to a ‘top-down’ logic, 
which encouraged the consolidation of a centralized authority at the expense of provincial 
independence.  Dating as far back as pre-Hispanic times, Mexico’s strong centralist tradition 
was a practical solution to the problem of maintaining control over a large and populous 
country.  Revolutionary leaders continued with this tradition and formally established the 
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 The Federal District encompasses Mexico City and nearly all of its constituent boroughs. 
16
 The number of municipalities per state ranges from five in Baja California to 570 in Oaxaca.  While this number 
usually depends on the size of a state’s population, Oaxaca is a special case.  Nearly 20% of Mexico’s indigenous 
population lives in Oaxaca where many closely identify with isolated villages scattered throughout the rough and 
isolated terrain.  Combine this with the self-rule system of Usos y Costumbres that grants indigenous communities 
considerable autonomy, the number of municipalities in Oaxaca is nine times the national average (µ = 62). 
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federal system in the 1917 Constitution as a way to extend Mexico City’s power and subdue the 
emerging influence of local strong-men (e.g., agrarian leaders in the state of San Luis Potosí), 
secessionist movements (e.g.,  Yucatán state), and counter-revolutionaries (e.g., the Cristeros; 
Courchene and Diaz Cayeros 2000: 204).  Although this process of consolidation did not 
proceed as smoothly as current conditions would indicate, Mexico City ultimately proved 
successful in containing most provincial unrest by the 1930s.  
 Once relations between the center and periphery normalized, how did the Mexican 
federation maintain a hold over its constituent parts?  For starters, it established a centralized 
fiscal regime that was relatively immune to change.  That is, taxation in Mexico is largely a 
federal responsibility whereby states and municipalities only account for 5% of the total 
revenue (Diaz Cayeros 2004: 230).  With little or no other source of income, states have relied 
on federal transfers to provide local services like water, sanitation, etc.  Additionally, if some 
coalition of states sought to change this arrangement, they found it extremely difficult to do 
given the dense patchwork of constitutional amendments and federal statutes governing the 
fiscal regime (Diaz Cayeros 2004; Courchene and Diaz 2000). 
  Second, the federal hierarchy outlined in the Constitution has greatly facilitated 
centralized control because it sought to reproduce locally what presidentialism achieved 
nationally (Balkin 2004).  That is, sub-national government was designed to be a literal copy of 
the federal system, limiting the number of relevant decision-makers and concentrating power 
within the executive via meta-constitutional means. 17  At the state-level, there is a governor, a 
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 Although there is some cross-state variation in gubernatorial power, all 31 executives lack legislative tools like 
partial vetoes and decree authority (Blanco González 2001).  So as ‘powerless’ as presidents are nationally, so too 
are governors locally.  
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unicameral legislature, and a judiciary, while at the municipal level there is a president and an 
assembly of regents, or city council (CPEUM: Articles 115 § I; 116).  Despite their institutional 
weaknesses, the lack of party competition allowed governors to enjoy a relatively fre e-hand 
over local candidacies and state bureaucracies alike.18   In short, local government was 
effectively a nested imitation of its federal counterpart.19 
This arrangement benefited the president because rather than navigate through the 
entire constellation of state-level interests, he only needed the support of the governors to 
advance his policies locally.  Governors, in turn, could compel local legislative approval of these 
policies in the same fashion that presidents did vis-à-vis the Chamber of Deputies.  This was 
possible for two reasons: the lack of political competition and the states’ fiscal dependence on 
the federal government.  As I have already mentioned, the lack of a viable opposition forced 
politically ambitious individuals to join the PRI: those outside of the party could only expect 
defeat and harassment while loyal insiders profited from the boons of political patronage.  This 
meant that gubernatorial candidates had to ally themselves with the PRI – and with the 
president personally – to win the nomination.20  Once his candidates were in office, the 
president would adjust the federal budget to ensure continued loyalty.  Governors would 
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 The Federal Constitution explicitly prohibits consecutive reelection for local legislative deputies (CPEUM: Article 
116 § II) and municipal presidents/regents (CPEUM: Article 115 § I).  And while not explicitly stipulated in the 
founding document, the term of office for both elected positions is three years in all 32 federal entities (including 
the Federal District).  In contrast, the governor – who is prohibited from re-election, consecutive or otherwise 
(CPEUM: Article 116 § I) – is elected for a six-year term.  Similar to PRI presidents, governors also had veto power 
over local candidacies and their longer term gave them the opportunity to stack the government full with 
supporters for two legislative periods. 
19
 Municipal governments in Mexico are also highly centralized in that municipal presidents have near-absolute 
control over their ‘fiefdom’ (Cleary 2004).  They are not only the most familiar ‘face’ in government, but presidents 
also have access to several sources of tax revenue not available to either state or federal government (Courchene 
and Diaz Cayeros 2000: 203) 
20
 Absent a viable opposition candidate, a PRI nomination effectively meant victory during the general election. 
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likewise use their own influence over electoral candidacies and the local bureaucracy to compel 
legislative support, preserving political consistency from Mexico City on down to the state. 
Yet despite whatever influence PRI presidents had over state executives, one should be 
cautious when characterizing the relationship.  That is, governors during the one-party era have 
traditionally been treated as extensions of the federal administration, mindless envoys 
“charged with truthfully implementing…presidential desires” (Hernández-Rodriguez 2003: 103; 
Needler 1971; Scott 1964).  Many, however, now argue this blind vassalage is an extreme view 
that minimizes the governor’s own personal influence.  According to new research on state 
government, the relationship between governor and president was, in fact, far more complex 
than previously imagined (Hernández-Rodríguez 2003; Ward and Rodríguez 1999).  Mexico, 
despite its political homogeneity, was still a large country with varying sub-national contexts.  
So to limit micromanagement and avoid unfamiliar pitfalls, presidents gave governors 
substantial autonomy over their personal ‘fiefdoms’.  So long as governors kept local political 
order and did not contradict the party, they were generally free of federal intrusion.  In this 
way, governors behaved more like intermediaries linking the national to the local.  Moreover, 
while presidents certainly had a strong veto over gubernatorial nominations, it was not 
absolute given the influence other local elites had over state party organizations.   
2.1.2 Electoral Pluralism 
At the height of power, the PRI was uncontested in its control over Mexican politics.  
Not only did its candidates win every significant election between 1929 and 1988, it also 
maintained socioeconomic stability at a time when so much of Latin America suffered from 
chronic breakdowns (Schedler 2005; Crandall 2005).  And yet as ‘perfect’ as this dictatorship 
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appeared to be, it could not hold its grip forever, falling victim to both miscalculation and 
disaster. 21   
Since its first electoral ‘reform’ in 1933, the PRI struggled with the idea of balancing 
hegemony with legitimacy.  That is, with each modification, the PRI used the instruments of 
democratic choice to tighten its grip; however as the party’s dominance grew, its legitimacy 
began to suffer from the lack of political competition (Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 2001: 
210).  Of course there was the PAN who, since 1939, had campaigned as the only independent 
opposition in the country; but even an opposition as committed as the PAN was early on, it had 
its limits.  By 1958, when the PAN had won just 6 legislative seats (out of 161) in the Chamber 
of Deputies, its leaders decided to protest the results by forbidding its candidates from taking 
office.  The PAN threatened to do the same in 1961 when it won even fewer seats.  Fearing a 
boycott of the 1964 elections – which would severely undermine the PRI’s own democratic 
credentials22 – the hegemon decided to completely overhaul the electoral system in 1963. 
A departure from U.S.-inspired plurality elections, the new system marked the country’s 
first experience with a mixed-member system.23  Although a restricted version – whereby only 
small parties could field list candidates – it did allow opposition groups to win as many as 
twenty seats in the Chamber of Deputies.  For the next thirty-five years, the PRI continued to 
open the electoral arena and promote greater political competition – albeit largely to its 
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 Peruvian author and one-time presidential candidate, Mario Vargas Llosa, coined the term ‘perfect dictatorship’ 
in 1990 when debating the merits of PRI hegemony with leading Mexican intellectual, Octavio Paz. 
22
 It was one thing to protest a midterm election; it was another to protest a presidential election, which the 1964 
contests were.  That is, despite its dominance, the PRI could not afford to have the legitimacy of its top politician 
questioned.  However, without PAN participation, this is exactly what would have happened. 
23
 Shugart and Wattenberg (2001: 10) define a mixed-member system as a multi-tier framework in which one set 
of seats is allocated nominally (i.e., voters select candidates, not parties) and another by list (i.e., voters select 
parties, not candidates).   
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detriment.  That is to say, the PRI did not willingly enact these reforms but was actually forced 
into it by extenuating circumstances.  Beginning with the Student Movement of 1968, and the 
government’s disastrous response, the PRI found itself increasingly on the defensive as it 
scrambled to manage a number of domestic and foreign crises over the next three decades.  
This came to a head following (1) the 1981 collapse of oil prices, which crippled Mexico’s ability  
to service the massive debt it had accumulated;24  and (2) the deadly 1985 earthquake that 
struck downtown Mexico City.  An 8.1 on the Richter scale, the disaster caused over 10,000 
deaths, billions of dollars in damage, and exposed deep weaknesses in an already stressed 
government apparatus.  As economic/political turmoil continued into the 1990s, opposition 
groups used their growing leverage over an embattled PRI to push for even greater reform, 
culminating in 2000 when the hegemon lost its first presidential election since the Revolution.25 
At the local level, states followed the federal government and adopted the same mixed-
member system originally approved in 1963 (Téllez González 2006: 144; Orta Flores 2004: 18; 
CPEUM: Article 116 § II).  For the most part, however, the federal government tended to follow 
the lead of the states, taking many of its cues from the reforms the latter had enacted locally.  
In the edited volume, Subnational Politics and Democratization in Mexico (Cornelius, Eisenstadt, 
and Hindley 2006), the contributors show that many of the forces now driving national-level 
elections first saw light in the states: political alternation (Baja California; Espinoza Valle 2006), 
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 President Luis Echeverria (1970 – 1976) sought to shift national policy away from economic development and 
towards social programs.  The consequent rise in public spending, however, could only be sustained by the oil 
discoveries in the Gulf of Mexico.  With the OPEC embargo in full effect – driving prices to record levels – Mexico 
benefited from a tremendous windfall in petroleum revenue.  This, in turn, permitted further borrowing to finance 
even larger public expenditures, something Mexico would later regret with the rise of interest rates and decline in 
oil prices in 1978. 
25
 For a more detailed discussion of Mexico’s national-level reforms, please see Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 
(2001), Weldon (2001), and Schedler (2005). Taken together, these three studies provide the most comprehensive 
account of the Mexican electoral system in the literature, highlighting the specific changes associated with each 
round of reform.  
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mobilized opposition groups (Guanajuato; Shirk 2006), and civic activism (San Luis Potosí; 
Calvillo Unna 2006).  This not only helped future politicians prepare for multiparty competition 
at the federal level, but it also laid the foundations for an non-partisan body charged with 
organizing elections and adjudicating related disputes, a critical component of Mexico’s 
democratic transition.26 
And what exactly were some of the consequences of these sub-national reforms?  
According to Figure 2.1, the PRI enjoyed a majority of legislative seats in at least 90% of state 
assemblies prior to 1997.  However, between 2000 and 2007, the PRI controlled a majority in 
just 49% of assemblies, reaching a low point of 35% in 2006.  Reflecting similar patterns at the 
federal level (Weldon 2001), one of the most notable features of this rapid decline was the 
effect of political competition on state-level candidacies: free elections have made it more 
difficult for any one party to enjoy long-term success, so leaders must look beyond their most 
partisan and loyal supporters to fill the group’s slate of nominees.  With respect to the effective 
number of legislative parties, Figure 2.2 illustrates two related points: 27  first, the general 
tendency over the last three legislative periods is in an upward direction, indicating a weak rise 
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 Whether the Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral, IFE) is actually free of party influence is a 
matter of debate.  There have always been rumors and speculations suggesting the councilors who manage IFE are 
nothing more than party agents; but until recently there was little in the way of empirical evidence to confirm this 
suspicion.  Rosas, Estevez, and Magar (2005) provide some clue as to how autonomous councilors truly are, using 
ideal point estimation to evaluate party loyalty from a sample of 500+ roll call votes.  The results indicate that IFE 
councilors are in fact ‘party watchdogs’ intent on protecting the parties who sponsor them.  Interestingly enough, 
the authors do not oppose this arrangement as they find electoral institutions “that embrace political strife, rather 
than…purport to expunge politics from their midst, might be better able to guarantee fair electoral competition in 
new democracies” (Rosas et al. 2005: 23). 
27
 Laakso and Taagepera (1979) define the Effective Number of Parties,  as, 
 = ∑ 	
 , 
where n is the number of parties and p the percentage of seats party i holds.    
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in legislative pluralism; second, the average effective number of legislative parties is relatively 
high (average ENLP = 2.54), evidence that state legislatures are no longer one-party systems. 28 
As I argue in the next section, the effect of increased competition has had a positive 
effect on state legislatures, giving them strong incentives to assert their autonomy.  With that 
in mind, I turn to the following question: why study Mexican state legislatures? 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1.  Share of Mexican State Legislatures under PRI Majorities, 1990 – 2007.  The PRI is 
shown to have experienced a rapid decline in legislative power at the state level.  Mirroring the 
party’s losses in national elections, this pattern represents a marked shift in political 
competition that has serious consequences for the relevance and performance of state 
government.  Source: Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, A.C. 
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 27 of Mexico’s 31 states are included in this graph for the last three legislative periods (including the current 
one).  The exact numerical values for the effective number of parties in each state (calculated for both electoral 
and legislative parties) are available in the Appendix. 
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FIGURE 2.2 .Effective Number of Legislative Parties in 27 Mexican State Legislatures, 1999 – 
2008.  Calculating the effective number of legislative parties yields two interesting points: there 
is a weak tendency in the upward direction, suggesting growing legislative pluralism; and the 
level of pluralism is relatively high, averaging 2.54 parties per legislative period.  Source: 
author’s data. 
 
 
2.2 Why Mexican State Legislatures? 
 With the possible exception of the governorship, state institutions like the legislature 
and judiciary were largely irrelevant for most of the one-party era.  They were either expressly 
subordinated to gubernatorial dictates or were co-opted by federal authorities.  Regardless of 
the circumstances, state government had long been a ‘black box’ that did not merit opening.  
That, however, is no longer the case.   As I argue in the following sections, the recent growth in 
political competition – both within the electoral arena and between government branches – 
has dramatically changed the sub-national landscape in Mexico: the demands of electoral 
pluralism not only compels parties to decentralize candidate selection, it also encourages the 
rise of divergent institutional preferences.  Consequently, state institutions have taken on 
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greater importance as neither the party nor the governor can expect these bodies to blindly 
follow their lead.   
From a purely academic view, state institutions offer political researchers an 
opportunity to take advantage of the unique circumstances surrounding sub-national politics, 
i.e., the lack of institutional variation.  Without having to account for fundamental differences 
in the basic form of government, researchers can better isolate the impact of socioeconomic 
variation on political behavior and vice versa.   Moreover, sub-national research on states may 
prove informative for other areas of study such as political careers in Latin America.  Current 
research finds a strong trend in which federal politicians begin and end their careers in local 
government.  Consequently, any analysis of Mexican political ambition must also include a 
discussion of the local offices these politicians once occupied, highlighting how sub-national 
experience can influence federal behavior.  Finally, from a normative perspective, research on 
Mexican state institutions can provide a public service by improving what everyday citizens 
know about an increasingly pro-active local government.  In this way, citizens can make better 
voting decisions and hold their public officials accountable. 
2.2.1 Decentralization 
The defining characteristic of PRI rule was the monopoly it had over the distribution of 
elected office.  Absent a viable opposition – which the PAN was not – the PRI offered the only 
viable path to a political career.  Locally, this meant a PRI candidacy virtually guaranteed 
nominees victory, giving tremendous leverage to the highest ranking member of the state party 
organization, the governor.  Executives not only controlled bureaucratic and judicial 
appointments, but as the state party’s de facto leader, they also commanded a near-absolute 
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veto over local legislative candidacies, shrewdly using it to build coalitions of support, reward 
loyalty, and punish dissent (Hernández-Rodríguez 2003: 104). 
Because a governor faced few obstacles ‘appointing’ her hand-picked candidates, she 
rarely selected individuals on the basis of electability or competence.  Instead, she was free to 
stack the PRI slate full with loyal and politically expedient nominees irrespective of their 
broader electoral appeal (Langston 2003).29  By selecting legislative candidates whose careers 
depended exclusively on PRI patronage, a governor guaranteed her proposals smooth passage.  
However, this reliance on party insiders changed considerably with the rise of competitive 
elections as candidates and voters alike found themselves with a much larger set of choices. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 clearly show the PRI suffered a rapid decline in local legislative 
influence, translating into significant representation for opposition groups.  Under these 
competitive conditions, it naturally became difficult for any one party to enjoy long-term 
success unless they responded to voter interests.  Consequently, the PRI could no longer 
guarantee loyal members office and was driven to select candidates capable of rallying the all-
important vote.30  
Both the PRI and the country’s two main opposition parties, the PAN and PRD, have 
adopted numerous measures – direct party primaries, town hall meetings, polling data, and 
expanded memberships – to identify the most politically viable candidates.  Note, while these 
measures are commonplace in Western democracies throughout the world, they have only just 
taken root in Mexico.  They lack an established tradition and are frequently changed to 
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 Interview: Tecuapacho Rodriguez (Tlaxcala), “Cualquier cuate sirvió”, translated as “Any guy would do.” 
30
 The mixed-member system is designed so that any vote for a district deputy is also a vote for her party’s list 
deputies, an arrangement which drives parties to select candidates who are not only electable but can alos win by 
large margins. 
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accommodate shifts in electoral support (Solano Ramirez 2007; Shirk 2005; Langston 2003).  In 
fact, party leaders are often known to revert back to their old habit of unilateral action in which 
they dictate at least a portion of a party’s slate of candidates.  The difference now, however, is 
that leaders use their influence to place the most electable candidates on the ballot rather than 
the most loyal.  Moreover, these candidates tend to already enjoy substantial local support and 
are not as reliant on party cronyism.  That is, legislative candidates today are not just defined by 
their party affiliation, but are also civic leaders, businessmen, and former municipal presidents 
who, independent of the party, enjoy both popular support and privileged access to resources.  
Under particularly competitive conditions, candidates use this influence to extract benefits, 
future promotion, and status from the party in exchange for the votes they can rally.  Party 
leaders then simply facilitate the nomination of these chosen candidates so as to better 
prepare for the general election. 
A particularly telling example of this new-style imposition is the case of Gabriel 
Gutiérrez Albarrán, currently a deputy in the Morelos state legislature.  A local political hero, 
Gutiérrez rose to prominence working with rural groups in his hometown of Jaloxtoc.  During 
the 1997 local elections, he campaigned under the PRI banner and won handily despite an 
overwhelming PAN victory.  In fact, Gutiérrez – with the support of rural voters – outperformed 
all of his fellow co-partisans by winning the largest PRI plurality in the state (43.48%).  His local 
support continued to be so strong in the years after that current Morelos governor, Marco 
Antonio Adame Castillo, personally offered him the PAN’s nomination for the 15th district in 
2006 despite his previous affiliations with the PRI.  What mattered for the PAN in this hotly 
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contested state were the votes Gutiérrez could win for the party:31 Adame and the rest of the 
party leadership realized the conservative PAN could not win the 15th district (largely rural and 
populist) without a candidate who enjoyed as much widespread popularity as Gutiérrez did.  In 
fact, the deputy proudly claimed he was so popular in the state that he once drew a larger 
crowd than the PAN presidential candidate when both were campaigning the same weekend in 
Morelos.32  And while the PAN nomination process is rather decentralized – district candidates 
are elected via party conventions in their respective districts ( PAN 2002: Articles 65 and 84) – 
there was an implicit understanding among the party elite that none would publicly oppose 
Gutierrez’s nomination; if any did, they would have to contend with a powerful Governor 
Adame.33  As a ‘reward’ for the votes Gutiérrez won for the PAN, he has since been allowed to 
pursue a political agenda relatively free of PAN Interference.34 
 This example is one of many scattered throughout the federation whereby individual 
legislators – who, as candidates, are now well-positioned to rally new supporters – enjoy 
substantial leverage over vote-hungry parties.  However, one should resist concluding that 
deputies enjoy the same level of autonomy as legislators in other Western-style legislatures like 
the United States Congress; reelection constraints in Mexico still exist and continue to 
empower the party at the expense of individual deputies.  Given this, the relatively high level of 
party unity reported in Table 2.135 seems to indicate strong party control.  Yet, at the same 
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 Morelos is one of the country’s smallest states (population, 1,612,899); however, because of its proximity to 
Mexico City as well as its importance in terms of agriculture and tourism (it is a popular weekend destination for 
those in the Federal District), the state is at the very least of symbolical importance.   
32
 Interview: Gutiérrez Albarrán (Morelos); Alemán Olvera (Morelos). 
33
 Interview: Alemán Olvera (Morelos). 
34
 Interview: Espinoza Bravo (Morelos). 
35
 Using plenary roll call votes, Rice (1928) measures party cohesion as 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time, one should also refrain from characterizing deputies as simple party hacks.  In Baja 
California, for example, cohesion is considerably lower than anywhere else in the sample; more 
generally, 28 state parties exhibit cohesion scores below 0.960, reaching a low of 0.661 
(Guanajuato PRD). 
 
State Legislature PRI PAN PRD36 
Baja California (XVII: 2001 – 2004) 37 0.791 0.768 
Baja California (XVIII: 2004 – 2007) 0.861 0.897 
Campeche (LVIII: 2003 – 2006) 0.991 0.830 
Guanajuato (LIX: 2003 – 2006) 0.819 0.844 0.661 
Estado de México (LV: 2003 – 2006) 1.000 0.999 0.929 
Morelos (XLIX: 2003 – 2006) 0.928 0.896 0.945 
Puebla (LVI: 2004 – 2007) 0.990 0.856 
Veracruz (LX: 2004 – 2007)  0.958 0.905 0.910 
Zacatecas (LVII: 2001 – 2004) 0.963 0.956 0.943 
Zacatecas (LVIII: 2004 – 2007)  0.926 0.833 0.944 
 
TABLE 2.1.  Rice Party Cohesion Scores for Ten Mexican State Legislative Periods, 2001 – 2008.  
The level of party cohesion in Mexican state legislatures is relatively high, just as it is in the 
Federal Chamber of Deputies (Weldon 2005; Heller and Weldon 2001).  However, this should not 
suggest a complete lack of autonomy on the part of the local deputies; conversely, one should 
not argue that legislators are wholly independent either.  As Mexico’s democratic transition is 
considered incomplete, we should expect parties to still wield significant influence over their 
deputies; because of political competition and the personal support legislators already enjoy, 
this influence should also be somewhat muted.  Source: Chapter 4. 
 
 
Interview subjects also maintain that deputies exert significant power within the 
organization, using their influence as high-ranking party members, business leaders, civic 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
for i party in j legislative session, where values range between 1 (indicating perfect voting unity) and 0 (co-
partisans never vote with each other).  Because abstentions frequently occur in Mexico – mostly to signal dissent 
(see Chapter 4) – I code abstentions as ‘nays’ when calculating the Rice scores.  With respect to the actual sample 
of roll call votes used to calculate these scores, please see Chapter 4 where I explain why I use this particular set of 
assemblies. 
36
 Rice scores could not be meaningfully calculated for the PRD in several of the states because they control less 
than 3 legislative seats: if there are 2 PRD deputies, then the only possible values are 1.000 or .500. 
37
 Each three-year legislative period is denoted by Roman numerals. 
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organizers, etc., to realize their preferred outcomes.  But because of a premium on consensus 
(more on this shortly), legislators exert their influence indirectly so as to preserve the illusion of 
unanimity; as a result, cohesion scores may not necessarily reflect the true level of legislative 
autonomy from the party.  Nevertheless, irrespective of what this true level is, most agree that 
Mexico’s democratic transition is incomplete and, consequently, any conclusions should be 
considered tentative.  What is important here is that political competition can have 
consequences for individual legislators and their relationship with the party.  How this 
relationship will evolve as competition persists is debatable, but early indications suggest local 
deputies are indeed growing more independent despite any constraints term limits impose. 
2.2.2 Divergent Preferences 
Aside from greater individual autonomy, the rise in pluralism has also encouraged 
legislatures as a whole to fortify their institutional position.  Under one-party rule, Cortina 
(2004) argues that state legislative preferences were essentially the same as the governor’s.38  
However, as elections have grown more competitive, parties are finding it increasingly difficult 
to win both a legislative majority and the governorship on their own.  Combine this potential 
for divided government with the growing autonomy of individual legislators, there is a very real 
possibility that the executive and the legislature will have divergent preferences today and in 
the future.  Cortina (2004: 5) claims legislators will anticipate this and will seek to reinforce 
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 Preferences were the same either because of self-selection or because governors were strong enough to stack 
the party slate full with supporters. 
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their institutional position “in order to …compete ‘on an even footing with the executive as 
policy making actors’” (as quoted in Carey 2003: 13).39 
Because of Mexico’s highly centralized system of government, state executives have 
long-enjoyed a considerable political advantage over the local assembly despite their weak 
institutional position.  Governors used their party veto to select the most preferred/convenient 
legislative candidates, ensuring passage of their executive proposals.  In this environment there 
was little incentive for legislators to independently draft their own proposals, especially when it 
came to major policy.  The executive would shoulder most of that responsibility and leave 
legislatures with the simple chore of approving its proposals.  This ultimately led to a situation 
where legislatures became severely under-resourced, lacking much of the infrastructure they 
need to challenge executive policy.  However, as political competition has grown – and 
governors find it difficult to place all of their candidates in office – legislatures are filling up with 
individuals who owe the executive nothing and are intent on pursuing a significantly different 
set of policies. 
Solt (2004) finds the Michoacán state legislature to be a prime example of such 
reinforcement.  Following the 2001 elections, the PRI lost its legislative majority while it still 
retained control over the governorship.  Consequently, opposition parties were in a position to 
make significant changes that would give them a greater voice and allow the legislature to 
counter executive excesses in the future.  Decision-making bodies – like governing committees 
responsible for the agenda – were decentralized to limit gubernatorial control; oversight was 
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 Cortina (2004) only explicitly considers the case of minority government where no single party controls a 
legislative majority.  However, intuition and anecdotal evidence suggests that just the expectation of divergent 
preferences in the future might be enough to prompt a legislative response. 
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no longer entrusted to a single party, i.e., the governor’s party; and administrative budgets 
were enlarged to overhaul antiquated infrastructure and hire skilled personnel.40   
A different and more recent example is the LVIII Legislature (2007 – 2010) in Jalisco 
where a major schism occurred within the ruling PAN.  The conflict was ostensibly between the 
incumbent governor and his predecessor, Emilio González Marquéz and Francisco Ramírez 
Acuña, respectively.  Although belonging to the same party, the former is affiliated with the 
ultra-conservative wing while the latter is allied with the more pragmatic group currently in 
power (Milenio 2008; Ferrer 2008).  A product of political competition within the party, this 
ideological division has created highly divergent preferences within the government as 
pragmatists in the legislature strongly oppose ultra-conservative policies (Quintero 2003). 41  
Specifically, Jorge Salinas –an ally of Ramírez Acuña and current PAN coordinator – successfully 
blocked every one of the governor’s proposals during the first half of the legislative trieno. 
(Templo Mayor 2007).  Although the two sides have since came to an accord, this episode 
revealed the extent of legislative power while exposing how weak the executive really is.  Note 
in Table 2.2 that Jalisco legislature spent an average of MX$372 million between 2004 and 2006 
on its yearly budget, a figure which includes all monies spent on committee resources, 
administrative personnel, and consultants.  However after 2006, when the confrontation within 
the PAN began to boil over, the legislature spent an average of MX$632 million, almost twice 
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 On the other side of this relationship, Ward and Rodríguez (1999: 690) argue that governors have also 
demonstrated a greater willingness to “let go”, allowing for a more proactive legislature. 
41
 The ultra-conservatives are motivated by Catholic orthodoxy whereas the neo-panistas – such as Ramírez Acuña 
and the president, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa – take a far less ideological stance, preferring to promote free market 
development over the Church’s social doctrine (Uribe 2008).  While this alliance was critical to the PAN’s electoral 
ascent in the 1980s, political competition within the party quickly stiffened as the differences between the two 
groups became increasingly apparent (Shirk 2005).  That is, after so many years of straw candidacies, running for 
office was no longer a symbolic act reserved for the “last man in the room.” Interview: Hernández (San Luis 
Potosí).  With a chance to win, candidacies became exponentially more valuable to conservatives and pragmatics 
alike, inevitably leading to major internal schisms from the federal level on down the municipality. 
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the amount allocated during the previous three years.  The year-on-year changes also reflect a 
marked shift in spending as there was nearly a 27% increase in the 2007 budget (as opposed to 
the ≈ 18% increases before that).  While it is difficult to infer from these aggregate figures a 
willingness to increase legislative autonomy, the pattern does seem to correspond with a 
divergent preferences argument (Cortina 2004). 
 
Year MX$ (2004 values) % Change (Year-on-Year) 
2004 312482573.12 - 
2005 368143083.51 17.81 
2006 436371047.49 18.53 
2007 553070380.11 26.74 
2008 710764960.74 28.51 
 
TABLE 2.2.  Yearly Budgets for the Jalisco State Legislature, 2004 – 2008.  What is particularly 
noteworthy about these figures is the marked rise in funds after 2006 when inter-party conflict 
between the PAN governor and the PAN legislature reached an all-time high.  Although the 
table does not disaggregate the budgets to identify which specific areas received more funding, 
the general pattern does seem to support a divergent preferences argument.  Source: Jalisco 
State Legislature – Department of Transparency 
(http://www.congresojal.gob.mx/transparencia/). 
 
 
Beer (2003) extends beyond these single cases and presents evidence linking electoral 
pluralism and local legislative autonomy across all 31 states, the first large-scale analysis of its 
kind.  Using a combination of case study evidence, survey data, and statistical modeling, Beer 
(2003) finds deputies consider themselves free of gubernatorial influence (58 – 50), they 
produce far more legislation than was the case under one-party rule (83 – 88), and have more 
resources  with which to counter executive proposals (79 – 83).  Although Beer (2003) primarily 
uses aggregate-level data – and thus can say little about the autonomy of individual legislators 
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– the quantifiable evidence supports the notion that Mexican state legislatures as are gradually 
emerging as stand-alone policy makers (89 – 92). 
2.2.3 Natural Laboratory 
 From a policy perspective, political competition is increasing the relevance of state 
assemblies: with a more active hand in actually producing the legislation it approves, this once-
dormant branch of government has seen its profile grow, receiving greater attention from 
fellow politicians, citizens, and the media (Lujambio 2004).  Yet the impact of political 
competition on local legislative autonomy also creates a situation benefiting academic efforts.  
According to Article 116 in the CPEUM, the institutional environment at the state-level is 
relatively fixed across all 31 states, excluding the Federal District.42   In this way, researchers can 
effectively disregard the effect of a state’s governing bodies (i.e., the three branches) and 
instead concentrate on the relationship between socioeconomic variation and political 
behavior.  This is in stark contrast to the wide institutional variation at play in the United States 
where state governments differ in terms of legislative chambers, reelection constraints, and 
district size (Squire and Hamm 2005: 66). 
As an example, consider public infrastructure in Mexico’s northern border states:  with 
trade restrictions becoming ever-more relaxed between the United States and Mexico, the 
consequent rise in international traffic requires a modern system of highways, bridges, and 
ports.  Taking advantage of their relative homogeneity, one can easily explore partisan 
differences in the public financing of trade-related infrastructure in the north.  That is, these 
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 The Federal District only recently gained constitutional recognition as an autonomous federal entity, which now 
allows its denizens to directly elect their mayor and legislative assembly.  However, given its unique situation – it is 
the largest city of the world, home to the federal government, and is not governed by the same separation-of-
powers arrangement as the other 31 states – I exclude the Federal District from any general discussion of Mexican 
state legislatures.  For a more detailed discussion on its unique situation, please see Davis (2002). 
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states  are very similar historically, culturally, and economically, but they differ greatly in terms 
of electoral support: Baja California (PAN), Sonora (PAN-PRI), Chihuahua (PRI), Coahuila (PRI), 
Nuevo León (PAN-PRI), and Tamaulipas (PRI).  In this way, one could directly compare how each 
party approaches the need for modern infrastructure without confounding variables like 
culture or regime type distorting the relationship. 
This should not suggest, however, that the idea of Mexico-as-‘natural laboratory’ is 
either novel or exclusive to the study of state government (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Arzaluz 
Solano 2005; Balkin 2004).  And yet what is new is the idea of improved transparency: 
institutions can either be fixed or highly variable across states – but without the necessary 
information, the ‘most-similar’ approach suggested here provides little analytical value. 
This lack of information was certainly one of the main reasons why so few have invested 
significant effort on studying Mexican state government.  That is, local assemblies have 
rightfully been characterized as opaque institutions, providing the public with few resources to 
monitor legislative activity.  Under one-party rule, this was particularly true because of the low 
demand for legislative information; consequently, deputies saw little political value in 
improving transparency and largely ignored it for most of the 20th century.  Yet as electoral 
pluralism has re-energized Mexican political life, democratic proponents are successfully 
lobbying for greater access to information across all government institutions.43 
Each state legislature is legally obligated to provide some level of transparency.44  The 
extent of this transparency, however, varies considerably and is not wholly contingent on the 
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 Interview: Pérez Campos (Chihuahua); Villarreal Martínez (Estado de México); Belmonte (Michoacán) 
44
 As of May 1, 2009, every state legislature – except for the assembly in Guerrero – maintains a website where the 
government’s transparency law is clearly posted. 
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level of development.  For example, despite the state’s advanced economy (Table A.6), the 
Nuevo León legislature only recently installed an electronic system in late 2007 to record roll 
call votes; in contrast, Michoacán, one of Mexico’s poorer states, has had a system in place 
since 2001.45  And of course there are the less developed states, like Chiapas, which do not 
publish anything more than paragraph-length summaries of legislative proceedings.  Moreover, 
of the state legislatures that do record information like roll call votes, only some make it 
available after submitting to lengthy and, at times, arbitrary approval processes (e.g., Morelos, 
Sinaloa, Hidalgo, and Yucatán); that is, assuming they even read the request (e.g., Sonora and 
Baja California Sur). 
 Nevertheless, given the number of states, these obstacles are not as insurmountable as 
one would expect.  For example, Baja California (PAN), Campeche (PRI), Guanajuato (PAN), the 
Estado de México (PRI-PAN-PRD), Puebla (PRI), and Zacatecas (PRD) all upload detailed 
information on roll call votes, budgets, and public debates directly onto their websites; in fact, 
some of this information is available as far back as twenty years (Guanajuato and Estado de 
México).  So with an ever-growing number of states digitalizing records, easing solicitation 
requirements, and hiring better-trained personnel, researchers now have at their disposal a 
much wider range of previously unusable information.46 
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 San Luis Potosí – one of Mexico’s most important manufacturing hubs – is similar to Nuevo León, having only just 
installed its roll-call recorders in 2006/2007.  However, the legislature has also made other advances beyond a new 
roll call system.  Under the stewardship of Juan Pablo Colunga López – current Secretary of Parliamentary Services 
– the legislature has made a concerted effort to upload all relevant documents from plenary and committee 
sessions onto the assembly’s website.  However, when asked why, Colunga was not entirely specific: although 
hinting at concepts like ‘democratization/citizenization’, he appeared to value the efficiency of accurate record-
keeping more.  Interview: Colunga López (San Luis Potosí). 
46
 In addition to the effect political competition has on transparency, it also encourages greater access to the 
legislators themselves.  Many of the incumbents interviewed for this research project stress the growing 
importance of constituent work.  For example, Patricia del Socorro Gamboa Wong – current PAN caucus leader in 
the Yucatán legislature – believes that most of her time is spent attending to a whole host of constituent requests, 
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2.2.4 Political Recruitment 
 Mexican state legislatures are not only policy-relevant actors and reliable sources of 
information, but they are also an opportunity to better understand career choices within the 
country’s unique political system.  Following Schlesinger’s (1991) ground-breaking research on 
political ambition in the United States, scholars have developed a promising literature on 
‘professional politicians’ in Latin America.  With a particular focus on federal systems, this 
literature tracks career movements across multiple levels of government (e.g., Argentina: Jones, 
Saiegh, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002; Brazil: Samuels 2003; Mexico: Langston and Aparicio 2008).  
Interestingly enough, these analyses – despite the different approaches – all arrive at the same 
conclusion: federal legislators tend to begin and end their political careers in local office.  
 With respect to Mexico, the evidence is clear for federal deputies: between 1997 and 
2003, as many as 30% of all deputies had previous local legislative experience (Valencia 
Escamilla 2006: Table 7);47 moreover, Langston and Aparicio (2008: Table 1) report that fully 
72% of deputies during this time period went on to pursue some sort of sub-national office 
immediately after their federal term.48  While federal deputies may not necessarily return to 
the state assembly – only 5% of all local legislators have experience in the federal Congress 
(Lujambio 2004: Table 6) – the fact of the matter is that local legislative experience is important 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
e.g., helping with grocery bills, facilitating access to medical care, addressing grievances, etc.  A fortunate side 
effect of this improved access is that legislators view academic research as just another opportunity to conduct 
constituent service, further improving data availability.  Interview: Gamboa Wong (Yucatán). 
47
 Valencia Escamilla (2006: Table 8) also finds a comparable percentage of deputies – approximately 30% – served 
as municipal presidents as well. 
48
 This total percentage includes deputies who occupied sub-national positions within the party, bureaucracy, and 
as elected officials.  With respect to elected office, nearly 30% of all deputies pursued this particular career choice. 
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for the political recruitment of national-level officials.49  Combine this with the growing 
relevance of the federal legislature,50 a better understanding of local level politics will prove 
instrumental in deciphering how career choices influence legislative policy at the national level 
(Nacif 2005; Casillas 2000).  For example, what kind of local experience has the greatest effect 
on committee assignment; are Mexican legislators similar to their South American counterparts 
who vote in support of state bosses; and to what extent does legislative pork benefit local 
constituencies?  These and other questions cannot be answered without learning more about 
professionalism in state assemblies, the deputy-party relationship, and candidate selection. 
2.2.5 Value of Representation 
 The final reason why Mexican state legislatures deserve greater study is that it would 
help improve representation by providing citizens with a better idea of their political 
environment.  In Mexico, few know who their local deputies are; even fewer know what a 
deputy actually does (Ramirez 2008; Cuenca 2007; El Siglo de Torreón 2005).  And while I do not 
wish to overstate the importance state legislatures have to everyday citizens, this lack of 
familiarity constitutes a significant democratic deficit given how much authority legislatures 
have over the distribution of federal funds (Jiménez Badillo 2006).   
That is, both the federal Constitution (Articles 115 § IV.c, 116 § II) and the current fiscal 
regime (Courchene and Diaz Cayeros 2000) explicitly endow state legislatures with the power to 
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 In fact, this experience may be necessary because (1) the PRI requires its pre-candidates to have served as an 
elected representative, and (2) the PAN’s early successes were at the local level, suggesting the party’s has a 
natural inclination towards candidates with sub-national experience (Valencia Escamilla 2006: 74; Shirk 2005). 
50
 Just as political competition has helped bring local legislatures out from the shadows, so too has it helped raise 
the profile of the federal Congress.  That is, because no party controls a legislative majority, Weldon’s conditions 
for presidentialism no longer hold; consequently, the president must negotiate with the legislature to realize his 
agenda (as opposed to simply dictating policy).  Recent reforms to electoral and petroleum laws (2007 and 2008, 
respectively) – delayed by exhaustive debate and repeated amendment – clearly illustrate the limits of presidential 
power in contemporary Mexico as well as the newfound influence of an emerging Congress.  
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(1) distribute federal funds to state/municipal government, and (2) conduct oversight  to ensure 
these funds are used appropriately.  If political competition continues to increase the relevance 
of local legislatures, it becomes critical that everyday people understand who their 
representatives are and how their assemblies distribute state funds.  Otherwise, citizens will 
continue on discontent with this distribution and yet be unable to hold their representatives 
accountable.  This analysis, and others like it, will hopefully minimize any democratic deficit by 
informing citizens of the role local legislatures play today – as opposed to the role they played 
during one-party rule, a time when state legislatures had no true influence on policy making. 
 
2.3 Legislative Life in Mexican States 
 Having explored the reasons why Mexican state government in general – and state 
legislatures in particular – merit greater attention from policy-makers and researchers alike, the 
rest of this chapter will provide an in-depth look into legislative life at the state level.  A 
relatively undeveloped literature, the study of Mexican state legislatures has only recently 
found itself the focus of serious academic interest.  Research by Beer (2003), the edited 
volumes El Poder Legislativo Estatal en México: Ánalisis y Diagnóstico (Balkin 2004) and 
Gobiernos Divididos en la Federación Mexicana (Lujambio Irazábal 1997), and the Salamanca 
Project on Legislative Elites (Hernández Norzagaray and Vivero Ávila 2005)  all provide excellent 
analyses on professionalism, historical development, and elite preferences in Mexican state 
legislatures.  And yet, this limited amount of research also constitutes the bulk of what we 
know about these emerging assemblies.  Moreover, these studies generally lack a detailed 
understanding of the relationships between institutions governing the legislative process.   
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Although Balkin (2004) and Beer (2003) certainly provide a tremendous amount of 
information about the internal organization of state legislatures, they are both lacking in critical 
areas.  On the one hand, Balkin (2004) presents a rather detailed treatment of internal rules, 
chamber composition, and deputy demographics; however, the observations and conclusions 
are not guided by a generalizable theory of legislative behavior.  Absent that, it is difficult – if 
not impossible – to either compare these institutions across time/space or predict a given 
outcome with any degree of certainty.  On the other hand, Beer (2003) adroitly adapts 
established theory to the Mexican case, linking electoral pluralism with legislative autonomy; 
and yet the analysis glosses over many of the parliamentary institutions that are critical to 
exercising this autonomy.   
 In this and the chapters to follow, I address the main weaknesses of the extant literature 
by combining detailed information about an assembly’s internal rules with established 
theoretical models of legislative organization to generate causal explanations of committee 
composition and plenary approval in Mexico.  With respect to this particular chapter, I provide 
the background necessary to derive my theory-driven hypotheses of legislative institutions.  
This, in and of itself, is a contribution to the study of Mexican politics in that no known study 
has yet tackled the (1) the party-deputy relationship, (2) the structure and consequences of 
centralized committee systems, and (3) the premiums on consensus compelling deputies to 
disguise most, if not all, public manifestations of internal dissent.  Moreover, I supplement this 
discussion on the procedural rules with an array of elite-level interview responses so that this 
exercise is not simply an academic venture removed from real world contexts, but is in fact a 
true-to-life discussion of what actually occurs in these democratizing assemblies. 
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2.3.1 Strong Parties51 
 The first feature of legislative life in Mexican state legislatures is the prevalence of 
strong-party politics, an artifact of the country’s century-long experience with one-party 
government.  Owing in large part to the constitutional restrictions on consecutive reelection, 
parties command tremendous influence over their members.  This dominance is enhanced even 
further by current prohibitions on independent candidacies.  According to both federal and 
state electoral laws, only officially registered political parties can nominate candidates for 
elected office.52  Moreover, Mexico provides – for better or worse – a tremendous amount of 
public funding for its parties to support their organizations and run their campaigns (Poiré 
2006; Poiré 2005; Orozco Henríquez 2004). 53, 54  And because parties – not candidates – are 
considered “public interest entities”, only they are entitled to public monies (CPEUM: Article 41 
§ I).55  Consequently candidates not only find it nearly impossible to make it onto the electoral 
registry without partisan support, but if they do, they tend to be denied the funds needed to 
run a competitive campaign.56   So while the recent democratic opening has certainly strained 
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 Before proceeding any further, it is worth nothing that I cite statutes governing eight different state legislatures: 
Baja California, Campeche, Guanajuato, Estado de México, Morelos, Puebla, Veracruz, and Zacatecas.  While 
constituting only 25% of the total states, I argue in Chapter 4 that this is a rather representative sample 
encompassing a variety of partisan arrangements.  And as it will become evident throughout this discussion, there 
is relatively little in the way of institutional variation; so, whatever holds for these particular legislatures should 
also hold for the others as well. 
52
 Baja California Electoral Law (BEL): Article 65 § IV; Campeche Electoral Law (CEL): Article 70 § IV; Guanajuato 
Electoral Law (GEL): Article 26 § IV; Estado de México Electoral Law (EMEL): Article 67; Morelos Electoral Law 
(MEL): Article 42 § III; Puebla Electoral Law (PEL): Article 42 § V;  Veracruz Electoral Law (VEL): Article 41 § IV; 
Zacatecas Electoral law (ZEL): Article 38-A § IV; Federal Electoral Law: Article 36. 
53
 At the federal level, public financing has grown exponentially: during the 1991 elections, the government spent 
MX$752,970,000 (≈ US$75 million) on political parties; for the 2006 contest, this figure rose to more than 
MX$4,300,000,000 (≈ US$430 million).  Source: Instituto Federal Electoral. 
54
 BEL: Article 68 – 73; CEL: Articles 83 – 84; GEL: Article 40 § II; EMEL: Articles 57 – 58; MEL: Articles 49, 53, 54; 
PEL: Articles 46 – 47; VEL: Articles 51, 53; ZEL: Article 43 § I. 
55
 Private contributions are generally prohibited from exceeding a percentage of the total public fund received. 
56
 Although prohibitively difficult, independent candidacies are not unheard of in Mexico.  Given the complex 
statutes governing electoral coalitions, candidates may sometimes run for office without an explicit party 
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party discipline as candidates enjoy greater personal support, the mechanisms of party rule 
continue to preserve the leverage party leaders have over elected officials. 
 With respect to state legislatures, party influence manifests itself within the design of 
key internal offices.  First, there is the parliamentary coordinator who is the legal 
representative of the party’s legislative delegation.  At the beginning of the term, each 
delegation can form an official parliamentary group.57  In the process, the group elects a 
coordinator who articulates the group’s position and will represent it on a number of legislative 
bodies.58  However, the coordinators are not always elected solely by their colleagues in the 
assembly.  According to the various state organic laws outlining internal legislative governance, 
the rules for selecting a parliamentary coordinator are set by the party.59  In fact, more often 
than not, the state party leader (outside of the assembly) appoints the coordinator directly.60  
In doing so, the party organization inserts itself right into the legislative process as it is usually a 
‘company man/woman’ who heads the parliamentary group. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
nomination.  Interviews: Jiménez (Estado de México); Villarreal Martínez (Estado de México); Alarcón Hernández 
(Puebla). 
57
 Baja California Organic Law (BOL): Article 27; Campeche Organic Law (COL): Article 48; Guanajuato (GOL): Article 
107, 109; Estado de México Organic Law (EMOL): Article 67 BIS; Morelos Organic Law (MOL): Article 27; Puebla 
Organic Law (POL): Article 49; Veracruz Organic Law (VOL): Article 27; Zacatecas Organic Law (ZOL): Article 37.  
Note, only one parliamentary group per party is allowed. 
58
 BOL: Article 31; COL: Article 52; GOL: Article 112; EMOL: Article 67 BIS-4; MOL: Article 29; POL: Article 52; VOL: 
Article 27; ZOL: Article 108. 
59
 BOL: Article 30; COL: Article 51; GOL: Article 111; EMOL: Article 67 BIS-2; MOL: not mentioned; POL: Article 51; 
VOL: not mentioned; ZOL: Article 40. 
60
 Gerardo de los Cobos Silva, current PAN coordinator in Guanajuato and former federal deputy, noted how the 
CEN was expressly responsible for appointing its parliamentary coordinator in the Chamber of Deputies.  And while 
there is always substantial negotiation over the post, the decision was ultimately the CEN’s to make.  Moreover, 
with a wry smile, de los Cobos asserted that a similar dynamic also governs the selection of the PAN coordinator in 
Guanajuato.  Jose Porfirio Alarcón Hernández, former state (Puebla) and federal deputy for the PRI, echoes this 
sentiment: “[coordinators] belong to the [party] president.” Interviews: de los Cobos Silva (Guanajuato); Alarcón 
Hernández (Puebla), Spanish translation, “pertenecen a la dirigencia.” 
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A prototypical case of such strong party control is Puebla, a state long-considered a PRI 
enclave where the old rules of one-party government still apply.61  For example, at the start of 
the current LVII Legislature (2008 – 2011), PRI and PAN coordinators negotiated the initial 
distribution of committee assignments and other appointments.  Over the course of the 
negotiations, the two coordinators agreed to certain changes in the rotation of assignments 
that would allow the opposition to directly respond to the upcoming Executive Address (Pineda 
2008).  Citing his ‘inexperience’, the PRI leadership – and, by extension, Governor Mario Marín 
Torres – immediately vetoed this agreement because it wanted to limit the party’s exposure to 
opposition criticism.  Although the PRI coordinator, José Bailleres Carriles, was not punished, he 
was still publicly chastised and compelled to admit his ‘mistake’.  Whether this was in fact a 
miscalculation – or, as some suggest, a play at asserting some independence from the PRI 
leadership – the party organization clearly sent a message: it would brook no defection from 
the official party line, especially not from its coordinator; and, more importantly, it signaled to 
this new legislative delegation that it had the means to effectively enforce this position.62   
 Within the parliamentary group, the coordinator formally enjoys broad, unrestricted 
authority over the group’s membership, its distribution of offices, and its public platform.  In 
most respects, they are the ‘face’ of the legislative party.  However, their importance to the 
party stems more from their membership on a key decision-making body than on ambiguously-
worded powers.  And while this governing body is known by a number of different names, it 
                                                                 
61
 The party has never lost the governorship or its legislative majority and maintains a highly disciplined 
parliamentary group (López Rubí 2007).  Satisfying the conditions for hyper-presidentialism (Weldon 1997), Puebla 
is a prime example of a highly centralized one-party environment. 
62
 Interviews: Mercada Villagra, Micalco Méndez, Popcatl Gutiérrez, Alarcón Hernández (all from Puebla) 
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invariably serves the same purpose of approving legislative assignments, providing 
administrative direction, and coordinating daily calendars. 
 Before proceeding further, there is an important caveat to address: although the 
governing committees in all 31 state legislatures essentially perform equivalent functions, their 
compositions are not the same.  That is, governing committees can be classified as belonging to 
one of two groups, a Gran Comisión or a Junta.  The Gran Comisión model – like the one 
employed by the Campeche and Puebla legislatures – is an artifact of PRI hegemony in which 
the majority party controls a supermajority of the committee assignments regardless of its 
overall seat share.  The Gran Comisión in Campeche, for example, currently consists of five 
seats, of which the majority party is automatically given three: in addition to the presidency, 
the majority party is awarded an additional seat for each opposition party represented on the 
committee.63  In Puebla, the committee consists of eight members, with majority-party 
deputies filling five of those spots and the remainder divided between as many as five 
opposition parties.64  Moreover, only the coordinators of the three largest parties can vote on 
committee decisions, further solidifying the majority party’s grip. 
 This differs from the Junta model – found in Baja California, Guanajuato, Estado de 
México, Morelos, Veracruz, and Zacatecas – in that it explicitly addresses the issue of 
proportionality ignored by the Gran Comisión model while preserving the primacy of party rule.  
First, only coordinators serve on the Junta.65  Second, unlike the Gran Comisión where each 
vote is weighted the same, the Junta weights each coordinator’s vote according to the relative 
                                                                 
63
 COL: Article 22 §§ I – V. 
64
 POL: Article 40. 
65
 BOL: Article 59; GOL: Article 58; EMOL: Article 60; MOL:  Article 46; VOL: Article 31; ZOL: Article 108. 
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size of her parliamentary group.66  Although this preserves a majority party’s numerical 
advantage, it neither inflates this advantage nor deflates minority representation.  It is no 
surprise then that as local legislatures become increasingly pluralistic, there is a movement 
away from the Gran Comisión model towards the Junta (Beer 2003: 63; Molina Zepeda 2004).67 
 Arguably, the most important function these governing committees perform – whether 
it as a Gran Comisión or as a Junta – is the management of standing committee assignments.68  
Internal statutes require an initial round of committee review (more on this later): if 
committees are not constituted, legislative proposals cannot reach the floor and the entire 
policy-making process grinds to an abrupt halt.69  Moreover, because standing committees are 
relatively free to modify proposals any way they see fit before discharging their final versions to 
the floor, they are highly prized by the party leadership.  Coordinators therefore use their 
influence on the governing committee to strategically fill these offices with proxies, which 
allows parties to effectively control the flow and substance of legislative traffic without having 
to micromanage.70  Committees are also valuable because of the resources at their disposal, 
which deputies frequently use for their own personal benefit.71 
                                                                 
66
 GOL: Article 61; EMOL: Article 60; MOL: Article 45; VOL: Article 34; and ZOL: Article 111; note, Article 59 of BOL 
only stipulates that decisions be reached via consensus. 
67
 In the event that no legislative majority exists, the governing committee presidency rotates between the three 
largest parties; otherwise, this office tends to stay with the majority party for the duration of the term. 
68
COL: Article 24 § V; GOL: Article 59 § V; EMOL: Article 62 31 § I; MOL: Article 50 § II-d; POL: Article 41 § I; VOL: 
Article 33 § III; ZOL: Article 113 § X.  The Baja California legislature does not formally invest its governing 
committee with the power to assign committee members.  However, coordinators do possess this power and are 
the only ones permitted to serve on the governing committee (BOL: Articles 31 § I, 59). 
69
 The most famous example of this occurred after the 1997 midterm elections when no party controlled a 
legislative majority in the Chamber of Deputies.  The problem was that the rules outlining the composition of the 
Gran Comisión did not account for the possibility that a majority party might not exist; although shocking, this 
should not surprise anyone given 70 years of PRI hegemony.  It was only after lengthy inter-party negotiations that 
legislative deliberation resumed under the Junta model as we now know it. 
70
 Interviews: Chávez Ríos (Hidalgo); Domínguez Méndez (Tlaxcala); Medina Galindo (Michoacán); Duarte Ramírez 
(Michoacán); López Murillo (Zacatecas); Labastida Aguirre (San Luis Potosí); Posadas Hernández (Estado de 
México); Montes de la Vega (Guanajuato); Yáñez Herrera (Chihuahua); Castillo Ruiz (Yucatán); Micalco Méndez 
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 Additionally, governing committees are endowed with a number of administrative 
powers such as drafting the legislature’s internal budget, providing the plenary with technical 
support, and appointing administrative personnel.72  By deciding how legislative resources are 
distributed, governing committees can further manipulate the pace and quality of deliberation.  
For example, governing committees can grant (or deny) access to a wide range of resources 
standing committees need to study and discharge legislative proposals.  If the governing body 
chooses to restrict these resources, it can effectively bankrupt any number of committees and 
preserve the status quo by making deliberation too costly to perform.73 
 Governing committees also have a direct hand in shaping daily agendas, forming the 
core of the conference group charged with deciding when and how the plenary considers 
legislation.  Alongside the steering committee (Mesa Directiva) and other select members of 
the plenary, the governing committee uses these conferences to explicitly script the calendar, 
draft the terms of debate, and determine which proposals committees will review. 74, 75  
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
(Puebla); Alemán Olvera (Morelos).  Additionally there are no restrictions in any of the eight legislators prohibiting 
coordinators from serving as committee presidents. 
71
 Interview: Menchaca Salazar (Hidalgo). 
72
 BOL: Article 59 §§ III, IX; COL: Article 24 §§ III, VI; GOL: Article 59 §§ VI, XV, XVIII; EMOL: Article 62 §§ III, IV, IX, X; 
MOL: Article 50 § II-e, g; POL: Article 41 §§ III – V, VII; VOL: Article 33 § IV – V; ZOL: Article 113 §§ VI, XVII. 
73
 Interviews: Popocatl Gutiérrez (Puebla); Rodriguez Núñez (Chihuahua); Espinoza Bravo (Morelos). 
74
 The Mesa Directiva presides over daily legislative meetings.  Although technically the legislature’s legal 
representative when in session, the steering committee tends to function as little more than an additional set of 
party proxies.  Coordinators are either legally empowered to nominate/appoint the steering committee or they 
informally negotiate Mesa assignments prior to the session’s start (BOL: Article 42; COL: Articles 90, 13; EMOL: 
Article 67-BIS 4; POL: Articles 52, 25; Zacatecas Reglamento, ZRO: Article 34).  Interviews: Labastida Aguirre (San 
Luis Potosí); Medina Galindo (Michoacán); and Malo Lugo (Hidalgo).  Moreover, steering committees are not 
constituted for very long.  According to the Organic Laws, steering committees are elected as often as every 
month, preventing any one Mesa group from consolidating power (GOL: Article 46; POL: Article 42; ZOL: Article 
101).  In fact, it was quite extraordinary to attend legislative sessions and observe how strictly the Mesa adheres to 
the tightly scripted agendas set forth by the governing committee.  As Neil Pérez Campos – Secretary of 
Parliamentary Services of the Chihuahua legislature – said during one interview: “watch [the Mesa] and you’ll see 
it does just two simple things, albeit very well: read the calendar and announce the results.”  Interview: Pérez 
Campos (Chihuahua), Spanish translation, “fíjate que la Directiva se integra con expertos en dos cosas: leer el 
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Although these conferences do not shape policy directly like standing committees, they are 
institutionally empowered to decide when and how proposals are considered.  Figure 2.3 
provides a general outline of legislative agenda setters, highlighting the role parliamentary 
coordinators (i.e., parties) play. 
2.3.2 Centralized Committee System 
 Exercising unlimited proposal power within their jurisdictions, standing committees 
constitute the center cog driving the legislative process (Aparicio and Langston 2009; Nacif 
2005; Rivera Sánchez 2004).  Yet as powerful as they are, committees are not autonomous 
decision-makers like their counterparts in the U.S. Congress.  Instead, because of their highly 
centralized structure, standing committees are especially susceptible to partisan pressures: 
coordinators (and the party interests they represent) need only control the presidencies of 
‘prestige’ committees to effectively monopolize legislative production.  
 First, parties value standing committees because they are the assembly’s primary gate-
keepers.  When they are initially proposed, legislative bills must first pass through a round of 
committee review.76   And while committees lack the ability to block plenary consideration of  
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
orden del día y declarar los resultados de las votaciones.” Note, coordinators cannot serve as Mesa presidents in 
Morelos (MOL: Article 33) and Veracruz (VRO: Article 19). 
75
 BOL: Article 59 § I; COL: Article 24 § IX; GOL: Article 62; EMOL: Article 622 BIS; MOL: Article 42; POL: Article 41 § 
III; VOL: Articles 33 – 34; ZOL: Article 105 § VI. 
76
 Deputies, the governor, the state supreme court, municipalities, the electoral institute and citizens all have the 
right to submit legislative proposals in Baja California (BOL: Article 116); however, this right is not uniform across 
states.  In Campeche, citizens cannot initiate legislation but bureaucratic departments can (Constitution Article 46); 
Guanajuato and Morelos reserve these rights solely for the three main branches of government and municipalities 
(GOL: Article 146; Morelos Constitution Article 42).  Except for the electoral institute, the same actors who initiate 
legislation in Baja California also have that right in Estado de México and Puebla (Estado de México Constitution 
Article 51; POL: 69).  In Veracruz and Zacatecas, federal and state legislators, governors, the state supreme court, 
municipalities, bureaucratic departments, and citizens have this right (VOL: Article 48; ZOL: Article 46). 
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FIGURE 2.3.  Party Influence over State Legislative Offices in Mexico. Mexican state legislatures 
are highly centralized so their main governing bodies come under the direct influence of state 
party organizations.  The governor may be in a position to compel legislative support, but this 
depends on how closely aligned she is with dominant party interests. 
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their proposals,77 they nevertheless have the power to freely modify proposals any way they 
see fit during this round.  In fact, their first-mover advantage is so strong that committees are 
under no obligation to report anything even remotely similar to the version originally 
submitted.78  After the committee discharges its report, the plenary votes to approve the 
proposal in its entirety (en lo general).  If the report is approved, then it becomes eligible for 
amendment (en lo particular).  However, if the proposal is rejected en lo general, it is either 
discarded or sent back to committee.  Figure 2.4 outlines this legislative process. 
Nevertheless, despite their broad powers, committees are still subordinate to the 
governing committee in terms of political power.  As I have already mentioned, coordinators –
as members of the agenda conference – can directly determine the proposals committees 
consider and when they consider them.  Furthermore, coordinators are ostensibly free to 
reassign committee members any time they wish.79 
With respect to committee organization, their highly centralized structure allows 
coordinators to monopolize most key positions within each of these bodies.  That is, not all 
committee members are endowed with the same legal authority.  Like their counterparts in the 
federal Chamber of Deputies, standing committee presidents (i.e., chairpersons) are considered 
the most powerful members within their given jurisdiction and wield near-absolute control over 
                                                                 
77
 Once the agenda conference sends a given proposal to committee, the panel has a relatively short amount of 
time – ranging from 10 days (Veracruz Reglamento, VRO: Article 66) to four months (GOL: Article 76) – to discharge 
their version to the floor.  Additionally, legislators can circumvent committee consideration by requesting the 
plenary to consider a proposal as urgent and obvious.  If the request is approved by a 2/3 majority, it is 
immediately submitted for final plenary approval. 
78
 BOL: Article 118; COL: Article 69 §§ IV – V; GOL: Article 149; Estado de México Reglamento (EMRO): Articles 75, 
80; Morelos Reglamento (MRO): Article 103; Puebla Reglamento (PRO): Article 93 §§ VI – VII; VOL: Article 49; ZOL: 
Articles 44, 52. 
79
 BOL: Article 31 §§ I - II; COL: Article 24 § V: GOL: Articles 34 § V, 59 § XI; EMOL: Article 62 § I; MOL: Article 50 § II-
d; POL: Article 41 § VI; VOL: Article 33 § III; ZOL: Article 113 § XII.  
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group proceedings (Aparicio and Langston 2008).80  Only presidents can schedule meetings, 
distribute group resources, and establish the rules of debate.81  Committee members, on the 
other hand, enjoy very few institutional rights other than their vote.   
Similarly, not all committees enjoy the same level of importance: a select number of 
‘prestige’ committees – e.g., Tax/Appropriations and Constitutional Points – process the vast 
majority of legislative proposals; the remaining are usually left with few proposals, if any, to 
review (Córdova González 2004; Aparicio and Langston 2009).82  In Figure 2.5, I report the total 
number of prestige committee proposals approved by the plenary as a percentage of the total 
number of proposals approved. 83  Without question, the percentages illustrate how centralized 
the committee system is, at least in terms of legislative production: in every state legislature, 
prestige committee discharge no less than 70% of all proposals approved by the floor, reaching 
as high as 94% during the second legislative period in Zacatecas.  
 
                                                                 
80
 Interviews: Ceballos Quintal (Yucatán); Rivera Toribio (México); Yañez Herrera (Chihuahua); Morales Morales 
(Tlaxcala). 
81
 GOL: Article 81; EMRO): Article 15; MRO: Article 53; Puebla Reglamento (PRO): Articles 32, 56; VRO: Article 106; 
and ZOL: Article 126.  Note, Baja California Organic Law does not outline any of the procedures governing 
committee deliberation: committee meetings are private and their internal rules are not readily available (BCO: 
Articles 73, 60).  However, committee presidents are given broad authority to convene meetings whenever they 
consider a matter “urgent” without having to directly notify other members (BCO: Article 72).  The same applies 
for the Campeche Organic Law which says little about committee deliberation other than giving presidents the 
power to make meetings private (COL: 37). 
82
 Some states, like Baja California, even go so far as to restrict proposal power to just four committees: Legislation 
and Constitutional Points, Treasury, Taxation, and State Reform (BOL: Article 61). 
83
 A complete listing of all prestige and non-prestige committees in effect during the period of observation is 
located in the Appendix.  Note there is no typology currently available to systematically distinguish prestige from 
non-prestige committees in Mexico.  As result, I rely on a combination of interview data and internal statutes to 
identify the most highly-prized and productive committees in each state.  This approach yielded a classification 
whereby prestige committees are defined as those responsible for constitutional reform or taxation and 
appropriations.  These two groups are frequently cited by legislators and observers alike as having the greatest 
relevance in the approval process.  Moreover, they are consistently found in all eight state legislatures and handle 
the bulk of legislative proposals, lending further confidence to my classification. 
 FIGURE 2.4.  The Approval Process in Mexican State Legislatures.  The approval process is highly 
centralized:  coordinators are free to assign proposals to any committee they prefer whe
they like.  Once committees discharge their report, the plenary can vote on it.  Note: committees 
are not constrained in their ability to modify proposals within their jurisdiction.  Moreover, this 
approval process is typical of Latin America where t
and only then is it open for amendment. 
he proposal is approved in its entirety first 
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Figure 2.5.  Total Percentage of Committee Proposals Approved by the Plenary Assembly.  The 
number of prestige committee proposals approved by the plenary assembly is represented here 
as a percentage of the total number of approved committee proposals.  What is particularly 
noteworthy is the extent to which prestige committees dominate legislative production.  Well 
over a majority of legislation was originally discharged by either Tax/Appropriations or 
Constitutional Points, reaching as high as 94% and a low of just 71%. 
 
 Parties capitalize on these intra- and inter-committee differences in power by focusing 
most of their attention on the presidencies of prestige committees.  From the outset of a 
legislative period, for example, parliamentary coordinators spend much of their time 
negotiating the allocation of committee presidencies, and are intent on assigning loyal 
supporters to the most important panels.  Moreover, if a party controls a majority, its 
coordinator will tend to distribute prestige committee assignments so as to award the party a 
super-majority of seats, regardless of how large the majority party is.  In this way, majority 
party coordinators can further limit opposition challenges.  To illustrate this general point, take 
the LVIII session (2003 – 2006) of the Campeche state legislature when the PRI commanded a 
90% 83% 89% 87% 71% 78% 83% 84%
91% 94%
0%
100%
Prestige Committees Non-Prestige Committees
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simple majority of seats:84  according to the upper panel in Figure 2.6, the PRI controlled the 
presidencies of both prestige committees, as well as a majority of their seats (lower panel).  In 
contrast, Figure 2.7 shows the PRI controlled a more proportional share of non-prestige 
assignments,85 permitting greater opposition participation – albeit on committees with little 
control over substantive policy.  If this case is representative of the current sample – which I 
believe it is86 – then one can conclude that party leaders will negotiate most public policy in 
committee because of the broad discretion they have over how committee deliberation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
84
 Out of 35 total seats, the PRI controlled 18 (51%). 
85
 The dotted line on each of these graphs is a 45° line representing a 1-to-1 relationship between x and y values   
(x = y).  Any values above this line are examples of over-representation while values below this line indicate under-
representation. 
86
 Graphs for all eight state legislatures can be found in the Appendix.  Additionally, I have data on information 
from 13 other states although I have not yet graphed their seats shares yet. 
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FIGURE 2.6.  Party Representation on Prestige Committees, Campeche (LVIII), Majority Party: 
PRI. The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this 
line indicate over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.   
Source: Diarios de Debate, Campeche (LVIII). 
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FIGURE 2.7.  Party Representation on Non-Prestige Committees, Campeche (LVIII), Majority 
Party: PRI.  The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points 
above this line indicate over-representation while points under the line indicate under-
representation.  Source: Diarios de Debate, Campeche (LVIII). 
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2.3.3 Premium on Consensus 
 The third defining feature of legislative life in Mexican states is the premium on 
consensus.  That is, Mexican political institutions suffer from a severe lack of public confidence.  
According to Consulta Mitofsky polls, the most popular of these institutions, the executive, 
enjoys only half of the support the Roman Catholic Church does (Figure 2.8).  In fact, the 
military, universities, the media, and IFE (not shown) all performed better than the executive.  
Legislatures and parties, however, faired far worse, occupying the bottom-half of the scale.   
 
FIGURE 2.8.  Percentage “Highly Supportive” of Select Mexican Institutions, 2007 – 2008.  
Graphing the level of ‘high’ support for a select number of Mexican institutions, it is clear that 
neither legislatures nor parties are particularly popular.  In fact, of all the institutions 
mentioned, these two perform the worst.  Source:  Consulta Mitofsky. 
 
 
 Given this, it is not surprising to find legislators reaching across party lines in a 
concerted effort to improve public perception.  In fact, after conducting over 70 interviews, I 
found a striking commonality to every conversation with an incumbent deputy: the emphasis 
on unanimity.  Deputies clearly recognize their precarious position as representatives of both 
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party and government, and are constantly working to maintain an image of consensus to boost 
their legitimacy, regardless if this image is genuine or not.  So long as a perception of consensus 
can be maintained – thus improving public confidence in legislative decisions – many believe 
even the most autocratic party can be successful in this new era of democratization.  One way 
legislatures and parties achieve this consensus is by securing rank-and-file support for proposals 
still in committee.  According to Figure 2.9, the percentage of non-unanimous roll call votes in 
the sample of eight state legislatures varies from a high of 45% (Baja California I) to a low of 
10% (Estado de México).  That is, while state legislatures certainly exhibit some level of dissent 
during plenary voting, it is not especially frequent. 
 
FIGURE 2.9.  Total Percentage of Unanimous Roll Call Votes. To remedy the lack of popular 
support, political parties tend to pursue consensus when making legislative policy.  However, 
this should not suggest that parties pursue harmonious policies that every deputy agrees with; 
in fact, most interview subjects suggest that party leaders use their control over key committees 
and inducements to ensure their policies pass with the highest level of assent possible. 
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So in addition to the broad legal powers standing committees already enjoy, the 
precarious nature of political support for legislatures and parties give these panels even greater 
importance as they provide the leadership with the time, resources, and discretion to build 
large enough coalitions that ensure bill passage.  And while the methods for building these 
coalitions may not necessarily be the most democratic – what with the control party elites have 
over committees and political resources – they nevertheless try to produce outcomes with 
consensus and legitimacy in mind. 
 
2.4 Different Actors, Same Machine? 
 Taking these three features together, one finds a legislative environment where parties 
use their influence both inside the assembly and out to dominate policy-making.  Moreover, 
parties enjoy a type of protected status in that the Federal Constitution considers them ‘public 
interest entities.’  Consequently, they not only control access to nominations and public funds, 
they also command a monopoly over the internal institutions charged with drafting policy. 
 Given all this, how is legislative life now any different from what it was under one-party 
rule?  According to José Porfirio Alarcón Hernández – a former federal and state deputy in 
Puebla – the differences are apparently cosmetic: the people in office have certainly changed 
over the years, but the basic machinery of authoritarian rule still persists, empowering parties 
at the expense of the individual.87  Although not the most cynical view I have encountered, it 
certainly captures the discontent many in Mexico feel towards its democratic transition.  The 
PAN, for example, has long been characterized as a champion of democracy, an alternative to 
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 Interview: Alarcón Hernández (Puebla), Spanish translation, “Ha cambiado el equipo, pero la maquina sigue 
como mismo.” 
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the authoritarian rule, etc.  However, it too has come under attack for adopting the very same 
strategies the PRI used to preserve its grip (Thompson 2009).  
 Ultimately, this situation proves to make Mexico a particularly fascinating case.  That is, 
parties are undeniably the primary unit of representation in Mexican state legislatures.  Still, in 
this new era of democratic competition, there is something to be said about the growing 
autonomy of individual deputies.  More specifically, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that 
deputies are wholly independent of their parent organizations; that would simply be impossible 
with the current system of term limits and party nominations.  But to argue that deputies are 
wholly dependent on the party would also be incorrect. 
With the rise of electoral competition, parties need popular candidates who can win 
over new voters.  These candidates naturally come with their own personal political groups, 
which they can use as leverage to access party resources like money and leadership positions; 
and as López and Loza (2003: 62) find, deputies today may lack legislative experience but they 
still tend to have plenty of political experience.  In this way, candidates become a part of the 
very leadership structure that once dominated the legislature.88  So, when we speak of party 
leaders and parliamentary groups, there should be some caution in conceptualizing the two 
groups as separate and distinct when the difference between them is actually growing smaller 
with every election.  Moreover, with the premiums on consensus driving deputies to maintain 
an image of consensus – genuine or not – deputies will usually exert their influence indirectly so 
that the party not only looks unified but also all-powerful.   
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 Prominent examples include Juan Pablo Escobar, who is PAN coordinator in the San Luis Potosí legislature as well 
as president of the state party organization; Eruviel Villegas, current PRI coordinator in the Estado de México and 
former municipal president of Ecatepec, one of the most industrialized cities in the country; and Rafael Micalco of 
Puebla, who served as both a local deputy and state party president in 2006. 
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So, while parties still maintain centralized control, this does not necessarily translate to 
a loss of individual control.  What with new types of candidates and legislators, partisan 
decision-making now includes many more voices than it did during the one-party era when only 
the governor and her close supporters ruled the state.  
 
Armed with the information presented here, I proceed in the next three chapters to 
derive and evaluate several hypothetical expectations regarding committee deliberation and 
plenary approval.  Drawing from the current literature on legislative organization and spatial 
voting models, this dissertation not only provides a substantive account of the internal 
processes driving newly ‘democratized’ assemblies in Mexico, but it also improves 
generalizability by framing these processes within the context of established theory. 
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3 THEORIES OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 
 
Research on Mexican state legislatures currently suffers from two major weaknesses.  It either 
lacks institutional detail or is under-developed theoretically.  With respect to the first, research 
is mostly comprised of descriptive summaries outlining what parliamentary bodies can and 
cannot do.  These summaries, however, often neglect the details essential to internal decision-
making (Balkin 2004; ITAM 2004).  That is, what these institutions do is usually well-
documented – e.g., committees dictate proposals, governing bodies set the agenda, etc. – but 
how they accomplish it and why is unfortunately not.  The previous chapter helps remedy this 
weakness by closely following the technical aspects of legislative deliberation in Mexico.  
Although by no means comprehensive, the chapter is still one of the first to study how 
legislative rules allow state parties to centralize decision-making. 
With respect to its second weakness, research on Mexico lacks a firm theoretical 
foundation on which to build exact predictions about the internal organization of state and 
federal assemblies.  Without some basic framework guiding the analysis, it proves almost 
impossible to separate specific causal relationships from unrelated events, limiting logical rigor 
and generalizability.  The following sections attempt to fill this void by developing a common 
understanding of legislative organization in Mexican state assemblies.  In short, I combine 
established theory on the U.S. Congress with the information from Chapter 2 to derive a new 
set of hypothetical expectations about committee deliberation and plenary approval.89 
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 According to Chapter 2, there are technically four stages of the legislative process: policy initiation, agenda-
setting, committee deliberation, and plenary approval.  This and later chapters, however, focus on the last two 
stages rather than on the first because (1) policy initiation includes extra-legislative actors, and (2) agenda 
conferences are restricted to a select number of individuals.  In the present analysis I focus exclusively on what 
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At the committee stage, I focus on three specific models of panel selection.  First, the 
distributive approach assumes legislative organization serves an electoral purpose.  Committee 
seats themselves are allocated so that legislators can provide constituents with a steady flow of 
public goods.  The second model, however, claims committee selection is more of an 
informational issue than it is about satisfying electoral demands.  Given the inherent complexity 
of modern policy, legislators are generally uncertain about the consequences their votes can 
have.  To remedy this, committee seats are assigned to legislators who have an incentive to 
acquire specialized information and faithfully report it to the assembly.  The third approach 
treats committees as instruments of partisan control over the all-important agenda.  To that 
end, parties stack panels full with loyal supporters.  Once a ruling party assumes monopoly 
control over these offices, it can effectively block all policies its members oppose. 
The benefit of using these three models is that they provide a way to indirectly study 
why committees in Mexico are organized the way they are.  If the distributive logic holds then 
panels should consist of preference outliers who have a vested interest in a given policy area.  
However, if committees are considered sources of costly information, then one should 
generally expect no outliers.  Finally, if the partisan approach holds, committees consist of 
neither outliers nor inliers vis-à-vis the chamber; they instead reflect dominant interests within 
the ruling party.  Although Chapter 2 strongly favors this third prediction, I argue several 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
legislators can formally accomplish in the assembly and not on actors outside of it like governors or citizens who 
lack parliamentary powers.  Second, there are no formal restrictions on standing committee assignments such that 
every legislator has the potential to participate in both committee and plenary stages.  In the agenda-setting stage, 
however, only coordinators are permitted to vote.  This constraint on membership likely creates a situation where 
agenda conferences operate according to different dynamics than in the more open forums where everyone can 
potentially participate.  For those two reasons I consider only committee and plenary stages of the legislative 
process. 
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features of Mexican politics suggest otherwise and that informational/distributive approaches 
might hold in legislatures today.   
Looking next to plenary approval, I ask: what has a greater effect over how a legislator 
votes, her personal preferences or party pressure?  Once again, while Chapter 2 supports a 
strong-party perspective, I argue the changing political landscape creates new incentives for 
legislators to assert their individual autonomy.  If true, one should observe more preference-
based voting than partisan theories predict.  Furthermore, how exactly do parties exercise their 
influence if voting is indeed party-based?  Do they use a combination of rewards and sanctions 
to compel plenary support; or do they use their influence over governing committees to 
favorably set the agenda?  This is a particularly important question as most studies, without 
asking how or why, assume Mexican deputies always vote with their party.  
Ultimately, my goal in this chapter is to derive a new set of hypotheses using established 
and competing theories of legislative organization.  This, in and of itself, constitutes a major 
contribution to the literature because it clearly demonstrates how theories originally developed 
for the U.S. can be adapted to settings as different as modern-day Mexico.  The key here is to 
use the information I have already collected to generate hypotheses specific to Mexican states 
without compromising any of the theory’s critical components. 
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3.1 Committee Composition 
 Systems of standing committees are essential to modern legislatures throughout the 
world.  That is clear to even the most casual of political observers.  Why these bodies are so 
important, however, is a matter of significant debate.  Over the past three decades, numerous 
models of legislative organization have been developed to explain the fundamental roles U.S.-
based committees play.  Most scholars favor one of three interpretations – panels serve 
constituent demands, collect information for the chamber plenary, or protect partisan 
interests.  Yet because each view produces a different prediction about committee selection, 
there is some disagreement as to which should prevail.  The following briefly outlines these 
perspectives and how they were originally used to explore the U.S. Congress.    
3.1.1 Distributive Approach 
 Distributive theories base their main expectations on a simple premise: “representatives 
of different constituencies have…incentives to exchange [legislative votes] so as to provide 
benefits to their supporters” (Weingast and Marshall 1988: 157).  United States representatives 
are elected via plurality vote to represent single-member districts and are not term-limited.  
This arrangement creates strong incentives for an individual legislator to seek policies that 
benefit her particular constituency and, ultimately, improve her electoral prospects.  However, 
she must first trade her support in one policy area for the votes she needs in another.  To 
encourage this exchange, legislatures develop institutions that “lower the risk of ex post 
opportunistic behavior” by limiting a legislator’s ability to renege on non-simultaneous 
agreements.  Weingast and Marshall (1988) argue committees in the U.S. Congress are 
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organized to be these institutions and are given veto authority over certain jurisdictions to 
preserve support in other unrelated areas. 
 Take for example an assembly consisting of three groups of legislators.  Group A wants 
new infrastructure for its constituency; group B proposes a regulatory agency for its own 
supporters; and group C is intent on blocking B’s proposal.  Furthermore, I assume (a) groups A 
and B initially agree to support each other’s proposal and (b) no committee system exists.   
Now consider a situation where A’s proposal is considered first: here the group can 
easily withdraw from its initial agreement with B once the infrastructure it requests is 
approved.  That is, A may find little reason to honor the agreement with B, especially if C offers 
A better terms in exchange for A’s opposition of B’s proposal.  This scenario, however, changes 
dramatically when committees are organized to protect constituent-driven proposals.  
Specifically, I assume (c) committees hold significant gate-keeping power over the proposals 
they consider and (d) legislators self-select themselves into their seats.  If B can secure enough 
seats on the relevant committee, then it is well-positioned to protect its proposals against any 
A-C coalition because only the relevant committee can decide when and if its proposals are 
reviewed (Weingast and Marshall 1988: 144). 
 What patterns of committee composition then should we expect if a legislature 
operates according to a distributive logic?  According to Weingast and Marshall (1988: 151), 
“representatives of particular interests gain policy benefits through membership on relevant 
committees.”  Because committees have veto power over proposals within their jurisdiction, 
legislators can funnel public resources directly to their constituencies without having to 
regularly contend with the entire chamber.  Consider representatives along the Florida 
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panhandle, whose districts benefit from a large military presence.  These individuals should be 
more interested in securing seats on the Appropriations and Armed Services committees 
because they can provide additional funding for bases that sustain many of their voters.  
Similarly, legislators who represent rural communities should demand a greater presence on 
committees responsible for farm subsidies and the like.  These ‘high demanders’ – who are 
unrepresentative of the parent chambers in terms of a specific policy area – can use their 
committee power to protect proposals within their jurisdiction while conceding their veto over 
other unrelated policy areas. 
 Given this, the distributive approach yields the expectation that the average set of 
preferences for a given committee, µC, will not be representative of those in chamber, µF. 
 ≠  !     3.1  
Note that this difference in means depends on the committee under consideration: that 
is, a legislator may be an outlier vis-à-vis the chamber floor on Agriculture because of her 
extreme views on ethanol production; but as a member of Ways and Means, she may have a 
more moderate view on issues like health care reform.  Absent policy-by-policy measures of 
preference – which are certainly unavailable for Mexican legislators – this multi-dimensionality 
may not lend itself to straightforward hypothesis testing.  However, as I argue later, the small 
number of ‘relevant’ committees in Mexican states legislatures permits me to evaluate the 
distributive approach using just a single policy dimension. 
Nevertheless, as straightforward as the distributive logic may be, it lacks widespread 
support in the literature: its institutional features are largely fictitious as “legislative majorities 
can extract proposals from obstructive committees” (Krehbiel 2004: 119); committee 
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jurisdictions are assumed fixed, although they are usually not; and the empirical evidence 
simply does not support the outlier hypothesis (Richman 2008; Overby, Kazee, and Prince 2004; 
Groseclose 1994).  What has received support, however, is an alternative explanation that 
hinges on the inherent uncertainty surrounding legislative policy. 
3.1.2 Informational Approach 
 Constitutional reform, fiscal policy, the provision of public infrastructure – these are not 
only the most pressing issues facing legislatures today, they also count among the most 
complex. While assemblies are filled with lawyers, doctors, engineers, and other professionals, 
few of these individuals have the expertise to confidently identify the unintended 
consequences of legislative policy.  In game theoretic terms, individual legislators are 
incompletely informed, unsure of the relationship between policy and its outcomes.  So, absent 
all-knowing legislators, assemblies charge committees with the responsibility of acquiring and 
disseminating information to plenary members (Krehbiel 1991; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; 
Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987). 
 How exactly then do legislatures achieve this?  One of the principal obstacles the parent 
chamber must overcome is the incentive to misreport, i.e., committee members strategically 
use the information they collect to favorably alter the outcomes of final votes.  Consequently, 
the legislature’s median voter must find a way to assign committees so that any information 
they do transmit is considered credible. 
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Now the chamber’s median voter is a powerful legislative actor.  When single-peaked 
preferences are arrayed along a single dimension of legislative conflict 90 – e.g., left-right, 
center-periphery, government-opposition, etc. – the primary decision-maker in the chamber 
becomes the median voter because every winning coalition must include the median (Downs 
1957; Black 1948).  So within this environment, the parent chamber tends to assign legislators 
whose preferences credibly signal that the information they report is accurate.  Under 
moderate levels of uncertainty, the chamber median usually fills important committees with 
the legislators whose preferences match its own.  In this way, the chamber can protect 
majority-preferred policies by stacking panels full with individuals who already support them.   
Note that this tendency towards committee inliers strongly depends on the level of 
uncertainty in the chamber and the choice of rules.91  That is, under certain circumstances, 
legislators may consider information from unrepresentative panel members more credible than 
information from members close to the legislative median (Richman 2008; Krehbiel 2004).  
Given this, analysts should take care when forming their hypotheses and avoid the expectation 
that chamber always assign moderate inliers to important committees. 
A second and related obstacle is that the chamber must provide committee members 
with an incentive to specialize: that is, panel members may not wish to deceive the chamber 
but they may nevertheless lack an incentive to invest the time learning more about their 
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 Single-peaked preferences are defined as strictly concave utility functions, "(∙) such that no more than one 
maximum exists (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 92 – 93).  Assume a legislature whose main dimension of policy 
conflict is the level of taxation. Assume further that legislator A prefers – for whatever the reason – a tax rate of 
30%.  If A’s preferences are single-peaked, then she derives no greater utility from any tax rate other than exactly 
30%, i.e. "(& < 0.30) < "(0.30) > "(& > 0.30).  For this reason, I will refer to a legislator’s preferences on a 
single policy dimension as her ideal point. 
91
 Legislatures can assign ‘rules’ dictating how a specific committee proposal is considered.  Closed, or restrictive, 
rules do not allow the chamber to amend the proposal; open rules, on the hand, do. 
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committee’s specific policy area.  To solve this problem, the parent chamber delegates veto 
power to committees by limiting the extent to which the chamber can amend their proposals.  
That is, if committees are to serve the informational role, they must be sure that their 
proposals will survive plenary deliberation; otherwise they will have little reason to faithfully 
provide the floor with well-informed proposals. 
Given this – and a moderate level of uncertainty – the informational approach yields a 
hypothetical expectation that sharply contrasts with distributive models. 
 =  ! 
 What is particularly noteworthy about both informational and distributive approaches is 
that neither requires a ‘political party’ for their hypothetical expectations to hold.  In fact, 
Krehbiel (1993) eloquently argues that what is commonly defined as ‘partisanship’ may in fact 
be ‘preference-ship’ whereby members of the same party do not vote together because of 
party pressures but because they already share the same preferences.  Since co-partisans will 
vote the same way regardless, party control largely becomes a moot point.  There are others, 
however, who suggest that parties are real and are critical to solving collective action problems, 
a situation which gives these groups considerable influence over key agenda-setting bodies. 
3.1.3 Partisan Approach 
 Legislators are driven by a variety of goals that can only be realized from elected office.  
In the U.S. case, this ambition usually translates into a constant preoccupation with reelection.  
However, despite single-member districts and plurality votes, legislative candidates do not 
necessarily campaign ‘alone’.  For better or for worse, candidates are bound together by their 
party, and how that party performs in office has a substantive impact on its members’ electoral 
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prospects.  Recent events – such as the Republican reversals in 2006/2008, as well as the PAN’s 
misfortunes in 2003 –illustrate how the common party label not only works for a party’s 
candidates, but how it can also work against them.  
 Under the distributive logic, the principal challenge facing legislators is a commitment 
problem; for the informational, it is a matter of managing uncertainty.  However, according to 
the partisan perspective – at least in the United States – the primary issue is the collective 
action problem associated with modern-day campaigns (Cox and McCubbins 2007; 2005).  That 
is, members of Congress represent distinct districts, each defined by a particular set of interests 
and demographics.  Naturally, legislators must act to benefit these interests or they stand to 
lose their next election.  Yet because of cross-district differences, even members of the same 
party have an incentive to oppose one another.  Absent coordination, these differences could 
eventually lose the party electoral support and, perhaps, destroy it altogether.  Legislators 
recognize this and delegate decision-making to a set of party leaders who can coordinate their 
group’s parliamentary activities.  So long as they successfully advance the party’s electoral 
prospects, the leadership will continue on in office; however, once leaders fail a majority of 
party members, they are replaced quite quickly. 
 Cox and McCubbins (2007; 2005) argue that party leaders manage the group’s legislative 
reputation using their influence over key agenda-setting offices.  If a party can secure a 
sufficient number of these offices – whether through its status as a majority party or because of 
its proximity to the median voter – then it can effectively dictate the ‘what’, ‘when’, and ‘how’ 
of plenary debate.  This procedural monopoly effectively becomes a cartel parties use to 
promote their policies without having to incur the costs of inducing rank-and-file support.  
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Parties need only create an agenda that gives legislators no other alternative but to vote for the 
cartel’s preferred choice. 
 With respect to committee selection, the party leadership values these panels because 
of their procedural advantages over the agendas of critical policy areas.  Consequently, 
committee selection should not be “neutral, non-discretionary, or routine”; nor should it be a 
matter of personal preference (Cox and McCubbins 2007: 175).  Party loyalty – as defined by a 
legislator’s proximity to the party’s median voter – should in fact be the strongest predictor of 
committee assignment, such that 
 =  ,     3.3  
where µM is the ideal point of the cartel’s median voter.
92 
 Unlike informational models, procedural cartel theory anticipates committees to be 
representative of the party-in-power and not of the parent chamber.  Additionally, while Cox 
and McCubbins (2007; 2005) only considered the U.S. case where a majority party necessarily 
exists, there is little evidence to suggest that plurality parties are incapable of establishing a 
procedural cartel; it may simply require more institutional engineering (Cox, Heller, and 
McCubbins 2008; Chandler, Cox, and McCubbins 2006; Cox, McCubbins and Masuyama 2000).93 
 Having outlined the main explanations of committee composition, the following section 
derives a new set of hypothetical expectations about committee life in Mexican state 
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 The concept of party loyalty used here is slightly different from the way Cox and McCubbins imagine it (2007: 
159).  They define loyalty as the number of times a legislators votes with the party/leadership.  Yet because the 
hypotheses I derive later are specified in terms of spatial distance from median voters, I redefine party loyalty to 
reflect that.  Moreover, the loyalty scores Cox and McCubbins (2007) calculate ought to convey the same 
information as the variables I use to measure ideological proximity (Chapter 5).  In the former, higher scores 
indicate a strong agreement between a legislator and the majority of the party; in the latter, smaller distances 
between legislators and the party median indicate a similarly high level of agreement. 
93
 A plurality party is defined as one which lacks a legislative majority but still controls the largest share of seats.  
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legislatures.  A distinct contribution to our understanding of Mexican politics, these hypotheses 
not only incorporate information presented in Chapter 2 – which has never been done before – 
but it also benefits from the conceptual rigor of established legislative theory. 
3.1.4 Expectations 
 The discussion in Chapter 2 highlights the institutional and political influence Mexican 
parties have over their legislative delegations.  Whether as proxies of the party leadership or as 
leaders themselves, coordinators use their broad legislative powers to advance partisan 
interests.  Given that, one would expect committee assignments to be distributed according to 
a partisan logic, i.e., coordinators select committee members who are representative of the 
ruling party.94  In other words, because of their first-mover advantage, committees in Mexican 
state legislatures are exactly the kind of agenda setting offices parties seek to fill with 
supporters.  Moreover, the current premium on consensus in these unpopular assemblies 
drives party leaders to negotiate the bulk of policy in committee first.  This way, disagreements 
can be kept behind closed doors and party leaders maintain control over the negotiations. 
And yet as compelling as all this is, there are two caveats worth mentioning before I 
state a party-based hypothesis.  First and foremost, the committee system is highly centralized: 
the bulk of legislation is reviewed by just a select number of ‘prestige’ committees; and all 
formal power within these committees is effectively held by the panel president.  This 
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 A ruling party in Mexico does not necessarily mean it is a majority party with at least 50%+1 seat.  The Estado de 
México is an excellent example as no group there has held a legislative majority since 1997.   However, because 
the PRI controls both the governorship and the ideological center (Chapters 4, 5), it is a necessary component for 
any majority coalition to exist.  Moreover, plurality parties – e.g., the PRD in Zacatecas, the PAN in Baja California, 
the PAN-PRD in Tlaxcala – usually buy the support of minor parties either with money or favors to secure a large 
enough majority.  Minor ‘parties’ are usually comprised of one or two deputies who are more concerned with their 
own personal gain than with a programmatic platform.  If plurality parties – which are invariably the PRI, PAN, or 
the PRD – are in urgent need of additional votes, they will frequently turn to these ‘free-lance’ deputies for 
support (Kellam 2008). Interviews: Popocatl Gutiérrez (Puebla), Spanish translation “Esos partidos son 
mercenarios”; Labastida Aguirre (San Luis Potosí); López Murillo (Zacatecas). 
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arrangement provides coordinators with an economical way of exerting influence over 
committee deliberation: rather than negotiate with every member of every committee, 
coordinators need only concern themselves with a small group of individuals.  Naturally, ruling 
parties use their influence to assign themselves an overrepresented share of prestige 
committee presidencies.  Once they secure cartelized control of these offices, ruling parties 
usually allow the opposition to have a strong presence on non-prestige committees with no 
impact on substantive policy.  Ruling parties can thus claim ‘fairness’ and ‘consensus’ without 
having to relinquish control.95 
Second, the literature on party-based committee selection clearly states that 
committees will be representative of the party, as a whole.96   Yet the discussion in Chapter 2 
argues that parliamentary coordinators wield significant powers over resources and the 
agenda, doing so as agents of the party leadership and not as elected leaders of the legislative 
delegation.  If this is true and coordinators are as powerful as they seem to be, then should I 
expect committees to represent the coordinator’s specific preferences or will they still reflect 
the party delegation as a whole?  I believe the answer to be ‘the party delegation’. 
Mexican parties are no longer monolithic structures; and while they maintain a high 
level of discipline, parties still experience fierce internal conflict as factions jockey for legislative 
dominance – the recent turmoil in Jalisco clearly exemplifies this.  Moreover, coordinating 
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 Interviews: Chávez Ríos (Hidalgo); Popocatl Gutiérrez (Puebla). 
96
 More accurately, committees with uniform externalities (i.e., panels with jurisdiction over policies affecting the 
entire electorate) are expected to have party contingents that are representative of their respective party 
caucuses (Cox and McCubbins 2007: 184).  None of this added detail, however, should prevent me from applying 
the partisan logic to the Mexican case.  First, prestige committees in Mexican states – which produce the bulk of 
bills approved by the legislature – are invariably those with ‘uniform externalities’: tax/appropriations committees 
are responsible for the distribution and oversight of all state funds; and constitutional points committees are free 
to revise any and all state laws.  Second, because of the power committee presidents have, I only consider party 
contingents that are in control of panel presidencies and effectively exclude the rest. 
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duties are known to frequently change hands over the course of a three-year term because 
previous occupants are usually unable to work alongside their parliamentary group.97  For 
example, Lisset Murrillo – currently a deputy and assistant PAN coordinator in the Zacatecas 
assembly – noted during her interview that the party was suffering from a major internal 
fracture at the time in which the delegation was on one side of the conflict and its coordinator, 
Manuel Garcia Luna, on the other.  Murillo claims this break was the product of Garcia Luna’s 
leadership style in that he dictated party policy and refused the delegation to voice its opinion.  
As a result, Garcia Luna often found himself losing every disagreement he had with the 
delegation.  Seeing this, party leaders stripped Garcia Luna of his post and turned the 
coordinator’s position over to Silvia Rodrez Ruvalcaba, an individual who commands both the 
support of the legislative delegation and the trust of the state party.   
Having observed similar situations elsewhere in the country, it is difficult to conclude 
that legislators are either absolute in their power or secure in their posts.98   That is, none of the 
individuals interviewed for this project disputed the political and institutional power 
coordinators have at their disposal; but at the same time, they noted that coordinators could 
not ignore the opinions of their fellow deputies; and if they did, they did so at their own risk.  
Coordinators – although powerful legislative actors – are charged more with managing a 
delegation’s affairs than with imposing the party line on a weak rank-and-file.  Deputies 
themselves are rather accomplished politicians having successfully reached the state assembly, 
and if challenged by an overreaching coordinator, are prone to rebel by making life politically 
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 Not counting, of course, coordinators who were either scheduled to leave office after a fixed period of time or 
nominated/elected to higher political office. 
98
 The most recent examples come from Michoacán and San Luis Potosí, which both involve coordinators who, 
after being accused of gross incompetence, were nearly thrown out of their position by their delegation’s rank-
and-file. Interviews: Duarte Ramirez (Michoacán); Rubio Carrero (San Luis Potosí).  
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untenable for their supposed leader.  For that reason, I focus on distance from the party 
median – and not from the coordinator.99 
 So in keeping with what we know about committees in Mexican state legislatures, I 
modify the generalized partisan hypothesis that committee assignments are representative of 
party interests to instead read: ruling parties will assign legislators with preferences near the 
party’s median position to the presidencies of prestige committees (as I define them).  In 
probabilistic terms, 
Hypothesis C.1   A deputy likely presides over a prestige committee the closer her ideal 
point is to the ruling party median. 
The hypothesis can be restated mathematically, which will prove critical when I develop 
statistical models in the next two chapters to evaluate these specific expectations:  
 -(./0123045 67 ./015280 699255002 = :) =  7[<306=682>?= @215?4>02 7/69 A], 
where f is expected to yield an inverse relationship between ideological distance and the 
probability a deputy i is president of a prestige committee.  In other words, the probability a 
deputy becomes president of a prestige committee will decrease the farther the ruling party 
median, M, is from the ideal point of deputy i. 
 But what about the other two approaches? Can informational and distributive logics 
provide alternative hypotheses that could credibly challenge Hypothesis C.1?  I argue ‘yes’ 
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 In addition to these two clarifying points, a third must be made: a median voter does not exist if the policy space 
is larger than a single dimension (McKelvey 1976).  That is, if legislative conflict is a function of foreign policy (more 
foreign aid or less?) and tax rate (higher or lower?), the median for each dimension may not be the same for the 
entire policy space; in fact, there may be no single median voter once the two dimensions are considered together.  
What does this mean for the Mexican case?  The evidence currently suggests Mexican politics operates according 
to a single left-right dimension; however without a more systematic measure of dimensionality, I cannot 
confidently evaluate median-based hypotheses using Mexico.  I return to this point in next chapter where I provide 
just such a measure generated from observed vote choices of individual legislators. 
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because the high level of electoral competition in Mexico creates a situation where (1) divided 
government encourages committees to play an informational role, and (2) increasingly 
autonomous deputies are free to use legislative resources – independent of the party– to 
further their ambitions.  In other words, the partisan logic may have universally held during the 
one-party era; however, with rise of political competition, committees may now play a different 
role, one suited to meet the needs of the legislature/legislators and not necessarily the party’s.  
 With respect to the informational approach, the largest impediment to generating a 
hypothesis of committee assignment for the Mexican case is the current prohibition on 
legislative reelection.  A reform originally intended to curb unbridled executive power, term 
limits were eventually used to reign in deputies by denying them the ability to effectively 
develop a personal constituency independent of the party.  But in addition to weakening the 
incumbent-constituent relationship, term limits have also prevented deputies from investing 
significant effort on specializing in the policy areas of their committees.  From an informational 
perspective, this poses a much larger problem than some other factor, like the number of 
committee seats each legislator occupies.100  Legislators can be on just a single committee but 
will still lack an incentive to specialize because in three short years, they will be out of office 
and are unlikely to return (Langston and Aparicio 2008).  
 And yet despite a 100% turnover, there is reason to suspect that committees may 
nevertheless serve an informational role in these emerging state institutions.   During my earlier 
discussion on the relevance of studying Mexican state legislatures, I mentioned the effect 
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 The argument relating the number of committee assignments with specialization claims that legislators will lose 
the ability/incentive to specialize as the number of committees to which they belong increases.  Committees are 
generally comprised of three to seven membes (Córdova González 2004: 98) 
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divided government can have on preferences and expectations.  In short, divided government 
(or the expectation of it in the near future) may compel legislatures to fortify themselves 
against potentially hostile executives.  Divided government, for example, creates a situation 
where legislative preferences may not necessarily align with the governor’s (Michoacán 2001 – 
2004, see Solt 2004).  Similarly, internal party divisions – as a result of decentralized candidate 
selection – may cause unified government to break down if the legislative majority does not 
share the governor’s preferences as in the case of Jalisco.  In these situations, legislatures will 
be more inclined to assert their constitutional prerogatives by developing the resources they 
need to produce higher quality legislation rather than having to rely on executive secretariats to 
do it for them (Beer 2003: 79).  Returning to the Jalisco example from Chapter 2 – where there 
was a massive internal schism within the PAN – the legislature certainly fortified its committees 
by giving them a much larger budget after 2006.  That is, prior to the PAN’s inter-branch 
hostilities, legislative committees received a fixed share of the budget.  However, after 2006, 
committee received a substantial boost in their funding, getting a 29% larger budget in 2007 
and another 6% in 2008. 
 
Year $MX % Change (Year-on-Year 
2005 1740000.00 - 
2006 1740000.00 00.00 
2007 2246400.00 29.10 
2008 2381184.00 06.00 
 
TABLE 3.1.  Monthly Budgets for Standing Committees in the Jalisco State Legislature, 2005 – 
2008.  Following the 2007 conflict between the PAN executive and the PAN legislative majority, 
committees received a substantial boost in funding, reflecting a possible move by legislators to 
fortify their constitutional position against future executive imposition.  Source: Jalisco State 
Legislature – Department of Transparency (http://www.congresojal.gob.mx/transparencia). 
79 
 
 More money, however, may not be enough in light of term limits; or is it?  That is, the 
lack of committee specialization may be a constant feature that will define Mexican state 
deputies so long as term limits are in place.  However, the administrative personnel, legislative 
consultants, and material resources assigned to committees may be of higher quality now that 
legislatures have gotten into the habit of allocating large portions of the budget to fortify these 
deliberative bodies (Beer 2003; 82).  Moreover, technical and administrative personnel may 
stay with the legislatures for a longer period of time now that salaries and facilities are more 
competitive with other sectors.101  One can even say that administrative and technical support 
in state legislatures is gradually becoming professionalized.  In fact, as of 2004, 15 state 
legislatures use a formal civil service to train their employees, 26 provide committees with a 
full-time staff, and 21 provide deputies with electronic resources for easier consultation; this is 
in stark contrast to administrative support during the one-party era when patronage was 
valued more highly than either efficiency or productivity (Nava Gomar 2004: 70, 64, 59).  
Additionally, an increasing number of legislatures now have access to semi-autonomous 
‘research institutes’ that provide non-partisan assistance with proposed bills.  Although 
susceptible to party pressures, these institutes are nonetheless an increasingly reliable and 
apolitical source of information in as many as 16 states (Nava Gomar 2004: 51).   
Combine this growing professionalism with the fact that committee presidents have near-
total control over the distribution of panel funds/staff, parent chambers in Mexican state 
legislatures should assign presidents who will use their resources to faithfully supply the 
plenary with accurate information.  Note that informational theories predict the type of 
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 Interviews: Mora Acevedo (Puebla); Pérez Campos (Chihuahua); Macedo Aguilar (Estado de México). 
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committee member the plenary selects – outlier versus inlier – depends partly on the level of 
uncertainty within the chamber.  Given the 100% turnover and the lack of previous legislative 
experience in most state assemblies (Valencia Escamilla 2006; Lujambio Irazábal 2004), one 
would expect parent chambers to be highly uninformed.  However, this overlooks the political 
experience deputies tend to already have: 52% of local deputies surveyed held elected office 
prior to their legislative term (Beer 2003: 78); well over 50% also held some prior position 
within the party (Jiménez 2006).  Similar to their Argentine counterparts, Mexican deputies may 
be amateur legislators but they are also professional politicians, forced by term limits to work in 
municipal government, executive secretariats, and the party organization (Jones et al 2002; 
Langston and Aparicio 2008).  As a result, they are likely familiar with the budgetary process 
and the politics of constitutional reform. 102 
So, under the reasonable assumption of low-to-moderate uncertainty in Mexican state 
legislatures, I predict, 
Hypothesis C.2 A deputy likely presides over a prestige committee if her ideological 
preferences are relatively close to the chamber median. 
Or, equivalently, 
EF(./0123045 67 ./015280 699255002 = :) =  7[<306=682>?= @215?4>02 7/69 G], 
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 Committee proposals will have an even stronger incentive to specialize when their proposals are protected 
from floor amendments.  In Mexico, committees not only draft the proposals the plenary will vote on, but 
amendments can only be considered (en lo particular) when the proposal has already been approved in its entirety 
(en lo general).  Moreover, amendments in  state legislatures are either highly infrequent or enjoy universal 
support, indicating that most of a bill’s details are negotiated first in committee: by the time it reaches the plenary 
for final approval, either no further amendment is necessary or the outcomes of amendment votes have already 
been fixed.  Interviews: Martin Magaña (San Luis Potosí); Gamboa Wong (Yucatán).  However, having these 
‘restricted rules’ protecting committee proposals may not necessarily indicate a need to compel specialization as 
informational models assume; these rules may instead be a way for parties to protect their committee agreements 
from plenary changes.  Likewise, ad hoc sub-committees are usually permitted in state legislatures, but their 
presence may also not always indicate a demand for information; in fact, sub-committees are popularly viewed as 
additional vehicles for party control (Reyes Colín 2007). 
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where f positively relates the probability of a prestige committee presidency with ideological 
distance from the chamber median, F; or, in other words, a deputy is more likely to be 
president the closer her ideal point is to the F. 
 Turning to the distributive approach, there is little evidence beyond the anecdotal to 
point us in any one direction as to what the relationship between committee assignments and 
high-demanders is – i.e., do committee jurisdictions correspond with a deputy’s specific 
geographic/social/professional interests?  Consider committee assignments in the current 
Zacatecas legislature (LIX, 2007 – 2010), which a former PRD secretary general emphatically 
claims is driven more by partisan interests (such as the unions representing educators and taxi 
drivers) than by either prior experience or expertise.103  However, looking at a sample of 
important committee assignments in the state, the evidence is mixed: for the two Budgetary 
panels, the presidencies are held by a civil engineer (Refugio Medina) and a former member of 
the education secretariat (Ubaldo Ávila); a lawyer (Angélica Náñez) presides over the 
Constitutional Points committee; a topographical engineer (Jorge Rincón) is president of the 
Public Works committee; and an agricultural engineer (José González) heads the Electoral 
Matters panel.  While there is some evidence that high-demanders are seated on the 
appropriate committees, there is also evidence to suggest the opposite. 
I argue that committees may be used as a way to distribute public resources and win 
future election, but term limits in Mexico may not encourage high-demanders in the traditional 
sense – e.g., rural deputies on agricultural committees and city deputies on urban development 
ones – to seek out assignment on a corresponding panel.  Instead, because term limits drives 
                                                                 
103
 Interview: Ortiz Méndez (Zacatecas). 
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career politicians to constantly prepare for their next government/party position, their 
immediate concern in the legislature may be providing future constituents with resources any 
way they can.  While this may not be so different from the U.S. approach, the distinction here 
stems from two features of legislative life.  
First, the vast majority of legislation is only reviewed by a very small number of prestige 
committees, namely Budget/Tax and Constitutional Points.  Second, many deputies pursue 
municipal presidencies after their legislative terms end: municipality government – although 
much smaller in terms of population and territory – carries a tremendous amount of authority 
over taxation and revenues. 104   In fact, there is a growing tendency in the federal government 
to circumvent the state legislature altogether and inject funds directly into municipal coffers 
(Courchene and Diaz Cayeros 2000: 217 – 218; Ward and Rodriguez 1999: 702).  Prominent 
examples of deputies-as-municipal candidates include Jorge Salinas, PAN coordinator in Jalisco; 
Ana Lilia Herrera, an influential PRI deputy in the Estado de México; and Arturo Garcia Perez, 
former Mesa president of the Aguascalientes legislature. 
Note that many deputies who pursue municipal presidencies tend to also represent a 
specific single-member district (as opposed to being a list deputy elected via proportional 
representation).  This means that district deputies have already proven themselves – to one 
extent or another – as capable of handling a campaign where the focus may be more on the 
candidate than on the party; and given the prevalence of legislators with power bases 
independent of the party organization, these individuals may be far more than simply capable 
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 Enrique Castillo Ruiz – currently a PRI deputy in the Yucatán legislature and former municipal president of Uman 
– was very straightforward in his preference for the municipal position over a legislative term: not only did the 
latter give him far more discretion over the distribution of public funds, but he also seemed to have a strong 
distaste for the collegial nature of legislative decision-making. Interview: Castillo Ruiz (Yucatán). 
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of winning ‘on their own’.  This last point is critical to answering the question: how can deputies 
be ‘high demanders’ and self-select into their preferred committees – as the distributive logic 
predicts – if party coordinators control panel assignment?  Returning briefly to previous 
discussions about the growing autonomy of individual legislators, the rise of political 
competition has decentralized candidate selection – or at least supplanted ‘party loyalty’ with 
‘electability’ as the primary basis for nomination.  Naturally, legislative candidates who are the 
most electable (and indeed win) will have a rather firm base of personal support; and at the 
very least, these individuals will count among the leading voices within the state party and may 
have enough influence to secure their most preferred committee assignment. 
 From this perspective, the high demanders in Mexican state legislatures are likely to be 
district deputies, politicians who are already well-positioned to run a candidate-centered 
campaign like a municipal presidency.  Moreover, given the centralized nature of committee 
deliberation, district deputies will be inclined to prefer an assignment on prestige committees 
that not only handle the bulk of legislation but also deal in matters that directly affect voters, 
e.g., taxation, fiscal policy, legal statutes, etc.  In this way, deputies can gain exposure for being 
a member on these important bodies and claim credit for any policies that specifically benefit 
their future constituencies.  For that, the distributive hypothesis is as follows 
Hypothesis C.3A A district deputy likely presides over a prestige committee. 
Or equivalently, 
EF(./0123045 67 ./015280 699255002 = :) =  7[@215/2>5 @0-J5K2 = :], 
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where f positively relates the probability of serving as president of a prestige committee with a 
deputy’s electoral origin.  That is, the probability of assignment will increase if a deputy 
represents a single-member district (as opposed to a party list). 
And because exposure may count more than having any real policy influence, 
Hypothesis C.3B A district deputy likely belongs to a prestige committee. 
Or equivalently, 
EF(,09L0/ 67 ./015280 699255002 = :) =  7[@215/2>5 @0-J5K2 = :]. 
The initial evidence strongly suggests committee assignments in Mexican states are 
distributed according to a partisan logic.  Parliamentary coordinators – and the party interests 
they represent – use their broad constitutional powers over legislative resources to stack key 
decision-making offices full with supporters.  Because the committee system is so centralized, 
ruling party leaders can manage legislative production rather efficiently as they only need to 
control a small number of ‘prestige’ committee presidencies.   
Yet, as convincing as this story is, I argue recent changes in Mexico’s political 
environment may have an effect on how committees are used today.  In one way, the growing 
competition between state legislatures and the governor may compel a traditionally weak 
assembly to fortify its institutional position.  This means providing committees with more 
resources to produce well-informed proposals free of executive intrusion.  Committees are not 
simply instruments of control; they provide the legislature with a way to assert itself as the 
primary counterweight to gubernatorial authority.  Another way committees could be affected 
is – rather than serve the party or the entire legislature – they now just serve the deputy.  That 
is, deputies, particularly those who win district elections, have become increasingly influential 
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as they are now in a position to help vote-hungry parties rally new supporters.  Leaders in their 
own right, district deputies can secure their preferred committee assignment and use it to 
increase post-legislative prospects. 
Nevertheless, in exploring alternative explanations of committee selection, I only 
consider a single stage in a much larger process.  Parties may or may not control committee 
assignments, but none of these models explain why legislators ultimately vote the way they do.  
Assuming coordinators (and their proxies) are in a position to negotiate the bulk of legislative 
policy in committee, how exactly do they maintain legislative support within an assembly full of 
politically motivated individuals?  Do party leaders buy them off individually or do they use 
their gate-keeping authority to set the agenda? 
In the next section I discuss three theories of legislative voting: one based on personal 
preference and the other two on party influence.  In much the same way I did for committee 
selection, I adapt explanations of legislative voting in the U.S. to the Mexican case using current 
information about the country’s state assemblies.  In the process, I derive three hypotheses 
which not only compare a preference-based model with a party-based one but also provide 
greater insight into how exactly parties influence their legislative delegations, if they do at all. 
3.2 Plenary Approval 
 “The [plenary] is a form of theater.  Its sessions are scripted behind closed doors and we 
[deputies], well, we act out that script.”105  A popular sentiment echoed by legislators 
throughout Latin America, it aptly characterizes plenary activity in Mexico to be a series of 
predetermined outcomes, a product of high-level negotiation and strong party politics.  During 
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 Interview: Duarte Ramírez (Michoacán), “Es una forma de teatro.  Las sesiones se elaboran a puerta cerrada y 
nosotros, pues, aprobamos lo que se decide.” 
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committee meetings, for example, party leaders wield tremendous veto power over the agenda 
and guard access to valuable political resources.  Within this schema, leaders can readily 
compel rank-and-file support of their closed-door agreements, rendering final votes of approval 
and other plenary activities largely meaningless. 
 Nevertheless, while this story seems straightforward enough, scholars have yet to 
develop a clear understanding of the specific mechanism driving legislative voting in Mexico. 
That is, if parties do exert pressure on deputies to vote a particular way, then how exactly do 
they apply this pressure?  The literature provides at least two explanations, one emphasizing 
inducements and another stressing agenda control.  The former argues that ruling parties have 
privileged access to political resources which they use to effectively ‘buy’ rank-and-file support.  
The latter, however, suggests a more indirect approach where ruling party leaders set the 
agenda in such a way that deputies prefer the party position to all other available alternatives. 
 Yet as plausible as these explanations may be, the previous discussions on electoral 
competition and its effect on legislative autonomy suggests a different dynamic might be at 
work.  Deputies – district and list alike – seem to be gaining some level of personal 
independence from the party. 106  Whether this now translates into more preference-based 
voting, however – such that the chamber median, not the party, dictates legislative policy – is a 
matter of debate, which I intend to address by deriving several new hypotheses of legislative 
voting. 
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 List deputies are usually nominated by party convention in which the leadership places its most trusted 
operators at the top of the list to better ensure their election.  Lists are closed – meaning only the party can 
nominate candidates – and seats are allocated according to a party’s statewide share of district votes.  Although 
every state in Mexico shares this basic electoral structure, they all use different formulas to translate votes into 
seats (Solt 2004: 162). 
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3.2.1 Median Voter Theorem  
 Suffice it to say, the study of legislative voting has long been a cornerstone of political 
research.   And a critical contribution to this literature has been the Median Voter Theorem, 
MVT (Downs 1957; Black 1948).  A spatial model, where preferences are distributed across a 
fixed policy space, MVT makes four basic assumptions.  The first is the policy space is one-
dimensional.  Within the context of legislative policy, unidimensionality means that a single 
cleavage drives the majority of political conflict, e.g., left-right, government-opposition, etc.  As 
I mentioned in the previous discussion (footnote 11), this is a particularly important assumption 
as the expectations of MVT and other party-based models are largely invalid in higher-
dimensional policy spaces (McKelvey 1976).  The second assumption is that legislators have 
single-peaked preferences.  That is, each legislator has a preferred point in the policy space 
from which she derives the highest amount of utility (footnote 2).  The third assumption is that 
legislators are free to vote in favor of their most preferred policies without obstruction or 
coercion.  In a strictly MVT environment where legislators vote on proposals as they are 
introduced, no actor has special privileges that would limit the ability of an individual legislator 
to cast her vote.  And fourth, outcomes are decided by majority vote. 
 Taken together, these assumptions create a legislature where the median voter 
dominates.  Arranging legislative ideal points along a real-number line (Figure 3.1) where F is 
the chamber median, MVT expects all majority coalitions to include the median voter.  Because 
their preferences are single-peaked, legislators will only vote in favor of a policy that moves the 
status quo closer to their ideal points; as a result, no majority coalition will consist solely of 
deputies at the extremes of the policy space.  To see how this works, consider the three-
 member legislature presented in Figure 3.1, w
different legislators,  A < B.107  In keeping with the tax
derives the most utility from 10% while 
respectively.  In one scenario, there are several proposals to change the status quo rate (
which lies somewhere between A 
support are those moving the status quo closer to 
median because the more that policy approaches 
other hand, any movement towards 
majority of two to one, any proposal moving 
approved.  In a second scenario, where the status quo (
space, any movement towards the center will benefit all three voters so long as the final 
proposal does not move policy closer to 
 
        
FIGURE 3.1.  A Stylized Example of the Median Voter Theorem.  The central tenet of the Median 
Voter Theorem is that all majority coalitions must neces
solution to the voting game, however, is contingent on the number of policy dimensions.
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 Note the two curves centered on A and 
The farther one travels away from a legislator’s ideal po
values on either side of the curve’s maximum).  Distance here, and in the other models, is Euclidean.
here A and B represent the ideal points for two 
-rate example from earlier, legislator 
F and legislator B prefer rates of 40% and 60%, 
and F.  However, the only proposals a majority coalition will 
F: A will oppose any movement towards t
F, the less utility A will derive from it; on the 
F will not only benefit the median but B as we
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In terms of legislative success – which I define as the extent to which a legislator votes 
with the majority – one would expect a median-dominated assembly to yield a pattern in which 
success depends exclusively on her ideological distance from F.  Graphing the rate a legislator 
votes with the majority as a function of ideal point position, MVT predicts the voting pattern 
illustrated in Figure 3.2 where a legislator will find herself voting less frequently with the 
majority the farther her ideal point is from F. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2. Legislative Success under the Median Voter Theorem.  Success under the MVT 
depends exclusively on ideological distance from the median, F.  
 
 A relatively simple model, the Median Voter Theorem does not provide any of the 
technical assumptions that would otherwise make it a more plausible approximation of real-life 
situations.  Nevertheless, it does provide an established standard against which to compare 
patterns of legislative voting under strict-party control – as it appears to be the case in Mexico.  
Moreover, given the growing autonomy of local deputies, this model may in fact prove effective 
at explaining why legislatures produce the policies they do. 
F
0.00
1.00
%
 L
e
g
is
la
to
r 
i
V
o
te
s 
w
it
h
 t
h
e
 M
a
jo
ri
ty
Left-Right Policy Space
90 
 
3.2.2 Party Inducement 
 Conventional wisdom once held that U.S. parties maintained legislative discipline with a 
carrot/stick approach (Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith 2006: 40).  Parties rewarded supportive 
legislators with a variety of benefits, such as nominations to higher office, executive 
appointments, and improved access to electoral funds.108  For legislators who defect from party 
positions, however, sanctions could strip them of leadership positions, deny them a vote in 
internal elections, or even expel them from the party altogether.  Generally speaking, parties 
are vote-buyers (Iaryczower 2005; Heberlig 2003; Snyder 1991). 
 In contrast to the median voter theorem, a legislator’s success does not depend on 
ideological position under the inducement model; what matters is partisan affiliation.  Standard 
in legislatures throughout the world, parties gain access to resources in proportion to their 
share of seats.  As a party’s seat share grows, so does its share of resources; and by virtue of 
having at least 50%+1 seats, majority parties should have undisputed access to such 
resources.109   With this access, majority parties are especially well-positioned to compel the 
legislative support of not only their own rank-and-file deputies but also of disaffected or non-
ideological members of the opposition.  In such a setting, one would expect members of the 
majority party to experience a high level of legislative success irrespective of ideological 
position (Figure 3.3).   
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 These can either be in the form of one-time payments or a stream of benefits. 
109
 “The Majoritarian Postulate.  Objects of legislative choice in both the procedural and policy domains must be 
chosen by a majority of the legislature” (Krehbiel 1991: 16). 
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FIGURE 3.3  Legislative Success under the Party Inducement Approach.  By virtue of their seat 
share, majority parties use their privileged access to legislative resources induce support from 
their rank-and-file members and guarantee passage of their policies. 
 
However, what happens in legislatures where there is no plurality?  The general 
expectation is that as a party’s plurality grows in size, they will still enjoy a greater share of 
legislative resources than their less-represented counterparts.  While this share may not be as 
dominant as it is under majority-party rule, these pluralities should nevertheless be in a better 
position to rally their rank-and-file members. 
The main criticism of the inducement approach is its supposed inefficiency: as 
legislatures grow in size, the distribution of benefits and sanctions will eventually become too 
expensive to benefit party leaders.  For that reason, scholars have suggested another approach, 
one which relies on party control over the agenda to effect rank-and-file support.110 
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 Additionally, if preferences are fixed – i.e., legislators vote sincerely, regardless – then vote-buying will not be 
an effective strategy. 
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3.2.3 Procedural Cartel Model 
 Cox and McCubbins (2005) hypothesize that parties exert their greatest legislative 
influence over the agenda and not directly over their backbenchers.  Returning to the earlier 
discussion on the partisan logic, legislators are bound to each other by their party labels and, 
absent coordination, face substantial collective action problems related to differences in 
constituent demands.  As a way to overcome these problems, the rank-and-file delegates broad 
discretion over policy/procedural decisions to parliamentary leaders in exchange for their 
assurances to sustain or improve the party’s electoral prospects.  
Rather than adopt an inducement-based approach to coordinate partisan activity, Cox 
and McCubbins (2005) suggest that leaders may instead seek to occupy key gate-keeping 
offices charged with directing the flow of parliamentary traffic, e.g., chairs of important 
committees, chamber presidencies, etc.  This monopoly effectively gives majority parties 
procedural control over the assembly: by having a direct say over the legislative agenda, party 
leaders can effectively limit the alternatives available to the rank-and-file and force it to vote 
with the party.  Leaders can either block undesirable proposals that would otherwise pass in 
the plenary or permit consideration of those the plenary clearly opposes.   
This is not to say, however, that legislative leaders are absolute rulers with the authority 
to do as they wish.  To remain in power, they must enjoy support from enough interests within 
the party organization – which can be imagined as a majority of the group’s legislative 
delegation.111  If they fail to advance their group’s interests, then leaders are summarily 
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 Cox and McCubbins (2007; 2005) assume that party power is held by elected officials and not by members of 
the party organization outside of the assembly.  Yet in strong-party systems – where the party leaders command 
significant influence over their parliamentary groups, e.g., pre-2000 Mexico – it may be more appropriate to think 
of legislative leaders requiring the support of party interests both inside the assembly and out.  However, for 
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replaced.  For that reason, party policies (as reflected in the floor agenda) must meet the 
approval of a majority of the group’s delegation, i.e., the median voter dynamic is assumed to 
define decision-making within the cartel. 
To see this model’s logic more clearly, consider a stylized example of agenda control.  In 
Figure 3.4, I assume a two-party legislature where preferences are arrayed along the same 
numerical line featured in Figure 3.1.  The chamber median, F, is flanked on both sides by the 
minority party median, m, and the majority party median, M, such that m < F < M.  Along this 
policy line, there are four status quo points eligible for consideration (SQ3 < SQ1 < SQ2 < SQ4).  
For the sake of consistency, one could imagine these points as the standing tax rates for 
different income brackets at the beginning of the legislative period.  In this example, I initially 
assume there are no controls over the agenda: bills are voted on in the order they are received 
and have not been modified from their original drafts.  With no outside influence over how a 
legislature votes, any policy modifying the existing status quo will ultimately move the new one 
closer to F.  This centripetal movement is the exact same as what happens in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
present purposes, it is easier to conceive of these various interests as reflected in the composition of the group’s 
legislative delegation.  
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   Minority Party Roll Zone             Majority Party Block-out Zone 
 
FIGURE 3.4.  A Stylized Example of the Procedural Cartel Model.  Under the cartel model, the 
majority party is in a position to only allow its preferred proposals to reach the plenary.  Once 
there, the plenary approves it according to a median-voter dynamic. 
 
 Yet when parties control a procedural cartel over agenda-setting bodies, we find that 
party leaders will only permit consideration of policies that will move the new status quo closer 
to M.112  In the stylized example, policies changing SQ1, SQ3, and SQ4 would certainly be 
vulnerable to plenary consideration because any proposal moving policy closer to F (and 
consequently, closer to M) will ultimately be approved.  However, a procedural cartel will 
prevent consideration of policies modifying SQ2 because the plenary will only pass proposals 
moving policy closer to the chamber median and farther away from M.  Note that around each 
party median there is an indifference curve where the party prefers any point within that curve 
to any point outside of it.  SQ2 is an example of this latter point, since any proposal moving it 
closer to F ultimately makes the majority party median worse off. 
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 Once again, nothing in the literature suggests that only majority parties can form procedural cartels.  Given 
particular ideological arrangements (e.g., the plurality party occupies the median position within the chamber), the 
prevalence of side-payments to minority parties, and a framework for majoritarian rules, pluralities can certainly 
establish procedural cartels.  In the Estado de México, for example, the PRI is widely known to be the state’s 
median party; and with its control over the governorship, the party appears anecdotally to control a cartel despite 
the absence of a majority party. 
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FIGURE 3.5.  Legislative Success under the Procedural Cartel Model.  In a two-stage approach to 
party control, a party cartel uses its agenda-setting powers to limit vote choices so that 
legislators have no other but to vote the party line.   
  
With respect to plenary voting, the procedural cartel model generally predicts that a 
legislator will find herself more often on the majority-side of a vote as the distance between her 
ideal point and M decreases.  In sharp contrast to the MVT hypothesis, where success depends 
on ideological distance from the chamber median, the procedural cartel model focuses entirely 
on majority coalitions within the ruling party (Figure 3.5).  However, a word of caution:  certain 
policy spaces may create observational equivalence between MVT expectations and what the 
cartel model predicts.  That is, when the distance between M and F decreases, the block-out 
zone will shift towards the median as if it were riding a wave, effectively mimicking patterns of 
legislative voting under a median voter dynamic (Figure 3.6; Calvo and Sargazazu 2009; Krehbiel 
2004).  But this should not pose a problem if one recognizes the potential for such equivalence 
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 and is easily remedied by formulating the two predictions to rely on different points in the 
policy space.113 
 
FIGURE 3.6.  Shifting from a Procedural Cartel to the
median-based models with party
observational equivalence, i.e., patterns of legislative success may be the same for both models.  
This potential increases as the distance separating chamber and cartel medians decrease
(limVWX  = Y).  Avoiding confusion is relatively straightforward given that the models depend on 
different points in the policy space; but one must remain aware of this potential or the results 
may initially be misleading. 
 
 
3.2.4 Expectations 
 In devising hypotheses specific to Mexican state legislatures, the previous discussions on 
legislative life in the country appears to support the idea that parties exert significant influence 
over their parliamentary groups.  But the question remains: how exactly 
influence so that the rank-and-file supports their decisions?  The literature offers two specific 
answers: parties either induce support using a combination of carrots and sticks, or they control 
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 Krehbiel (2004: 121) argues that no direct test comparing MVT with partisan gate
theory exist because observable floor behavior will be the same for both.  This, however, is obviously not the case 
as I differentiate between proximity to 
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the plenary agenda so that only their proposals are ever considered.  With respect to the 
inducement approach, Mexican parties are endowed with significant resources both within the 
legislature and out.  Inside the legislature, parliamentary coordinators control access to funds, 
personnel, facilities.  Although these resources certainly enhance a deputy’s ability to conduct 
legislative business, their real value comes from the personal/electoral benefits they provide.  
Examples include private cars for every deputy in Estado de México (Gómez 2007); 114 higher 
public pensions for ruling party members in Guanajuato (Reyes Colín 2007; Romero 2007); and 
wasteful expenditures on items as frivolous as iPods and party decorations (San Luis Potosí: 
Araiza 2007), just to name a few.  Moreover, majority/plurality parties are in an especially 
privileged position by virtue of their seat status because they can allocate to themselves an 
even larger share of resources irrespective of how disproportional that share is.  Given how 
little influence opposition groups have in the governing committee – whether because of its 
lightly-weighted votes or the extra seats ruling parties award themselves – opposition groups 
can do little to prevent abuses by the party.   In terms of extra-legislative resources, remember 
that parties have near-exclusive authority over the distribution of electoral nominations and 
campaign funds.  That is, as autonomous as deputies are/may become, the prohibition on 
reelection and the control parties have over nominations/funds give parties latter significant 
pull over even the most independent deputy. 
And with the exception of Estado de México, states have relatively small assemblies 
consisting of anywhere between 25 (Baja California) and 50 members (Veracruz).  In contrast to 
either the U.S. House of Representatives or the Mexican Chamber of Deputies – which both 
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 This is particularly incredible given the fact that the state’s assembly is by far the largest, with 75 total seats (the 
average state assembly seats 37 deputies). 
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seat over 430 legislators – small state assemblies in Mexico may find this inducement strategy 
far more feasible.  For that I, predict 
Hypothesis V.1 A deputy likely votes with a legislative majority if she is a member of 
the ruling party. 
Or equivalently, 
EF(Z650 [25\ ,?]6/25K2 = :) = 7[^J=248 .?/5K ,09L0/2 = :], 
where f positively relates ruling party membership with voting with the majority. 
 Looking to the procedural cartel model, I have repeatedly mentioned the level of control 
parties have over agenda-setting bodies – particularly over governing and standing committees.  
To continue describing this arrangement would be unnecessarily repetitive; there is, however, 
one point that requires some additional comment.  Unlike the partisan inducement – the 
motivation driving party delegation and cartelization is expressly tied with electoral prospects.  
According to one of the model’s underlying assumptions, “a party’s reputation depends 
significantly on its record of legislative accomplishment” (Cox and McCubbins 2005: 21).  While 
this ‘record’ can encompass the entire gamut of legislative activity – from constituent service to 
committee deliberation – no other piece of information is as available or is as emphasized as a 
legislator’s voting record.  This should come as no surprise since, by definition, legislators are 
elected to vote on proposals.  Cartel theory recognizes this and predicts the ruling party to 
exert most of its agenda influence on not only roll call votes in general, but on those deemed 
having the greatest impact on the ruling party’s electoral prospects.  So for any test of cartel 
model to be nominally valid, it is important to first identify those votes that are considered 
‘important’.  In the case of Mexico, the primary responsibility state legislatures have is the 
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distribution of public funds.  Budget battles are usually the highlight of the legislative session as 
each group is scrambling to build up its position prior to the next round of elections.115  And 
from the voter’s perspective, budget bills are the closest links tying the legislature to the 
population as they directly affect the state’s ability to provide health care, education, utilities, 
government services, etc.  For that reason, I predict 
Hypothesis V.2 A deputy likely votes with the legislative majority on budgetary bills the 
closer her ideal point is to the ruling party median. 
Or equivalently, 
EF(Z6501 [25\ ,?]6/25K 64 _J3805 _2==12 = :) = 7[<306=682>?= @215?4>02 7/69 A], 
where f inversely relates ideological distance from M to the probability of voting with the 
majority on budget bills.116 
 As is the case with committee selection, partisan models seem to fit neatly with the 
present story about Mexico’s legislative process; however, in the background – independent of 
party-based rules – one cannot forget the growing autonomy of state deputies.  Parties still 
maintain significant control over their legislative delegations, but this control may no longer be 
as absolute.  Party switching is relatively frequent, strong candidates are usually in a position to 
rally new groups, etc. – all leading to the idea that deputies may vote more independently, 
especially on budget bills where they can concretely demonstrate their willingness to support 
particular constituencies by approving bills that provide these groups with public goods. 
                                                                 
115
 Interview: Popocatl Rodríguez (Puebla); Medina Galindo (Michoacán) 
116
 Comparing these hypotheses should not suggest that Mexican legislatures provide either inducements or exert 
agenda control, and do not do both.  The reality is that both usually occur.  The goal here then is to determine 
which approach is more prevalent. 
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Combine this with the analytical leverage the MVT provides as a baseline model of 
political behavior, I predict 
Hypothesis V.3 A deputy likely votes with a majority on budget bills the closer her ideal 
point is to the chamber median. 
Or equivalently, 
EF(Z6501 [25\ ,?]6/25K 64 _J3805 _2==12 = :) = 7[<306=682>?= @215?4>02 7/69 G], 
where f inversely relates ideological distance from the chamber median with the probability of 
voting with the majority on budgetary bills. 
 
3.3 Summary 
 This chapter attempts to adapt legislative theories of the U.S. Congress to explain 
committee selection and plenary voting in Mexican state assemblies.  As these institutions 
emerge from a century of irrelevance, an increasing number of analyses have helped improve 
our understanding of them.  However, one of the literature’s main weaknesses is that it lacks a 
firm theoretical foundation.  Without that, it is difficult to closely study the specific 
relationships between institutions and political behavior because other factors may distort 
them.  Moreover, in the absence of some general framework, it is difficult to compare political 
events in Mexico with systems elsewhere in the world, especially when their common elements 
are not immediately apparent. 
 In an attempt to remedy this weakness, I derive several competing predictions about 
the internal organization of Mexican state assemblies.   This is a particularly interesting effort 
given the country’s recent changes in political competition: as legislatures have become more 
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pluralistic, there is reason to argue that non-partisan accounts of committee and plenary stages 
might now better explain behavior in some parts of the federation.  The following is a brief 
summary of the two sets of hypotheses. 
Committee Selection 
• Hypothesis C.1: a deputy i likely presides over a prestige committee the closer her ideal 
point is to the ruling party median, M. 
EF(./0123045 67 ./015280 699255002 = :) = 7[<306=682>?= @215?4>02 7/69 A] 
• Hypothesis C.2: a deputy likely presides over a prestige committee I the closer her ideal 
point is to the chamber median, F. 
EF(./0123045 67 ./015280 699255002 = :) =  7[<306=682>?= @215?4>02 7/69 G] 
• Hypothesis C.3A: a district deputy likely presides over a prestige committee. 
EF(./0123045 67 ./015280 699255002 = :) =  7[@215/2>5 @0-J5K2 = :] 
• Hypothesis C.3B: a district deputy likely belongs to a prestige committee. 
EF(,09L0/ 67 ./015280 699255002 = :) =  7[@215/2>5 @0-J5K2 = :] 
 
Legislative Voting 
• Hypothesis V.1: a deputy likely votes with a legislative majority if she is a member of the 
ruling party, M. 
EF(Z650 [25\ ,?]6/25K2 = :) = 7[^J=248 .?/5K ,09L0/2 = :] 
• Hypothesis V.2: a deputy likely votes with the legislative majority on budgetary bills the 
closer her ideal point is to the ruling party median. 
EF(Z6501 [25\ ,?]6/25K 64 _J3805 _2==12 = :) = 7[<306=682>?= @215?4>02 7/69 A] 
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• Hypothesis V.3:  a deputy likely votes with a majority on budget bills the closer her ideal 
point is to the chamber median, F. 
EF(Z6501 [25\ ,?]6/25K 64 _J3805 _2==12 = :) = 7[<306=682>?= @215?4>02 7/69 G], 
 
Beginning with the next chapter, I develop several statistical models to evaluate their 
empirical validity in eight Mexican state legislatures.  Specifically, Chapter 4 discusses at length 
the method I use to generate a quantifiable measure of legislative preferences for individual 
deputies.  With this measure, I can freely calculate distances between medians and legislators, 
obtain measures of confidence, and diagnose policy dimensionality. 
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4 MEASURING LEGISLATIVE PREFERENCES 
 
In the previous chapter, I introduce several explanations of legislative organization linking 
political behavior with institutional design.  Given what we know about Mexican state 
assemblies, I derive competing hypotheses about the effect ideological distance has on both 
committee selection and plenary voting.  However, before I can evaluate my predictions, I must 
first generate an objective measure of legislative ideal points to identify median positions and 
calculate the corresponding distances for each legislator.  Yet how exactly do I measure a 
concept as personal and as abstract as an individual’s preferences? 
 Measuring legislative preferences is one of the most productive and innovative fields of 
research today.  We find a variety of methodologies to produce quantifiable estimates of a 
legislator’s ‘ideal point’, ranging from self-administered surveys to statistical models of 
individual vote choice.  These latter methods – because of their flexibility and the availability of 
legislative information – have garnered considerable attention in the literature.   
In the following, I concentrate on one method in particular – ideal point estimation via 
Bayesian simulation.  Developed by Simon Jackman and his colleagues (Clinton, Jackman, and 
Rivers 2004), this approach is especially well-suited to handle the exigencies of the Mexican 
case.  Generally speaking, Mexican state legislatures are small assemblies which produce low 
volumes of roll call votes, posing significant problems for several statistical methods in terms of 
parameter bias and incorrect identification of unobserved effects.  Bayesian simulation 
provides solutions to these problems using the convenient R package, Political Science 
Computational Laboratory (Jackman 2008). 
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 This chapter proceeds first with a brief survey of alternative measures of legislative 
preference, outlining their weaknesses vis-à-vis the Mexican case.  Next, I discuss the actual 
method of Bayesian simulation, beginning with the vote-choice model used to estimate the 
main parameter of interest, a legislator’s ideal point.  The model itself assumes the probability a 
legislator votes ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ during a roll call vote is a function of the utility she derives from 
each outcome.  The complication here is that these latent utilities – i.e., ideal points – are 
unobserved covariates within the model and cannot be recovered via direct regression.   
Bayesian simulation is a relatively straightforward way to overcome this complication 
because it generates values for a legislator’s latent utility by repeatedly sampling from a joint 
distribution of model parameters; following enough iterations, the simulations produce a 
measure of legislative preference that is both precise and reliable.  Moreover, Bayesian 
simulation readily lends itself to post-estimation diagnosis, increasing statistical confidence in 
both the parameters of interest and the dimensionality of the policy space. 
 The remainder of the chapter focuses on how I use roll call vote (RCV) data from eight 
Mexican state legislatures to generate ideal points for a relatively unknown population of 
elected officials.  This, in and of itself, is a significant contribution to the study of Mexican 
politics because, to my knowledge, no other analysis has yet used a vote-choice method like 
Bayesian simulation to study the country’s legislatures – federal or local.  Not only does this 
approach allow us to map out the policy space by plotting ideological distance against an exact 
number of active dimensions, it also provides a way to incorporate prior information about 
specific parameters in the voting model.  For example, imagine a highly polarized two-party 
legislature where group discipline is especially strong; now imagine another legislature 
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populated mostly by moderates who are immune to party pressure.  One could reasonably 
model ideal points in the first legislature as having strictly bimodal distribution while ideal 
points in the second would have a more leptokurtic one.  With the Bayesian approach, one can 
freely tailor the parameters to respond to almost any difference across deputies, assemblies, 
and/or legislative periods; and unless these priors are grossly misspecified or their starting 
values unreasonable, the parameter estimates should ultimately converge to the mean of some 
stable posterior distribution. 
 
4.1 Alternative Approaches 
Naturally, the study of individual preferences in Mexican legislatures is still in its infancy 
as scholars have only recently turned their attention to these emerging institutions.  
Nevertheless, there are a few ambitious projects currently investigating the ideological profiles 
of legislative elites throughout the country.  Among the most promising is a series of analyses 
modeled after the Universidad de Salamanca project on parliamentary elites in Latin America 
(Alcántara Sáez 1998).  With a sample of 1,100 legislators representing 18 countries in the 
region, the Salamanca project uses a standardized survey to elicit responses about political 
experience, education, age, gender, etc.  Of particular interest are the self-placement scores 
indicating where respondents see themselves on the traditional left-right spectrum. 
López Lara and Loza Otero (2003) appear to be one of the first to apply this approach to 
the case of Mexican state legislatures, obtaining responses from 352 deputies in 12 federal 
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entities.117  Combine this with an impressive response rate of 77%, this study represents the 
most comprehensive analysis of legislative profiles so far for the sub-national case in Mexico. 118  
Use to examine legislative preferences in the Estado de México (Jiménez 2006), Guerrero 
(Jiménez Badillo and Licea Dorantes 2006), and Sinaloa (Hernández Norzagaray 2005), the self-
reporting method has become a staple as it provides a rather clear understanding of the 
ideological space. 
This approach, however, poses considerable challenges if it were used to obtain the 
preference measures for this particular project.  First and foremost is data availability.  That is, 
the analyses cited above all employed large teams of researchers scattered throughout the 
country conducting face-to-face interviews with each individual deputy; this is why response 
rates tend to be relatively high.  The costs of such an effort, however, are prohibitively high as I 
lacked both the personnel and the funding during the data-collection process to obtain a 
representative sample of deputies in any single state. 
Second, there is a matter of validity; in other words, do the answers deputies provide 
actually correspond with what the survey questions ask?  For example, much of the anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a deputy may not answer the questions herself, leaving that for an aide 
to do in his spare time – if he even choose to do it at all.119  There is also the potential for 
insincere answers where, for whatever the reason (party pressure, social desirability, etc.), 
deputies may simply not answer truthfully (Lopez Lara and Loza Otero 2003: 64).  Lastly, 
deputies may each have a different idea as to what positions on an ideological scale signify 
                                                                 
117
 The sample consists of Aguascalientes, Chiapas, the Federal District, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Estado de México, 
Morelos, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Tlaxcala,, and Zacatecas.  
118
 The response rate reached a high of 97% (Zacatecas) and a low of 50% (Chiapas). 
119
 Interviews: Posadas Hernández (Estado de México); Gamboa Wong (Yucatán); Menchaca Salazar (Hidalgo) 
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(Power and Zucco 2009: 224).  All of the studies mentioned so far assume a left-right ideological 
spectrum where the right-hand-side of the array traditionally indicates a preference for laissez-
faire liberal policies while the left favors a more statist approach.  Deputies may misunderstand 
the scale or have a different idea as to what the magnitude a 1-unit move on the scale means. 
Taking together these issues of validity and feasibility – which could potentially limit 
cross-comparison – I look to other means of measuring preference.  More specifically, I turn to 
statistical models of legislative activity to generate exact measures of a given legislator’s ideal 
point.120  Not only is the data more readily available but the resulting values for each sample 
are consistent and have uniform unit-values, i.e., a one-unit movement in either direction has 
the same magnitude for all legislators in the sample.  This is not to say, however, that all vote-
choice models are built the same.  In fact, most are currently unsuited to handle the 
information most Mexican states make available. 
To better understand this, consider first the NOMINATE method – the most widely-used 
approach to estimating legislative ideal points (Poole and Rosenthal 1997).   Designed explicitly 
to measure preferences in the U.S. Congress using public roll call votes, NOMINATE performs 
best when legislatures are larger than 50 members and produce more than 100 votes per 
period (Poole 2005: 115).  This, however, is not the case for Mexican state legislatures where 
the average assembly seats no more than 37 deputies.  Moreover, there is some variation in 
the number of roll call votes each state produces.  Consider Baja California during its XVIII 
legislative period (2001 – 2004) which held over 540 non-unanimous roll call votes;121 compare 
                                                                 
120
 I do not consider interest group ratings – long-used throughout the U.S. Congress literature – because, to my 
knowledge, no such measures publicly exist for either the Chamber of Deputies or state assemblies. 
121
 Unanimity – or even lop-sidedness – is not particularly useful for RCV-based methods as the lack of dissent does 
not permit researchers to discriminate one legislator from another.  More on this later. 
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this with Estado de Mexico which only held 26 non-unanimous votes.  Of the other six states I 
consider in the sample below, four recorded between 140 and 110 RCVs while the remaining 
two recorded fewer than 100 (Table 4.2).  Given this variation, any analysis using NOMINATE as 
a blanket approach to ideal point estimation – irrespective of chamber size or RCV production – 
runs a real risk of not recovering consistent and unbiased parameter estimates. 122 
Another RCV-based method is the agenda-formation approach developed by Londregan 
(1999).  It was originally developed to correct for the identification problem that affects 
methods like NOMINATE.  Specifically, Londregan (1999: 42) argues that the 
“…problem arises because each proposal is put to a vote only one time.  If two 
proposals each receive the support of the same group of ‘aye’ voters, and meet 
with the opposition of the same coalition of ‘nay’ voters, then their estimated 
locations will be identical.  This is a classic case of overfitting, and…has 
mischievous consequences, preventing identification of any of the parameters.” 
In other words, each proposal is assumed to be a unique event, unrelated to other proposals, 
requiring vote-choice methods to estimate at least one parameter per proposal.   Londregan 
(1999: 48 – 49) suggests reducing the number of parameters by modeling the agenda-setting 
process: differentiate proposals by author/policy area, identify partisan pressures, and/or 
model the level of ‘consensus’ legislators reach prior to submitting proposals for final approval.  
This, however, may not be the best approach for the Mexican case either, especially when we 
know so little about state legislatures.  That is, any “specification error will, in general, 
contaminate our estimates of the voting parameters” (Londregan 1999: 51).  So without first 
                                                                 
122
 This is not to say NOMINATE, or the updated DW-NOMINATE, should not be used on certain Mexican state 
legislatures, like Veracruz, which regularly records 100+ RCVs and seats 50 deputies. 
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developing a better understanding of how proposals reach the plenary – which is what this 
thesis attempts to do – I do not want to risk the validity of the ideal point estimates.   
A third method of obtaining statistical measures of legislative ideal points has recently 
been developed, one which differs starkly from the RCV approaches I have already discussed 
(including Bayesian simulation).  Alemán, Calvo, Jones, and Kaplan (2009) suggest using co-
sponsorship rather than roll call votes to recover a legislator’s ideological position.  The critical 
point here is that co-sponsorship is a voluntary activity in which legislators affix their names to 
a given proposal; consequently, the rate of non-sponsors will usually be high when compared to 
level absences/abstentions observed for RCVs what with quorum requirements and the like.  
The dilemma then for Alemán et al. (2009: 93) is how to classify non-sponsors, whose exclusion 
would severely bias the results of any RCV approach in favor of the most active legislators. 
A solution is to construct an affiliation matrix where each cell indicates the number of 
times a pair of legislators votes together, using this information to estimate individual ideal 
points with principal components analysis.123  Although the authors admit several conceptual 
weaknesses of co-sponsorship as a signal of preference, methodologically this approach is 
particularly well-suited for situations where RCVs are not frequently recorded, e.g., Mexico and 
other Latin American countries.124  This approach is even more compelling for the Mexican 
case, especially when one considers the growing number of initiatives deputies are now 
themselves drafting, increasing the opportunities to co-sponsor (Beer 2003: 86).   
                                                                 
123
 A Bayesian Item-Response Model is also an appropriate way to estimate these parameters, although the 
authors chose to present the PCA estimates for the sake of simplicity (Alemán et al. 2009: 96). 
124
 Although every document outlining legislative rules in Mexico now requires each committee report be 
approved using a roll call vote (votación nominal), public records of these votes might only mention if the bill 
passed by a majority or unanimously.  The actual vote tallies are usually either misplaced/disposed or restricted to 
internal use. 
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Nevertheless, this approach is relatively new and untested for a broad set of cases.125  It 
is certainly flexible and does not have any of the size requirements plaguing other RCV-based 
approaches; however, the Bayesian simulation method I discuss in the following section is not 
only an established process but the Bayesian paradigm itself is also conceptually appealing as a 
general approach to statistical inference.  Although I certainly intend to explore sponsor-based 
measures of Mexican preferences in the future – so as to possibly avoid many of the pitfalls of 
using roll call data (more on this later) – I employ Bayesian approach in the meantime to handle 
the immediate problems of small legislatures and few roll call votes.  
 
4.2 Estimating Legislative Ideal Points via Bayesian Simulation 
War, electoral victory, regime stability – these are complex social events political 
scientists have long sought to explain.  Over the years, methods of evaluating these 
explanations have progressed dramatically in terms of sophistication and theoretical rigor.    For 
example, the parameters thought to define an event – the probability it occurs, its duration, 
etc. – have long been viewed as “truly fixed and unchanging under all realistic circumstances” 
(Gill 2008: 3).  After observing an event enough times, the ‘true’ value of a parameter should 
become apparent, a perspective otherwise known as frequentism.  This perspective, however, 
has changed over the last decade as an increasing number of researchers now subscribe to a 
different paradigm, one which assumes (1) a distribution of data has a specific functional form 
and can be used to construct a likelihood function; (2) parameters have distributional qualities 
and are not fixed values; and (3) a prior distribution exists for the parameters of interest 
                                                                 
125
 Only the U.S. House and the Argentine Chamber of Deputies have been considered. 
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unconditional on the data (Gill 2008: 5).  This approach represents – with the support of 
simulation methods (more on this later) – a considerable advancement in statistical inference: 
analysts are now in a position to insert whatever previous knowledge they may have directly 
into models of hypothesized relationships and update them as information becomes available.   
To see why this is possible, first consider that the conditional probability of A given B is 
given by:  
`(|a) = (b,d)(d) ,     (4.1)  
where `(|a)is the probability of A given B; `(, a)is the joint probability that both A and B 
occur; and `(a) is unconditional probability B occurs (Gill 2008: 10). 
 Next, define a different conditional probability in which A occurs first: 
`(a|) = (d,b)(b) ,     (4.2)  
Since `(, a) = `(a, ), (4.1) and (4.2) can be arranged so that 
`(, a) = `(|a)`(a) 
`(a, ) = `(a|)`() 
`(|a)`(a) = `(a|)`() 
`(|a) = (b)(d) `(a|).    (4.3)  
Equation (4.3) is otherwise known as Bayes’ Law, which is a way to invert conditional 
probabilities.  In terms of statistical estimation, (4.3) can be rewritten so that A is now θ, our 
parameter of interest; B is X, the sample data; and  g(h|i) ∝ p(i|h): 
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`(h|i) ∝ `(h)g(h|i),    (4.4)126  
where `(h)is denoted as the prior distribution, which models any pertinent information one 
may already have about the particular distribution of parameter θ; and `(h|i) is the posterior 
distribution of the parameter θ given the observed data and one’s prior beliefs about the 
parameter’s distributional properties.  Under this interpretation, what we know about θ can be 
freely updated.   
 In addition to this ability to update, the Bayesian approach also provides us with a level 
of analytical rigor that is unmatched by the classic frequentist approach.  By specifying a prior 
distribution – whether it be an uninformative one like the uniform distribution or an 
informative power prior– the Bayesian method permits analysts to formally model any 
underlying assumptions they may have about the parameter of interest (Gill 2008: 155).  While 
critics claim this introduces an unnecessary amount of ‘subjectivity’ to the overall model, the 
Bayesian response is that all model selection is ostensibly subjective.  In that vein, any 
“inferential paradigm that gives the most overt presentation of assumptions,” like the Bayesian 
approach, should be preferred over others that do not, ceteris paribus (Gill 2008: 27). 
Unfortunately, the Bayesian approach has only recently gained ground in the discipline – 
although not for a lack of philosophical adherents.  The major obstacle has been the lack of 
computing power to handle the complex analytical integrations necessary to obtain the 
posterior distribution (Gill 2008: 29; Jackman 2000a).  However, with the introduction of 
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation methods, the task has simply become a matter 
                                                                 
126
 Formally, (4.3) is rewritten as `(h|i) = (l)(i) `(i|h), but because the actual data has already been observed, `(i) = 1, the denominator for the prior can be effectively discarded as a “normalizing constant since it does not 
change the relative probabilities for A” (Gill 2008: 17).  
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of iteratively exploring the sample space until settling into the target distribution, effectively 
replacing an analytical problem with a sampling problem (Gill 2008: 29).  MCMC simulation 
proves especially critical for ideal point estimation as maximizing the likelihood function for the 
vote-choice model would typically involve a large number of parameters; as the sample grows, 
so too does the number of parameters, which makes locating the likelihood’s maximum all the 
more difficult.  However, before proceeding any further, I first describe the vote-choice model 
used to obtain a deputy’s latent utilities within a given policy space. 
4.2.1 Model Specification 
Developed originally to evaluate ‘latent ability’ in educational testing contexts (Rasch 
1961), the vote choice model of Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) is relatively straightforward 
in its specification.  The data is organized as an m × o matrix where n legislators (i = 1, …, n) 
vote “Yea” (rj) or “Nay” (ψj) on m roll call votes (j, …, m) within a d-dimensional policy space, 
ℝd .  Legislators are assumed to have quadratic utility over ℝd , such that: 
"wrx = −y& − ryz + |,  |~(0,1), 
"w~x = −y& − ~yz + , ~(0,1), 
where & ∈ ℝ is the ideal point of legislator i; the stochastic terms, | and , have a joint 
normal distribution with (|) = (), varw| − x = z, and are independent across n 
and m; and ∙ is the Euclidean norm.  Let ∗ = "wrx − "w~x be a latent utility differential, 
linked to the observed data via the assumption of utility maximization, such that: 
 = 1  
∗ > 0
0  ∗ ≤ 0. 
It follows that,  
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   `w = 1x  = ` "wrx > "w~x 
     = `  − | < y − ~yz − y − ryz 
     = `  − | < 2wr − ~xz + ~z − rz 
     = w − αx,     (4.5)  
where  = 2 wr − ~xz  ,  = (rz − ~z)  ,  is an unobserved regressor corresponding 
to &, and (∙) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.  
Equation (4.6) is simply the probit model where the regressor  is the legislator’s ideal point 
and the coefficient βj is the direction of the jth roll call relative to the ‘Nay’ position. 
 Given the earlier assumption of independence, the likelihood function is specified as: 
g(, , i| ) = ∏ ∏ (¢£¤V¤  − )¥¦ × (1 − (¢ − )§¥¦, (4.6)  
where B is an o × ¨ with jth row ,  = (, … , £)′, X is an m × ¨ matrix with ith row ¢, 
and Y is the m × o matrix of observed votes with (, «)th element . 
4.2.2 Gibbs Sampler 
 When dealing with roll call data, we only observe Y; that is, each legislator i voted on 
the jth vote.  Yet, maximizing the likelihood to obtain estimates of unobserved X, B, and α may 
prove problematic because any d-dimensional vote-choice model with m × o data leads to a 
statistical model withm¨ + o(¨ + 1) parameters.  So as the sample grows so does the number 
of parameters, which may cause maximum likelihood estimators to lose their optimality 
properties (Clinton et al. 2004: 358).  Consider the ‘average’ state legislature in Mexico – where 
n = 35, m = 120, and d = 1 – which yields p = 275.  For the actual sample of state legislatures, 
Table 4.1 lists the number of parameters when the policy space is both one- and two-
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dimensional.  The point here is that even when one excludes the extreme case of Baja California 
(XVII), the number of parameters is still quite substantial and may prove too large for traditional 
estimation. 
 
State (Legislative Period) Legislators Roll Call Votes  p 
 (n)  (m) d = 1 d = 2 
Baja California (XVII: 2001 - 2004) 25 541 1107 1673 
Baja California (XVIII: 2004 - 2007) 25 264 553 842 
Campeche (LVIII: 2003 – 2006) 35 92 219 346 
Guanajuato (LIX: 2003 – 2006) 36 127 290 453 
Estado de México (LV: 2003 – 2006) 75 26 127 228 
Morelos (XLIX: 2003 -2006) 30 80 190 300 
Puebla (LVI: 2004 – 2007) 41 135 311 487 
Veracruz (LX: 2004 – 2007) 50 110 270 430 
Zacatecas (LVII: 2001 – 2004) 32 112 256 400 
Zacatecas (LVIII: 2004 – 2007) 32 124 280 436 
 
TABLE 4.1.  Number of Parameters in Roll Call Analyses.  When trying to obtain values for the 
unobserved parameters in (4.7) via direct estimation (e.g., MLE), the number of parameters 
grows in direct relation to sample size: p = nd + m(d + 1).  This may prove too much of a task 
for MLE to perform as the number of parameters would make finding the maximum value for a 
given likelihood function considerably more difficult to locate. 
  
To overcome this analytical problem, Bayesian analysts suggest reimagining it as a 
sampling problem where the number of parameters is fixed and the goal is to  
“compute the joint posterior density for all model parameters βj and αj, j = 
1,…,m, and xi, i = 1 …,n.  A Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm provides a 
computer-intensive exploration or ‘random tour’ of this joint density by 
successively sampling from the conditional densities that together characterize 
the joint density” (Clinton et al 2004: 367). 
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 The Gibbs sampler (Geman and Geman 1984) is one of the more popular MCMC 
algorithms where θ is a d -length vector of coefficients whose posterior distributions we want 
to describe.  For the present vote-choice model specified in (4.6), let h = (∗ ,  , & , , ), 
indexing iterations of the Gibbs sampler by t.  Using an arbitrary set of starting values for the 
parameters h°§, the transition to h° proceeds as follows (Clinton et al. 2004; Jackman 2000a): 
1. Sample h∗from a ‘jumping’ distribution `(h∗|h§°§), which for equation (4.7) 
would mean 
i. `w∗ ±, , ² , x. 
ii. `w² , ±∗ , x. 
iii. `w±∗ , ² , x. 
2. Increment to t + 1, using h∗ as the next iteration’s starting values and repeat 
until convergence.127 
In short, sampling from the distributions in step 1 updates all unknown quantities in (4.6) 
yielding the sequence ³ = ³(°), ³(°´), ³(°´z), … ³(°´µ), where  ³(°) = ((°), (°), i(°)).  This 
sequence ³ is otherwise known as a Markov chain (Gill 2008; Clinton et al. 2004; Jackman 
2000a; Jackman 200b).  Specifically, the properties of a Markov chain are such that as ¶ W ∞, 
the Gibbs sampler produces successively better approximations to the desired posterior 
density, and does so relatively quickly.  Given a large enough k, the output can be “validly 
regarded as samples from the posterior…[where] summaries of these samples amount to 
                                                                 
127
 The Gibbs sampler is actually a special case of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Metropolis et al. 1952; 
Hastings 1970), a method defining an entire class of h°§ ⟹ h° transitions.  What makes the Gibbs sampler 
different is that it samples each j element of  h° conditional on all other elements, h§°§, whereas the M-H 
algorithm samples conditional on all elements of h°.  This difference forces the algorithm to automatically select h∗, which it would not  always do in its general form. 
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summaries of the posterior, which can be used for inference and communication” (Jackman 
2000b: 308).  For present purposes, these summaries amount to the mean values of xi, a 
legislator’s ideal point.  An added benefit of the Gibbs sampler is that additional parameters of 
uncertainty, i.e., standard errors, are estimated simultaneously, whereas methods like 
NOMINATE require an additional step. 
 Having outlined the general machinery underlying Bayesian simulation, the next section 
outlines the specific values I use to obtain this all-important measure of legislative preference. 
 
4.3 The Sample 
 A major concern at the beginning of this project was the impact of data limitations on 
external validity.  That is, to evaluate any prediction about spatial relationships in Mexico – and 
apply the results to political behavior elsewhere – the sample of state legislatures must be large 
enough to control for confounding factors like majority-party status and economic 
development.  The initial challenges then were to identify which legislatures provided enough 
information on deputy preferences and determine if this sample represented a diverse enough 
range of interesting cases. 
4.3.1 Mexico as a ‘Natural Laboratory’ 
Because of its centralized approach to federalism, Mexico serves as a ‘natural 
laboratory’ where certain factors can be held constant while others are allowed to vary 
(Chapter 2).  For example, sub-national governments in the United States are free to constitute 
themselves as they see fit, leading to significant differences in political organization throughout 
the country (Squire and Hamm 2005); yet in Mexico, states must maintain a relatively fixed 
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system of separated powers, mixed-member elections, and fiscal dependence.  Statistically 
speaking, this lack of variation means regime type cannot have an independent effect on any of 
the hypothesized relationships because every observed outcome occurs within the same 
institutional setting.  In this vein, researchers can credibly assume Mexican states all share a 
relatively common history, culture, normative outlook, etc. – an assumption that does not hold 
for some cross-national studies where these factors can distort or even mask the true political 
relationships that interest us. 
At the same time, we find post-hegemonic Mexico is now subject to variation along 
other factors as well, such as party competition, the presence of unified government, and the 
level of economic development.  Given the rise of electoral pluralism, former opposition parties 
are now not only in a position to share real political power with the former hegemon, but they 
have also proven successful in developing their own strongholds of support, forcing the PRI to 
concede its presence in many parts of the country.128  A cursory examination of Tables A.3 
through A.5, which document party control in all 31 states over the past three legislative 
periods, concretely reveals the plural nature of Mexican politics today.   
Similarly, variation is observed on an economic dimension as well: after fifteen years of 
market liberalization there is now – for better or worse –a considerable range in the level of 
economic development (Crandall 2005: 77).129  In Figure 4.1, I graph state-level per capita 
income to illustrate the wide gulf separating wealthy states from the less developed.  This is 
                                                                 
128
 PAN: Baja California, Guanajuato, Jalisco; PRD: Baja California Sur, Michoacán, Zacatecas. 
129
 Mexico currently ranks 91
st
 out of 126 countries in terms of income equality, with a Gini coefficient of 0.46.  
Values near 1 include total inequality whereas those near 0 indicate total equality (United Nations 2008). 
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particularly evident when one considers the difference between north (yellow) and south (red) 
as the former benefits immensely from cross-border trade with the United States.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.1.  Average Per Capita Income in 31 Mexican States, 2004 – 2006. There is a relatively 
wide distribution of wealth in Mexico (Gini = .46), which is made particularly evident by the 
disparity between northern and southern border regions. Sources: Instituto Nacional Estadística 
y Geografía; United Nations Development Programme. 
 
Against this backdrop of a fixed institutional/historical/cultural setting, I am well-
positioned to isolate the specific effects party competition and economic development on the 
hypothesized relationships.  The value of this project thus extends beyond evaluating models of 
legislative politics in Mexican states as a whole; instead, by collecting a sample that captures 
variation in competition and development I can compare model performance under a number 
of plausible scenarios.   
The first factor has obvious importance as multiparty competition is now an established 
feature of political life in Mexico.  Because the PRI, PAN, and PRD are all in a position to win 
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elected office, it is of particular interest to examine how differently they each govern once they 
do reach office.  Similarly, it is important to understand the legislative process when a single 
party holds a majority as opposed to a legislature where no majority party exists, especially as 
non-majority legislatures are increasingly becoming the norm. 
With respect to the second factor the ability of legislators to assert their legal 
prerogatives should increase with the amount of taxable resources they collect.  States enjoy 
exclusive tax authority over two specific areas, payroll and automobile registration (Courchene 
and Diaz-Cayeros 2000: 217).  So, as states attract more investment and trade – like in the 
north following the passage of NAFTA – payrolls should increase and transportation take on 
greater importance (Diario de Chihuahua; Negrete 2007; El Siglo de Durango 2006).  The end 
result is a larger state budget, which legislators can use to fortify their constitutional position 
(Cortina 2004; Solt 2004).   
Returning to the original question of data availability, the only way to properly control 
for these two factors is to have information on legislative preferences from a large enough 
sample of states.  Without a large sample, little else can be said about anything more than the 
particular circumstances of a given state.   So absent interest group ratings, ready access to 
survey data, and a country-specific literature, measuring legislative preferences in Mexico 
largely hinges on the same RCV data NOMINATE and Bayesian simulation methods use to 
estimate ideal points.130  The next section will describe the data collection process in detail, but 
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 Once again, Alemán et al. (2009) may prove to be a useful alternative to RCV approaches, especially in 
legislative systems where roll call votes are not always available (like Mexico); however, due to the timing of this 
project and the doubts surrounding what co-sponsorship actually signals, I choose to use Bayesian simulation 
instead. 
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before doing so, I would like to briefly discuss the issue of roll call votes and their ability to 
convey a Mexican deputy’s true preferences.   
4.3.2 Roll Call Votes as a Measure of Preference? 
The first criticism of an RCV-based approach is that roll call votes are used strategically 
and do not reflect true legislative preferences (Carey 2009; Carrubba 2008; Carrubba, Gabel, 
Murrah, Clough, Montgomery and Schambach 2006).  That is, party leaders use roll call votes to 
induce discipline by forcing legislators to publicly assert their support; or, equally plausible, 
legislators might not vote their true preferences because of constituent pressures to vote 
another way.  Whatever the motivation, the public nature of a roll call vote makes them 
vulnerable to outside influence.  
And yet for the Mexican case, roll call votes (votaciones nominales) may not suffer from 
as pronounced of a selection effect as a typical strong-party system might otherwise.  That is, 
parties cannot restrict roll call voting once proposals reach the plenary floor.  Every proposal 
committees discharge must be approved via roll call; the same applies for amendments which 
are introduced on an ad hoc basis following the votación en lo general.  Now, this is not to say 
parties or other legislative leaders do not manipulate public access to the vote record; in fact, 
the sample I detail below is somewhat smaller than what is actually available.131  But if an 
assembly makes the record of its proceedings accessible to the public, then there is little either 
the party or the legislative leadership can do to prevent a roll call vote once a proposal reaches 
the floor.  Although it is difficult to say at this point what happens prior to the floor, if a diverse 
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 Either states restrict access to these votes (e.g., Coahuila) or they do not preserve the physical record (e.g., 
Michoacán, Yucatán, Puebla), choosing to either discard it or conveniently ‘misplace it’.  Interview: Abarca 
Salvatori (Puebla); Ceballos Quintal (Yucatán). 
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enough sample can be found where legislatures do record roll calls, then there is little worry 
about this particular selection effect influencing the voting decisions.  Moreover, not every vote 
should be biased in favor of the ruling majority. 
The second criticism frequently levied against RCV-based analyses is that it is 
problematic to test a statistical model using independent and dependent variables generated 
from the same data.  In the present analysis, those variables would be ideal points and the 
probability of voting with the majority, respectively (Hypotheses V.1 – V.3).  In response, I turn 
to Cox and McCubbins (2005: 30), who argue parties only target key procedural and final votes, 
like those on internal rules and the budget.  The first ne set of votes governs the distribution of 
power within the legislature and the second provides electoral benefits for the ruling party.  
Consequently, I use every roll call vote held during a given legislative period to generate deputy 
ideal points, but use only a select sample of roll call votes to measure the dependent variable.  
This way, I can (1) maximize the amount of information used to estimate ideal points by 
considering every roll call vote deputies cast while (2) I only focus on proposals serving 
partisan/electoral purposes – like budgetary bills – when calculating the probability a deputy 
votes with the majority.132  In fact, as I show in Chapter 5, ideal points generated from the two 
different sets of roll call votes are not the same, alleviating some of the concern. 
Obviously, while this brief discussion cannot eliminate the possibility that roll call votes 
are used strategically or are evaluated improperly, it should show that the Mexican case can 
provide a solution to partly mitigate these problems.  The next section will discuss the RCV data 
                                                                 
132
 Procedural votes are almost always voice votes (votaciones económicas) which are never publicly recorded. 
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used to generate ideal points and describe the specific starting values used to execute the 
Bayesian simulation method. 
4.3.3 Data Collection 
 There is practically no previous information about the availability of roll call votes in 
Mexican state legislatures.  The initial stages of this project involved either contacting all 31 
states directly or consulting their websites to determine if roll call vote records were available 
for public access.  In total I find that 16 state legislatures currently record legislative information 
(Table A.9).  Although this sample constitutes over half of the states in the Mexican federation, 
ranging from one-party strongholds to multiparty assemblies, they vary considerably in the 
exact availability of roll call data.  The legislature in Baja California has records dating back at 
least until 2001, all of which are readily available on its website; the Coahuila assembly, on the 
other hand, records all roll call votes but only makes them available for internal use.  In 
between those two extremes is a range of legislative systems which currently provide roll call 
date while varying in partisan composition and economic development.  For the most part, I 
exclude states requiring direct consultation of the physical archives.133  Also, I only consider 
legislative periods completed before August 2008.134 
The end result is a sample of state legislatures which, while relatively small, yields an 
interesting range of cases (Table 4.2).  That is, in addition to spanning various party systems and 
                                                                 
133
 I had previously collected roll call data for Tlaxcala (LVIII: 2005 – 2008); however, following a catastrophic loss of 
data in spring 2008, the lack of time and funding prevented me from collecting this information again. With 
respect to Zacatecas, most of the information is available digitally; so while the size and quantity of the relevant 
files precluded electronic delivery, it was readily accessible when I visited a second time.  And while Michoacán 
provides audio files for all of its legislative sessions, the high volume of roll call votes has prohibited me from 
coding them all. 
134
 This cutoff was chosen because it marked the end of the funding expressly designated for data collection.  This, 
however, should have little bearing on the validity of the data. 
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levels of economic development, the sample also allows for more exacting comparisons. For 
example, the sample includes majority party strongholds for the PRI in Puebla, the PAN in 
Guanajuato, and the PRD in Zacatecas; moreover, these three states are all relatively similar in 
terms of economic development (see Table A.6 for exact per capita figures). By focusing on 
these three states, I can compare how each of the major parties rules in an ‘average’ state.  The 
sample also includes PRI governments at different levels of development (Campeche – High; 
Puebla – Medium; and Veracruz – Low); this is a particularly interesting comparison given the 
history of PRI hegemony as well as the party’s resurgence over the past two years.135  
With respect to a more dynamic comparison, there is enough roll call information to 
cover two legislative periods in both Baja California and Zacatecas.  And while the PAN in Baja 
California does not have a legislative majority as the PRD does in Zacatecas, the PAN still 
controls 12 of the assembly’s 25 seats, the governorship, and most of the important 
municipalities.  So, in this way, I can compare how legislative politics change from one session 
to the next in states ruled by very different parties. 
This sample also offers an opportunity to examine how legislatures are governed when 
no single party enjoys a majority.  Aside from Baja California and Zacatecas, one of the most 
interesting cases of ‘coalition’ legislatures is Estado de México – the prototypical example of a 
plural legislature where all three major parties effectively share power.  The same holds for 
Morelos, the state is much smaller than Estado de México and the PAN, rather than a PRI, rules. 
                                                                 
135
 Beginning with Yucatán in 2007, the PRI has made significant advances ahead of the midterm federal election 
on July 2, 2009.  For example In 2007 alone, the PRI became the ruling party in ten of the 14 state elections, leaving 
the PAN and the PRD with just two each (Consulta Mitofsky 2008; Romero Miranda 2007). 
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Finally, the sample collectively spans a relatively similar and, more importantly, a rather 
eventful period of time: 2000 traditionally marks a fundamental change in Mexican politics 
what with the election of the first non-PRI president.  While data limitations prevent RCV-based 
analysis prior to 2001, the information I do have permits me to explore one of the more 
interesting moments in the country’s history, helping answer: what was the nature of local 
politics following the first alternation of power? 
With respect to the previous discussion about the advantages of Bayesian simulation, 
one will notice in Table 4.2 the relatively large volume of roll call votes held during each 
legislative period.  At the low end of the range, Estado de México records 256 votes, which, in 
and of itself, is a sufficient number of RCVs to conduct analysis using NOMINATE and other 
approaches.  However, the amounts reported in Table 4.2 do not distinguish between 
unanimous and non-unanimous votes.  This is a critical distinction as lopsidedness – where 
votes experience marginal dissent, if any – restricts the amount of information available to 
distinguish legislators from one another.  As I show in the following section, the number of roll 
call votes drops dramatically once this restriction of non-lopsidedness is put into effect, 
requiring the use of Bayesian simulation to obtain the desired parameter values. 
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State Legislative Period Ruling Party 
(% Share) 
2nd Party 
(% Share) 
Economic 
Development 
# Roll Call 
Votes 
Baja California I XVII: 2001 – 2004  PAN (48%) PRI (44%) High 1180 
Baja California II XVIII: 2004 – 2007  PAN (48%) PRI (36%) High 995 
Campeche LVIII: 2003 – 2006 PRI (51%) PAN (37%) High 304 
Estado de Mexico LV: 2003 – 2006 PRI (37%) PAN/PRD (56%) Medium 256 
Guanajuato136 LIX: 2003 – 2006 PAN (53%) PRI (25%) Medium 444 
Morelos XLIX: 2003 – 2006 PAN (30%) PRD/PRI (54%) Medium 268 
Puebla LVI: 2005 – 2008  PRI (63%) PAN (25%) Medium 483 
Veracruz LX: 2004 – 2007 PRI (44%) PAN (42%) Low 329 
Zacatecas I LVII: 2001 – 2004 PRD (43%) PRI (33%)  Low 614 
Zacatecas II LVIII: 2004 – 2007 PRD (50%) PRI (33%) Low 624 
 
TABLE 4.2.  The Sample of Mexican State Legislatures.  Although not a large sample – and by no 
means ‘representative’ – it does provide several interesting cases to examine: PRI governments 
across levels of economic development; major strongholds for the three major parties; 
prototypical examples of coalition government (Estado de México and Morelos), etc.  Moreover, 
this sample provides the first concrete data on legislative voting in Mexican state legislatures.  
Sources:  available upon request. 
 
4.3.4 Estimation 
 Returning to the discussion on Bayes’ Law, the relationship between prior and posterior 
beliefs is specified in the following manner: 
`(h| ) ∝ `(h)g(h| ),    (4.5)  
where `(h| ) is the distribution of θ given the data Y, g(h| ) is the likelihood function of the 
model f, and `(h) is information about the distribution of θ prior to observing Y.  For present 
purposes, Equation (4.7) is  g(h| ); θ  is our quantity of interest, a legislator’s ideal point (xi); 
and  Y are the roll call votes observed during the legislative periods listed in Table 4.2   
Specifically, I code y = 1 when a deputy votes ‘yea’ on a vote and y = 0 when she votes ‘nay’. 
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 A total of 538 roll call votes were held during this legislative period.  However, it was not until July 2004 when 
they were officially recorded in their totality; and while audio records do exist, they are largely inaudible.  
Nevertheless, 444 remains a large enough number to preserve generalizability. 
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Now, in almost any other setting this specification would likely capture all possible vote 
choices; however, in Mexico, deputies can choose from three options rather than just two: 
‘yea’, ‘nay’, or abstain.  Moreover, abstentions cannot simply be discarded as missing 
observations.  Yes, deputies may abstain because they either lack information or face a conflict 
of interest, providing researchers with little information about their true legislative 
preferences.137  However, with the exception of Guanajuato, the consensus view is that 
abstentions are actually low-cost signals deputies use to express dissent (Heller and Weldon 
2001).138  Abstentions are not considered costly because (1) they usually occur when a given 
proposal is expected to pass by a large margin and (2) in some states, are counted as votes in 
favor of the majority position.139  For these reasons, I code abstention as ‘nays’ (y = 0) when 
generating ideal points; however, when measuring the probability a deputy votes with the 
majority,140 I code abstentions as either missing observations  or as votes for the  majority 
position, depending on what the organic law stipulates.141 
With respect to the prior, `(&), the literature universally assumes that legislative 
preferences in Mexico are distributed according to a left-right cleavage  whereby panistas are 
on the right, perredistas are on the left, and the priístas are somewhere in the middle.  Yet 
despite any academic consensus, I am reluctant to construct `(&) on the basis of this 
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 In Guanajuato, deputies cannot abstain unless they cite a conflict of interest (GOL: Article 177). 
138
 Interviews: Chávez Ríos (Hidalgo); Morales Morales (Tlaxcala); Duarte Ramírez (Michoacán); Posadas Hernández 
(Estado de México), Alarcón Hernández (Puebla). 
139
 COL: Article 80; EMRO: Article 115; ZRO: Article 130. 
140
 Although I will discuss it at greater length in Chapter 5, this probability is simply the proportion of times a 
deputy votes with the majority. 
141
 Abstentions in Guanajuato are unconditionally coded as missing observations. 
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information because the literature assumes a left-right dimension but rarely tests for it. 142  For 
example, consider the analysis of legislative parties in the state of Guerrero (Jiménez Badillo 
and Licea 2006: 25):  the main variable measuring preference is generated from the survey 
question, “Using an ideological scale where 1 is left and 10 is right: where would you place 
yourself?”143  Rather than allow a respondent to offer her own views about the policy space, 
this question instead forces her to think in terms of left and right; this is obviously problematic 
if political conflict stems from other, distinct cleavages like the government-opposition split or 
the tension between urban and rural deputies.144 
Rather than build a prior based on what we know about Mexican state politics – which is 
very little – I instead use one which will help remedy a major methodological issue that afflicts 
most spatial models of vote choice, the lack of identification (Poole 2005; Jackman 2001; 
Londregan 1999).  “If two proposals receive the support of the same group of ‘aye’ votes, and 
meet with the opposition of the same coalition of ‘nay’ voters, then their estimated locations 
will be identical” (Londregan 1999: 42).  To resolve this issue I follow the lead of Jackman (2001: 
230) and assume as my prior &~(0,1) and that the policy space is unidimensional , d = 1.  
This last assumption should not be problematic at this stage because first, it greatly facilitates 
the estimation process since the vote-choice model is a simple linear regression when d = 1; 
second, since we know little about the dimensionality of the policy space in Mexican state 
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 If I were intent on modeling  the prior distribution of x2 to reflect a left-right dimension, then I would initially fix x2= 1 for the PAN coordinator; x2= 0 for the PRI coordinator; and x2=- 1 for the PRD coordinator (similar to how 
Jones and Hwang, 2005, model their own left-right prior). 
143
 Spanish translation: “Utilizando una escala ideológica donde 1 sea izquierda y 10 derecha: ¿dónde se ubicará 
usted?” 
144
 In fact, several deputies made it clear that politics in their state was not a matter of socioeconomic issues; 
although there was certainly conflict in this dimension, what tended to dominate was the conflict between the 
party in power and those in the opposition.  Interviews: Micalco Méndez (Puebla); Alarcón Hernández (Puebla); 
Chávez Ríos (Hidalgo). 
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legislatures, it is prudent to first assume as few dimensions as possible and then build up from 
that.  Conveniently, Bayesian simulation yield estimates for model parameters aside from x2, 
which can be used to diagnose multidimensionality (Jackman 2001).  More on this in the 
following section. 
 After specifying the right-hand side of (4.7), I turned to the PSCL statistical package to 
obtain simulated parameters from the Gibbs sampler (Jackman 2008).  As a matter of 
‘housecleaning’, I first omit all deputies who participated in less than 20% of votes; however, 
unlike other roll call analyses, I do not need to exclude any non-unanimous lop-sided votes, 
(Clinton et al. 2004: 359). 145  Because the Gibbs sampler reaches a stable distribution relatively 
quickly, I can obtain any point estimate of interest for any level of certainty; it is simply a matter 
of running a large enough number of iterations.  In that vein, I set the Gibbs sampler to run for 
500,000 iterations, recording every 500th iteration after the first 25,000 are run.  The result is a 
sample of 950 estimates for each cell in B and X.  With these estimates, I calculate the mean 
values » and ¼ and report them as my point estimates (assuming ¼ = &); moreover, unlike 
the NOMINATE and co-sponsorship methods, measures of uncertainty like standard errors  are 
calculated simultaneously. 
 In Table 4.3, I list the number of legislators and roll call votes used to generate the two 
parameters of interest; ideal point estimates and confidence intervals for each deputy are listed 
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 Thresholds on participation – like the 20% here – are generally used to exclude legislators whose brief voting 
records are not particularly informative.  Although simulation would remedy this rather easily, my motivation for 
using a threshold is not for statistical reasons.  Every deputy in Mexico is assigned a suplente who may assume the 
seat in the incumbent’s absence.  However, these substitutes usually only take office for short periods of time; 
similarly, there may be incumbents who are only in office at the beginning of the period, leaving their substitutes 
to hold office for the majority of the term.  All else being equal, these short-term deputies should have little 
bearing on real legislative business and should not factor as major legislative players.  Additionally, when I graphed 
the number of times a legislator voted, there was a distinct drop-off around the 20
th
 percentile (graphs available 
upon request). 
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in the Appendix (Tables A.10 – A.19).146  Notably, the number of deputies per legislative period 
corresponds very closely with the number of seats per legislature (Tables A.3 – A.4), lending 
some credence to the 20% threshold.  Another interesting point is the large drop-off in the 
number of non-unanimous roll call votes when compared with the total number of votes (Table 
4.2; Table 4.1; Figure 2.9), illustrating exactly why I chose to use the Bayesian simulation 
approach as opposed to alternative methodologies.  In the next section, I explore these ideal 
points more closely, beginning first with a discussion about the stability of the posterior 
distribution and then the dimensionality of the policy space. 
 
Legislative Period Deputies Non-Unanimous RCVs 
Baja California (XVII: 2001 - 2004) 25 541 
Baja California (XVIII: 2004 - 2007) 25 264 
Campeche (LVIII: 2003 – 2006) 35 92 
Guanajuato (LIX: 2003 – 2006) 36 127 
Estado de México (LV: 2003 – 2006) 74 26 
Morelos (XLIX: 2003 -2006) 30 80 
Puebla (LVI: 2004 – 2007) 41 135 
Veracruz (LX: 2004 – 2007) 49 110 
Zacatecas (LVII: 2001 – 2004) 32 112 
Zacatecas (LVIII: 2004 – 2007) 32 124 
 
TABLE 4.3.  Roll Call Data Used to Generate Sample Ideal Points.  Two points are particularly 
noteworthy:  first, the close correspondence between the number of deputies in the sample and 
the total number of seats is nearly perfect, supporting the 20% threshold; second, there is a 
large drop-off in the number of RCVs when unanimous ones are excluded.  This is another 
reason why the Bayesian approach is an appropriate method for these particular analyses. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
146
 I have also generated ideal points where abstentions are coded as missing observations and have found they do 
not yield a substantively different set of regression coefficients for the models in Chapter 5; as such I only discuss 
ideal points where abstentions are coded as ‘nays’.  I discuss this at greater length in Chapter 5. 
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4.4 Describing the Policy Space 
 With the mean of `(| ) assumed to represent a legislator’s true ideal point, I have 
now effectively constructed a map of the policy space for each legislative period in my sample.  
However, before these maps can inform our understanding of state level politics in Mexico, it is 
critical that I evaluate their statistical validity.   
First, are the posterior distributions for each of the parameters stable?  In other words, 
the Gibbs sampler essentially ‘wanders’ the range of possible values until it settles within a 
particular distribution.  This Markovian property (ergodicity), while reliable, is nevertheless 
asymptotic.  As more iterations are run – i.e., the Markov chain increases in length – we can be 
increasingly certain that that the marginal distributions have converged to the parameter’s 
posterior.  However, convergence is not guaranteed, allowing for the possibility that the 
Markov chain will continue to ‘wander’ and never settle down in a fixed distribution.  If this is 
true for the present roll call data, then the reported means cannot be said to represent 
legislative preferences. 
Second, there is the issue of dimensionality.  While the parameter estimates cannot say 
anything about the qualitative nature of the cleavages dividing a legislature, they can provide 
us with some idea about how many dimensions there are.  This is important for two reasons.  
First – outside of survey data – the literature lacks an empirical basis for the claim that a single 
dimension dominates political conflict in Mexico.  Second, dimensionality has a significant 
impact on the predictions of the various spatial models mentioned in Chapter 3.  Only when d 
= 1 does the Median Voter Theorem hold (McKelvey 1976); and without its predictions, it 
would prove difficult evaluating the stated hypotheses with the available data. 
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4.4.1 Diagnostics: Convergence147 
 Assessing convergence of Markov chains is a well-studied topic, yielding several useful 
and user-friendly diagnostics.  One of the most popular is a traceplot, which maps the progress 
a given chain makes through the parameter space; this is, however, an unreliable approach if 
the chain ‘wanders’ into “a nonoptimal mode…[because] there is no visual indication that this 
area is not the desired high-density region”(Gill 2008: 462).   For the purposes of this analysis, I 
refrain from graphical representations and will instead rely on two analytical diagnostics.  The 
first is the Geweke Time Series Diagnostic (Geweke 1992).  The test is based on “comparing 
some proportion of the early era of the chain after the burn-in period with some non-
overlapping proportion of the late era of the chain” (Gill 2008: 465).  If the chain has converged, 
then the averages of the two lengths should exhibit no statistical difference, indicating the 
Geweke statistic is essentially a difference of means test that is asymptotically standard normal 
(i.e., a Z-score).  Given two non-overlapping proportions of the chain, one early and one later 
(h of length m, and hz of length mz) and some function of interest ½(), the Geweke statistics, 
G, is given by 
 = ½¿(h) − ½¿(hz)
ÀÁ(0)m +
Áz(0)mz
 
 Geweke (1992) suggests comparing the first 10% of the chain with its last 50%.  If the 
test yields a difference that is statistically significant from zero, then there is strong reason to 
believe that the chain has not yet converged. 
                                                                 
147
 All test statistics were obtained using the R package CODA (Plummer, Best, Cowles, and Vines 2008). 
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 To complement Geweke, I also run the two-part Heidelberger and Welch Diagnostic 
(Heidelberger and Welch 1983, 1981; Schruben 1982).  A more involved test, the first part 
evaluates stationarity, i.e., how stable is the posterior distribution?  Using the Cramér-von 
Mises statistic to test the null hypothesis that the sample values come from a stationary 
distribution, the statistic is successively applied first to the entire chain; if the null is rejected, 
then the test is repeated after discarding the first 10% of the iterations, then 20% and so on 
until either the null hypothesis is accepted or 50% of the chain has been discarded.  The second 
part of the H-and-W diagnostic tests if the sample size is large enough to produce the 
parameter’s estimated mean.  Using the portion of the chain passing the stationarity test, its 
half width is compared with the mean estimate; if the ratio between the two is lower than 
some target value – default is usually 0.1 – then the chain passes the test. If it does not, then 
the sample cannot be considered long enough to accurately obtain the original mean estimate. 
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Acosta Fregoso PRI -0.951 pass Pass 
Castro Trenti PRI -0.387 pass Pass 
Ferreiro Velazco PRI 0.166 pass Pass 
Hidalgo Silva PRI 0.453 pass Pass 
Osuna Aguilasocho PRI 0.186 pass Pass 
Quintero Peña PRI -0.280 pass Pass 
Ramos García PRI -0.010 pass Pass 
Salazar Acuña PRI 2.047 pass Pass 
Salazar Castro PRI -0.090 pass Pass 
Suarez Córdova PRI 1.907 pass Pass 
Alvarado González PAN 0.344 pass Pass 
Araiza Regalado PAN -0.193 pass Pass 
Avilés Muñoz PAN 0.141 pass Pass 
Cortez Mendoza PAN 0.611 pass Pass 
Morán Díaz PAN -1.521 pass Pass 
Paniagua Figueroa PAN 2.905 pass Pass 
Rodríguez Jacobo PAN -0.580 pass pass 
Rosales Hernández PAN -0.063 pass pass 
Rueda Gómez PAN -1.289 pass pass 
Ruiz PAN 0.455 pass pass 
Sánchez Medrano PAN 2.373 pass pass 
Terrazas Silva PAN -0.116 pass pass 
Ruiz Uribe PRD -0.810 pass pass 
Zavala Márquez PRD -2.561 pass pass 
Martín Navarro PVEM -0.535 pass pass 
 
Table 4.4.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, 
Baja California (XXVII Legislature).  The third column is the Z-score reported by the Geweke 
diagnostic, where smaller values indicate a higher probability the Markov chain has converged.  
The fourth and fifth columns reports tests about the ability of the chain to produce the mean 
estimate of the parameter. 
 
 In Table 4.3, I report both sets of test statistics for the deputies in the XXVII Legislature 
of the Baja California assembly.148  Representative of all ten legislative periods, this particular 
legislature shows the mean estimates for  converge quite nicely.  Moreover, only two 
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 The Appendix reports diagnostics for all deputies 
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deputies in the entire range fail both tests.149  Given that, I am confident in the statistical 
validity of the Markov iterations and the parameter estimates they produce. 
4.4.2 Diagnostics: Dimensionality 
 With respect to evaluating dimensionality, Jackman (2001a) provides a relatively 
straightforward method based on the ² parameters the simulation procedure already 
estimates.  Remember, this parameter indicates the direction the jth vote moves with respect 
to a ‘nay vote’.  For example, in Figure 4.2 – where I graph discrimination parameters as a 
function of roll call margin, Â = # ÄÅÆÇÈÉ ÊÅË ÌÅÍÇÈÉ ÎÅÍÇÆÇÅÈ# ÆÅÆÏÌ ÄÅÆÐÍ  , most votes in Puebla are found on the 
negative side of the y-axis, indicating that most votes are approved by a ‘yea’ decision.  
Alternatively, the slope coefficient taps “the extent to which a jth roll call discriminates among 
legislators along the various dimensions of the proposal space” (Jackman 2001: 229).  If support 
for proposal j is unrelated to movement in  (i.e., ² is indistinguishable from zero), then 
support for proposal j is unrelated to the underlying policy continuum.  For example, given a 
vote choice model where d = 1, one can be confident in this particular assumption if most of 
the ² estimates indistinguishable from zero occur for relatively lop-sided votes.  
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 Huerta Aboytes (Guanajuato) and González Ortega (Puebla). 
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FIGURE 4.2.  Discrimination Parameters:  Significant v. Insignificant, Puebla (LVI).  Discrimination 
values are graphed as a function of the proportion of dissenting votes.  Generally speaking, 
when d = 1 and insignificant parameters cluster around the low end of the range (where low 
values indicate large margins of victory), then one can confidently claim the policy space is 
unidimensional. 
 
Looking specifically to Figure 4.2, most of the statistically insignificant parameters for 
the Puebla (LVI) assembly are clustered around relatively lop-sided votes.  Reflecting the same 
general pattern observed for the other nine legislative periods (Figures B.21 – 30), votes which 
experienced a high level of dissent were generally associated significant discrimination 
parameters; most of these votes were also on proposals discharged from prestige committees.    
Taking these two points together, I am confident that a one-dimensional model best fits the roll 
call data used for this project.150 
                                                                 
150
 At this point, one should ask: how well does a two-dimensional (d = 2) model fit the data?  Previous iterations 
of this analysis, which involved a much smaller sample of cases (n legislative periods ≤ 5), fit a two-dimensional 
model to data.  The results clearly supported a one-dimensional model as the additional dimension could only 
account for a small fraction of the non-discriminated roll call votes; however, following some data corruption, this 
information could no longer be recovered.  Moreover, after running a d = 2 model with the current sample, none 
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Nevertheless, as informative as ² estimates are for evaluating dimensionality, they do 
not reveal what these dimensions actually represent in the real world.  For that, I rely on the 
previous literature and my own in-country experience to hypothesize what these dimensions 
could mean.  In the next section I discuss both this and ideological positions within the policy 
space using several ‘maps’. 
4.4.3 The Policy Space 
The policy space is defined by its dimensionality and the distribution of ideal points 
along those dimensions.  With regards to the first characteristic, it is clear from the previous 
discussion that a single dimension defines political conflict in the current sample quite well.  
What the Bayesian-simulated parameters cannot say, however, is what this dimension means.   
Surveying the literature on Mexican politics, every single analysis of legislative 
preference assumes a left-right spectrum (Hernández Norzagaray and Vivero Ávila 2004; 
Jiménez Badillo 2006; López and Loza 2003).   This, however, is not without good reason.  Given 
the electoral nature of Mexico’s democratic transition, the cleavages dividing voters and parties 
alike have long been analyzed.  Mexicans themselves identify the two sides of policy conflict as 
‘left’ and ‘right’; what these two words mean, however, has changed considerably over the past 
20 years (Moreno 2006).  Essentially a proxy for any two opposing views, its meaning prior to 
Mexico’s transition was regime-based where the ’right’ had a more authoritarian connotation 
to it while voters associated the ‘left’ with more pro-democracy sentiments (Moreno 1999).  
Under this schema, the PRI was on the far right, the PAN a centrist party, and the PRD on the 
far left.  Following the 2000 election, however, Moreno (2006: 20) observes an ideological 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
of the estimated discrimination parameters reached statistical significance at the 95% level.  Despite discussing the 
problem with Simon Jackman, co-author of the R package, the reason for such results remains unclear. 
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realignment in the country which by 2006 yielded a policy space similar to what we would 
consider a more traditional scale of socioeconomic conflict. The PAN – by far the most 
conservative and pro-business party in the country – is firmly situated at one extreme of the 
policy space while the PRD, the leading standard-bearer for the progressive/populist 
movement, is at the other extreme, with the PRI somewhere in the middle. 
Whether one party is more ‘right’ or more ‘left’ is largely an irrelevant distinction for 
current discussion; what does matter, however, is the meaning voters/parties ascribe to the 
two sides of the policy space.  And if the views of the 2006 presidential candidates are 
indicative of where their parties stand, then it is clear – as Moreno and Méndez (2007) assert – 
that Mexicans are split along a hybrid dimension combining social issues (e.g., abortion, 
indigenous rights, etc.) with economic policy (less government or more?).  Moreover, my early 
work on the Chamber of Deputies supports this claim, placing the PAN and PRD on opposing 
sides, with the PRI as the median voter (González 2007). 
But does this same arrangement translate down to the state level?  Taking the median 
voters for each of the three major parties and chamber floor in all ten legislative periods, I 
create a one-dimensional map where the boundaries are denoted by the most extreme 
members of the chamber (Figure 1).151  Although it was difficult to preserve the exact distances 
separating each median voter, I do provide their relative positions and some idea of how far 
one is from the other.  
  
                                                                 
151
 In Chapter 3 (footnote 6), I briefly mention minor parties and the role they play as votes-for-sale.  While 
perhaps an overly cynical view as there are certainly deputies who firmly believe in their party’s platform, these 
parties remain largely inconsequential for present analysis.  
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Acosta (PRI) PRIm     F   PANM       Rosales (PAN) 
Baja California XXVII 
 
 
 
 
Palafox (PRD)  PRIm    F   PANM            Blake (PAN) 
Baja California XXVIII 
 
 
 
 
Duarte (PRI)   PRIM  F    PANm        Manzanero (PAN) 
Campeche LVIII 
 
 
 
 
Contreras (PRD) PRDm   PRIm    F PANM     Samano (PAN) 
Guanajuato LIX 
 
 
 
 
del Valle (PRD)  PRDm     F PRIM PANm     Enríquez (PAN) 
Estado de México (LV) 
 
 
Figure 4.3.  Ideological Positions of Party Medians in Ten Legislative Periods.  Combining 
ideological positions with a qualitative understanding of state politics can help identify the main 
cleavage dividing the legislative policy space.  Note, the policy spaces are bounded by the most 
extreme deputies. 
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Demedecis (PRD)  PRDm  PRIm  F  PANM                   Giles (PAN) 
Morelos (XLIX) 
 
 
 
 
Vite (PRI)   PRIM  F    PANm                          Díaz (PAN) 
Puebla (LVI) 
 
 
 
 
Flore (PRD) PRDm   PRIM F    PANm       Abascal (PAN) 
Veracruz (LX) 
 
 
 
 
González (PRD)  PRDM    F PRIm PANm  Hernández (PAN) 
Zacatecas  (LVII) 
 
 
 
 
Cruz (PRD)  PRDM   F  PRIm  PANM     Vanegas (PAN) 
Zacatecas (LVIII) 
 
 
Figure 4.3, cont.  Ideological Positions of Party Medians in Ten Legislative Periods.  Combining 
ideological positions with a qualitative understanding of state politics can help identify the main 
cleavage dividing the legislative policy space.  Note, the policy spaces are bounded by the most 
extreme deputies. 
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In looking at these maps, it is important to first recognize the distinction between two- 
and three-party systems at the sub-national level – remember, this variation is exactly what 
makes Mexico such an interesting case.  In Table 4.5, I list the effective number of legislative 
parties for each of the ten periods in the sample.  Combine this with a basic qualitative 
understanding of state politics, it is readily evident which states are two-party systems and 
which are composed of three parties.  First off, the values themselves are somewhat inflated 
because of the small chamber sizes and the constant presence of smaller parties (what with PR-
list seats).  Second, the PRD seems to be largely a regional party: in Baja California, there are 
only two deputies in each of the two legislative periods; in Campeche just one; and in Puebla, 
two.  This simple point suggests an empirical cut-off of 2.50 ENP to distinguish two-party from 
three-party systems in this sample.  Certainly an ex post distinction, it nevertheless corresponds 
with conventional thinking about each state’s political system. 
Given this information, consider first the two-party systems of Baja California, 
Campeche, and Puebla.  In this situation, any number of cleavages could divide the PAN and 
PRI, but I limit myself to two: the socioeconomic and the government-opposition dimensions 
(Moreno 2006).  Which one is more likely to be at work?  In the case of Baja California, one 
need only look to the history of PAN governance there in the state.  Going back to its time as an 
opposition party, the PAN was concerned more with winning office than promoting some 
ideological position (Hernández Vicencio 2005).  The party modernized its organizational 
structure, professionalized the governing elite, and sought out broad coalitions of support.  
Once in office, it adopted a particularly utilitarian approach, rejecting dogmatic conflict to 
preserve its stay in power.  In a certain way, this is similar to what the PRI did during its tenure, 
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using all of its resources to stay in power, even if it meant compromising on certain ideological 
positions.  The difference, however, is the PRI frequently used suspect methods – and outright 
fraud – to ensure its stay, while the PAN in Baja California has largely avoided such tactics.  
Although this should not suggest a pristine record for the PAN, it has had a far better record of 
legitimately winning office.   Nevertheless, aside from the methods, the motivation remains the 
same: stay in office.  This suggests a government-opposition cleavage.   
 
Legislative Period Effective # of Parties 
Baja California, XXVII 2.29 
Baja California, XXVIII 2.32 
Campeche, LVIII 2.48 
Guanajuato, LIX 2.83 
Estado de México, LV 3.36 
Morelos, XLIX 4.31 
Puebla, LVI 2.16 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave, LX 2.57 
Zacatecas LVII 3.16 
Zacatecas LVIII 2.54 
 
Table 4.5.  Effective Number of Legislative Parties in Eight Mexican States, 2001 – 2007.  For the 
current sample, I use an empirical cutoff of 2.5 Effective Parties to differentiate two-party 
systems from three-party systems.   
 
Interestingly enough, Puebla is also run by a state party intent on remaining in power 
regardless of what that requires.  A literal artifact of the one-party era, the PRI in Puebla not 
only uses suspect methods to maintain its grip over government (López Rubí 2007), but it has 
also proven amenable to compromise and flexibility.   One widespread rumor of such ‘flexibility’ 
– although not officially corroborated by anyone I interviewed – is based on an interesting 
pattern of electoral results between 2006 and 2007.  In the 2006 election, the PAN won 12 out 
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of 17 federal deputyships in Puebla.  Compare this with the party’s performance in the three 
preceding elections when it won five (of 15) in 2003, six (of 15) in 2000, and zero (of 17) in 1997 
(IFE 2009).  What makes the 2006 results even more interesting is that the PRI won 23 of the 
legislature’s 26 district seats during the 2007 local elections!  While, it would be inappropriate 
to make claims of conspiracy – despite a history of backroom collusion between the two parties 
– the evidence nevertheless suggests a conscious effort by the PRI to forgo its political 
representation in the Chamber of Deputies in exchange for a firm hold over state government.  
Whether it was simply a matter of the PRI dedicating more of its attention to the local election 
or an arrangement between the Calderón government and the Puebla PRI, this is a discussion 
best left for another day; either way, the electoral results strongly suggest the Puebla PRI is a 
flexible group intent on staying in power by whatever means necessary. 
Is Campeche also defined by a government-opposition cleavage like Baja California and 
Puebla, or is it more of a socioeconomic one?  The available evidence – as limited as it is – does 
not favor one cleavage over another.   However, what may modestly suggest a socioeconomic 
divide is (1) the PRI has never run in coalition and has avoided the peculiar electoral results 
observed in Puebla; and (2) it has maintained a legislative majority in its local assembly since 
the party first assumed power.  Unlike Puebla or Baja California, the PRI has shown little 
need/willingness to win elections using broad coalitions.  The reason for this may stem from the 
confidence the PRI has on running a campaign based on its socioeconomic values rather than 
on its ability as the party-in-government to shape the contest.  Nevertheless, this remains a 
largely unexplored topic and merits field research to speak directly with active policy-makers. 
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Looking to the three-party systems, I first consider Estado de México and Veracruz 
because they are clear examples of policy spaces where there is no government-opposition 
cleavage, at least not how it has been observed in Mexico. The reason for this is two-fold.  First 
and foremost, the PRI controls both a legislative plurality and the governorship, which 
effectively makes it the ruling party.  Second, the PRI occupies the median position, flanked on 
either side by the PAN and the PRD.  So if a government-opposition cleavage were in effect, 
then we should not observe the PRI occupying the median; instead it should be a matter of ‘us’ 
(the PRI) versus ‘them’ the opposition.  While the PRI may be in this position for strategic 
reasons, the PAN and PRD remain on opposite sides of each other, indicative of their 
fundamental disagreement on socioeconomic policy.  That is, similar to the PRI delegation in 
the Chamber of Deputies, the state parties in Estado de México and Veracruz serve as an 
intermediary between irreconcilable extremes (Nacif 2005).152 
With respect to Morelos and Guanajuato, the PAN is in power but it does not occupy the 
median position like the PRI.  The same can be said of the PRD in Zacatecas.  Because they are 
found at the extremes of the policy space, it is not readily apparent which cleavage is at work.  
Consider first Guanajuato, a stronghold for the extreme wing of the PAN (Uribe 2008).  There, 
the PAN pursues strongly ideological policies – not the least of which was the prohibition on 
kissing in public – and occasionally enjoys the support from the second largest party, the PRI.   
This last point is key because if a government-opposition cleavage did hold, the PRI would likely 
be at the extreme and not at the median like it is. 
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 Interviews: Ávila Villegas, Macedo Aguilar, Jiménez (all from Estado de México) 
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Morelos is similarly important to the PAN.  However, unlike Guanajuato, the state is run 
by a more pragmatic branch of the party associated with the Calderón administration in nearby 
Mexico City.153  In fact, Deputy Gutiérrez (formerly of the PRI – see Chapter 2) is a prime 
example of the PAN’s willingness to cross party lines to maintain its hold over the state.   
Moreover, the PRD – which is at the opposite end of the policy spectrum – is the second largest 
party.  With its large rural population, Morelos is a natural fit for the populist PRD, making the 
party a serious contender for the governorship.  As such, the PRD naturally seeks to oppose the 
government so that they themselves can win office; recognizing their precarious position, the 
PAN will do all it reasonably can to remain in power, thus yielding a government-opposition 
dimension typical of the mid-1990s Mexico (Moreno 2006). 
Finally, there is Zacatecas, which is a difficult case to classify.  One of the major ‘home 
states’ for the PRD (alongside Michoacán, Guerrero, and Baja California Sur), Zacatecas has 
been governed by two of the party’s most powerful members: Ricardo Monreal, an ex-priísta 
who is attributed with bringing the party to prominence in the state; and Amalia Garcia Medina, 
former communist, party president and current leader of the Foro Nuevo Sol group.154  
Although the two are caught in a heated feud over the future of the state – which has devolved 
into a ‘dirty war’, bringing in accusations of drug ties to light – they have nevertheless adopted 
a relatively similar approach to governing (Wilkinson 2009).  Both built political machines 
subordinating the legislature and judiciary to gubernatorial control; both have proven quite 
                                                                 
153
 Interviews: Alemán Olvera, Gutiérrez Albarrán, (both from Morelos). 
154
 The PRD is not a solid, unified party like the PAN or PRI, but is more a collection of institutionalized corrientes – 
or streams of left-wing thought.  It is no surprise then that the party suffered major internal conflict following its 
failed presidential bid in 2006, one which led to a stand-off in 2008 between two groups of corrientes: a pragmatic 
wing versus a more ideological wing.  Although the Foro Sol group was officially allied with the latter, once the 
pragmatists won the stand-off, García Medina and her ‘tribe’ sought to reconcile the two warring sides in 
preparation for the upcoming midterm elections in July 2009. 
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flexible in their political careers, jumping from faction to faction to maintain power within the 
state; and both had relatively moderate positions during their tenure, focusing on political 
decisions rather than ideological ones.  Combine this with the PAN-PRI clustering within the 
policy space, it seems there is indeed a government-opposition cleavage. 
 With respect to the second feature of the policy space, the distribution of ideal points, 
there is one important point to make: ruling parties are capable of inducing a high level of 
discipline to realize their policies.  Graphing the ideological position for each deputy, Figures 
B.26 – B.35 listed in the Appendix represent an alternative way to construct a spatial map of 
legislative preferences.  Taking a broad view, one of the common features found throughout 
the maps is the relative unity of the ruling party.  In the graphs I group deputies by party and 
draw circles around each delegation; these circles can serve as a visual indicator – albeit a very 
rough one – to illustrate the level of a party unity.   
Ruling parties exhibit a high level of unity as indicated by a narrow oval.  Compare this 
to the Rice scores in Table 2.1, where – with the exception of Baja California (XXVII) – the ruling 
party is consistently observed to have a high level of discipline.155  The opposition on the other 
hand, is far more undisciplined as indicated by the low Rice scores and relatively wide ovals 
surrounding the distribution of party ideal points.  In terms of what we know about plenary 
voting, it appears the ruling party indeed uses its position (and access to resources) to compel 
rank-and-file support.  Although this is not an entirely surprising finding, its strong consistency 
across the sample certainly is. 
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 In Baja California (XXVII), Laura Sánchez Medrano is seen as an independent deputy once affiliated with the 
PAN: following a succession of votes where she clearly voted against the party, she was sanctioned internally and 
eventually ousted (Ramón Gil 2002).  So excluding her, the PAN becomes as unified as the PRI. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined numerous ways to measure legislative preferences.  This 
is a critical point given that the hypotheses derived in Chapter 3 specify spatial relationships 
between median positions within the legislature and the political behavior of rank-and-file 
deputies.  Because of several data constraints – not the least of which is sample size – I selected 
the Bayesian simulation approach: it allows me to generate estimates of legislative ideal points, 
while also providing readily available measures to systematically evaluate the reliability of the 
estimates and the dimensionality of the policy space. 
Next, I provide a detailed description of the data I use to generate these estimates, 
emphasizing the diversity of the sample in terms of partisan control and economic 
development.  This is encouraging given the difficulty that sometimes comes with data 
collection in Mexican states.   The balance of the chapter discusses several of the diagnostics 
used to evaluate the validity of the parameter estimates, after which I highlight several of the 
more interesting points about the distribution of ideal points. 
In particular, I find a one-dimensional policy space – defined largely by a government-
opposition cleavage – dominates legislative politics at the state level.  This is somewhat 
surprising given the emphasis in the literature on the socioeconomic left-right spectrum.  What 
could account for this apparent discrepancy?   While I do not doubt the expertise of Mexican 
state experts to evaluate political conflict, the difference between this analysis and others may 
be found in the definition of ‘left’ and ‘right’.  As I mentioned before, these two labels have had 
a number of meanings in past, the most prominent of which was the government-opposition 
distinction dominating the latter half of the 20th century when opposition parties began 
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mobilizing a credible threat to PRI dominance.  If previous analysis simply adopts a left-right 
approach without asking respondents what they interpret these labels to mean, then that may 
contribute to the difference between the conclusions reached here and those in the current 
literature. 
In the next chapter, I finally evaluate the hypotheses armed with the data I generated 
here.  While the discussions so far have certainly contributed to the study of Mexican politics – 
a detailed description of state legislatures, new hypotheses specific to the country derived from 
established organizational theory, and new measures of legislative preferences – the ultimate 
goal of this project is to determine the nature of politics in Mexico using the hypotheses 
derived in Chapter 3. 
  
149 
 
5 ANALYSIS 
 
The following chapter is a first-cut attempt to evaluate models of committee selection and 
plenary voting.  I consider each one separately. 
 
5.1 Committee Selection under Strong Party Rule 
Standing committees are at the center of legislative life in Mexico, responsible for 
reviewing all proposed legislation and drafting the bills ultimately voted on in the plenary.  In 
fact, committees enjoy so much discretion within their policy areas that they are under no 
obligation to report back anything even remotely similar to the original proposal.  And yet 
despite their importance and broad amendatory powers, committees are not autonomous 
panels free to legislate as they wish.   
In Chapter 2 I describe a legislative system where parties are well-positioned to assert 
their influence over the assembly.  What with their control over parliamentary coordinators – 
who, in turn, dictate panel membership – parties can insert themselves directly into the 
decision-making process without having to micromanage its day-to-day business.  Moreover, 
the committee system is highly centralized, investing presidents with significant agenda power 
and diverting the bulk of legislation to a select group of prestige committees.  Parties need only 
place their agents on these prestige panels to dominate policy.  This is an especially frugal 
approach to legislative control as it gives ruling parties a virtual monopoly over the proposal 
process without spreading their ranks too thin.  And while opposition parties also share in the 
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material benefits of committee assignment – e.g., higher pay, more staff, and larger office 
space – they are largely consigned to non-prestige panels where their influence is limited.   
From an organizational perspective, Mexican state legislatures seem expressly designed 
to empower local parties.  Combine that with the control these groups have over nominations 
and campaign funds – as well as extant restrictions on reelection – politics in Mexico appears as 
party-centric as it was during PRI rule.  However if one considers the effect political competition 
has had on legislative autonomy, there may be reason to reconsider the partisan model as the 
best explanation of legislative design in Mexico. 
The following uses the data I describe in Chapter 4 to evaluate the three competing 
hypotheses of committee selection discussed in Chapter 3 – partisan, informational, and 
distributive.  Specifically, I build several statistical models estimating the probability a deputy is 
assigned to a particular committee/seat.  The results indicate a strong bias for the ruling party 
when prestige committee presidencies are concerned; however, beyond that the evidence is 
not so clear, immediately suggesting the models may not be fully specified.  
5.1.1 Expectations 
The partisan model generally expects a ruling party to monopolize the legislative agenda 
by stacking the chamber’s major gate-keeping offices full with supporters.  With their agents in 
place, party leaders can coordinate rank-and-file activity so that the resulting legislative record 
improves the group’s electoral prospects (Cox and McCubbins 2007).  In the case of Mexico, 
committee seats are exactly the legislative offices a party looks to control what with their broad 
institutional powers over proposals and the agenda. 
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Two caveats are worth mentioning.  The highly centralized structure of the committee 
system suggests that parties will focus most of their energies on securing the presidencies of 
prestige committees.  Second, while coordinators certainly wield considerable power – usually 
with the express backing of the state party organization – they still require the implicit consent 
of their legislative group.  With that in mind, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis C.1 A deputy likely presides over a prestige committee the closer her ideal 
point is to the ruling party median. 
To model this relationship, I propose the following specification, 
~ Ñ ( +  ∗ ÒÓÂÔ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×)¥ ∗ [1 − ( +  ∗ ÒÓÂÔ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×)]§¥
V
¤
 
where,  = 1 if a deputy is a president of a prestige committee, 0 otherwise; (∙) is the 
cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution; and ÒÓÂÔ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×  is the 
absolute difference between a deputy’s ideal point () and the ruling party median (), 
| − |.156 The expectation is that as ÒÓÂÔ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×  grows, `( = 1) will decrease.  Note, 
the ruling party is defined as the party with the largest share of legislative seats. 
 As reasonable as this partisan hypothesis sounds, however, there is reason to believe 
other explanations of committee selection might also hold.  The first assumes legislators are, to 
one extent or another, uncertain about the relationship between policy and consequences.  To 
reduce its informational demands, the chamber designates – via majoritarian rules – committee 
members who have an incentive to provide it with unbiased proposals; under moderate 
uncertainty, these individuals tend to be those who are the most representative of the chamber 
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 All committee information is taken from the stenographic versions of an assembly’s daily proceedings.  Because 
panel composition can change, I code seat assignments according to the memberships originally approved at the 
beginning of the legislative period.  
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(Krehbiel 1991).  I argue committees might now serve this informational role, although not for 
the party specifically but for the legislature as a whole.  That is, the rise of electoral competition 
over the last two decades has created a situation where parties, deputies, and governors no 
longer share the same policy preferences as they did under one-party rule – or perhaps even as 
recently as just a few years ago.  Vote-hungry parties are now divided internally as their efforts 
to remain competitive lead them to support candidates who, while popular electorally, may not 
necessarily share the same ideological view as the rest of the party.  Similarly, once in office, it 
is no longer as likely that a majority of the legislature will consist of deputies from a single party 
(or faction), much less share the same group as the governor (Cortina 2004).   
In response to this widening gulf in preferences, legislatures have begun to fortify their 
institutional position against party and governor by endowing themselves with more resources, 
better staff, and improved facilities.  What results is an increasingly professionalized 
administrative staff capable of providing ‘amateur’ deputies with the guidance and support 
they need to gain equal-footing with the executive (Nava Gomar 2004).  Within this 
environment of competing branches and vote-hungry parties, it seems committees could 
indeed be repositories of information rather than just instruments of party control.  Moreover, 
committee presidents – whether selected by the party or not – still maintain significant control 
over the distribution of committee resources, especially in terms of what information panels 
can provide the plenary.  For this reason, the chamber must assert its control over the 
committee presidents (particularly those at the head of ‘prestige’ committees) in order to 
assure itself a quality product.  With that in mind, I hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis C.2 A deputy likely presides over a prestige committee if her ideological 
preferences are relatively close to the chamber median. 
To model this relationship, I propose the following specification, 
~ Ñ ( +  ∗ YØÙÙÂ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×)¥ ∗ [1 − ( +  ∗ YØÙÙÂ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×)]§¥
V
¤
 
where YØÙÙÂ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×  is the absolute difference between a deputy’s ideal point () and the 
chamber median (Y), | − Y|.157  The expectation is that as YØÙÙÂ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×  increases, 
`( = 1) decreases. 
 The second alternative to the partisan logic is the distributive model of committee 
selection.  That is, the model assumes legislators engage in vote trading to secure passage of 
policies that are intended to benefit their constituencies.  To achieve this, committees are 
designed to have tremendous procedural rights over their particular policy area and members 
self-select themselves into their seats.  The outcome is that committees are composed of ‘high 
demanders’ whose preferences differ from the chamber median for a given policy area.  
Clearly, committees in Mexican state legislatures possess the kind of powers the distributive 
approach assumes; whether deputies self-select themselves, however, is currently unknown.   
 Yet what supports a distributive perspective is once again tied to the rise in electoral 
pluralism.  As vote-hungry parties recruit ever-more popular candidates to run for district seats, 
the former places itself in an increasingly precarious position where the latter can use their 
support as leverage against it.  Once in office, this dynamic could translate into one in which 
deputies can effectively self-select themselves onto the panel of their choosing.  Of course, if a 
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 All committee information is taken from the stenographic versions of an assembly’s daily proceedings.  Because 
panel composition can change, I code seat assignments according to the memberships originally approved at the 
beginning of the legislative period.  
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deputy had her choice – especially if she were running for office in the future, like a municipal 
presidency – she would naturally pick a presidency on a prestige committee, ceteris paribus.  
With that in mind, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis C.3A A district deputy likely presides over a prestige committee. 
And because exposure may matter more than policy influence, 
Hypothesis C.3B A district deputy likely belongs to a prestige committee. 
To model these relationships, I propose the following specifications  
~ Ñ ( +  ∗ ÕÁÔÂÖÔ)¥ ∗ [1 − ( +  ∗ ÕÁÔÂÖÔ)]§¥
V
¤
 
Ú~ Ñ ( +  ∗ ÕÁÔÂÖÔ)Û ∗ [1 − ( +  ∗ ÕÁÔÂÖÔ)]§Û
V
¤
 
where Ú = 1 if a deputy is a member of a prestige committee, 0 otherwise; and ÕÁÔÂÖÔ = 1 
if a deputy was elected in a district election, and 0 if she was elected via list PR.  The 
expectation for both is that `() and `(Ú) increases when ÕÁÔÂÖÔ = 1. 
5.1.2 The Model 
 The models I use to evaluate these four hypotheses combine all three specifications to 
build a single estimable likelihood function.  However, before that can be fully constructed, I 
first mention several control variables that could possible distort the hypothesized 
relationships.  The first is a dichotomous variable ÒØÜÂÓØÔ ÒÓÂÔ = 1 if a deputy belongs to 
the largest party, and 0 otherwise.  A rather blunt measure of party control, the expectation 
here is that a deputy is likely to be a prestige committee president if she is a member of the 
ruling party.   This says nothing about ideological distance or any other conditional factor, just 
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that party affiliation has an effect.  Next, I include a dichotomous variable 
ÒÓÂØÓo×mÔÓÂ ÝÙÙÂ¨mÓÔÙÂ=1 if a deputy is the coordinator of her legislative delegation, 
and 0 otherwise.  The expectation is that a parliamentary coordinators are more likely to be a 
president of a prestige committee because (1) there are no restrictions on whether a 
coordinator can serve on a specific committee;158 and (2) coordinators may find it simpler to 
‘cut out the middleman’ directly and assume the committee presidency herself.  
 The next set of controls consists of all context variables meant to capture the fixed 
effects associated with party affiliation and legislative period.  To that end, I coded a 
dichotomous variable for each party (where the PRI is the baseline category; and mÙÂ = 1 if 
a legislator does not belong to any of the three major parties, 0 otherwise) and each legislative 
period (where Zacatecas II is the baseline category).159  Additionally, I include count variables 
indicating the number of presidential assignments available at the beginning of the legislative 
period as well as the number of non-presidential assignment.  The expectation is that the 
number of assignments increases so does the probability a deputy will receive one. 
 Finally, I generate two additional dependent variables to capture the difference both 
across and within the four types of committees:  Þ = 1 if a deputy is the president of a non-
prestige committee, 0 otherwise; and  ß = 1 if a deputy is a non-president on a non-prestige 
committee, 0 otherwise. 
 Taking this all together yields the following likelihood function, 
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 Aside, of course, from the restrictions on serving as Mesa presidents or on too many committees. 
159
 I have already fitted several multi-level models where right-hand-side variables have an effect at different levels 
of interaction, avoiding the need to include dummy variables for each of these categories (xtmelogit command 
in Stata 10).  However, I chose to use a straightforward logistic specification because either (1) the Hessian matrix 
for the likelihood function was unstable, preventing further estimation, or (2) the likelihood ratio test favored the 
simpler specification.  
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`(¶|&&z…&zX), ~ Ñ ( + & … zX&zX)µ ∗ [1 − ( + & … zX&zX)]§µ
V
¤
 
where ¶ ∈ àß , Ú,  , Þá. 160  A full summary of the variables and their expectations is available 
in Table 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
160
 Note, I refrain from using an explicitly Bayesian approach to model the parameters because of the lack of prior 
information.  That is, rather than worry about how certain variables are distributed, I treat this analysis as a first-
cut attempt to inform future attempts.  In that vein, I ostensibly use a uniform distribution (where all values equal 
one) as my prior. 
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Independent Variables Definition Expectation 
ã:2: Distance – F 
Mean: 0.73; Std. Dev: 0.67 
Absolute distance between a 
deputy’s ideal point and the chamber 
median,  |ã:2 − !| 
 
↑ ã: ⟹ ↓ -(K = :) 
ãæ2: Distance – P  
Mean: 0.13; St. Dev: 0.23 
Absolute distance  between a 
deputy’s ideal point and the ruling 
party median, |ã:2 − ,| 
 
↑ ãæ ⟹ ↓ -(K = :) 
ãç2: Plurality Party 
Mean: 0.49; St. Dev: 0.50 
 
1 = if a member of the largest party; 0 
otherwise 
 
↑ ãç ⟹ ↑ -(K = :) 
ãè2: District Deputy 
Mean: 0.61; St. Dev: 0.49 
 
1 = if a district seat deputy; 0 
otherwise 
 
↑ ãè ⟹ ↑ -(K = :) 
&é: Parliamentary Coordinator 1 = if a parliamentary coordinator; 0 
otherwise 
 
↑ &é ⟹ ↑ `( = 1) 
&ê: # of Presidencies Number of committee presidencies 
 
↑ &ê ⟹ ↑ `( = 1) 
&ë: # of Other Seats 
 
Number of e non-presidential 
committee assignments 
↑ &ë ⟹ ↑ `( = 1) 
Fixed Effects   
&ì −  &: Party Affiliation  Dichotomous variables indicating 
party affiliation, PRI is the baseline 
 
 
&z − &zX: Legislative Period Dichotomous variables indicating the 
legislative period, Zacatecas II is the 
baseline 
 
Dependent Variables   
: President – Prestige 1 = if president of a prestige 
committee; 0 otherwise 
 
 
Ú: All Others – Prestige  1 = if non-president member of a 
prestige committee; 0 otherwise 
 
 
Þ: President – Non-Prestige 1 = if president of a non-prestige 
committee; 0 otherwise 
 
 
ß: All Others – Non-Prestige 1 = if non-president member of a non-
prestige committee; 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
Table 5.1.  Variables and Hypothetical Expectations of a Model of Committee Selection. 
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5.1.3 Discussion 
In Tables 5.2 and 5.3, I report the probability a deputy is assigned to a prestige and non-
prestige committee, respectively.  Looking first to the entire sample (models 1, 2, 7, and 8), 
there does not appear much in the way of empirical relationships between dependent and 
independent variables.  Aside from the negative effect  ÝÙÙÂ¨mÓÔÙÂ has on the probability of 
a non-prestige presidency (model 7) – which disappears once the sample is disaggregated into 
majority-party legislatures and plurality legislatures – there is little to suggest the hypothesized 
factors capture any of the observed variation in committee assignment, prestige or not. 
 As disconcerting as this may initially appear, the results are much more promising once I 
consider majority-party legislatures (where a single majority party exists) and plurality 
legislatures (where no single party has a majority) separately.161  With respect to majority-party 
legislatures (models 3, 4, 9 and 10), the ideological distance from M has quite a different effect 
when prestige presidencies are compared with their non-prestige counterparts. In terms of the 
former, the infinitesimal odds ratio indicates that a one-point movement away from the party 
median effectively precludes a prestige presidency.  Remember, when specifying the vote 
choice model in Chapter 4, I set as my as my prior ~(0,1)., so a one-point move away from 
the median – encompassing approximately 68% of the distribution space – is no arbitrary 
distance .  To get a better idea of the effect distance from M has, I use Clarify to calculate first 
differences for the predicted probability a deputy is a prestige president (King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg 2000).  Specifically, I consider two cases: a district deputy from Puebla in the PRI 
who is at an average distance from party and floor medians; and a panista from Guanajuato. 
                                                                 
161
 For the majority party sample, the baseline legislative period category is Campeche. 
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 All States Majority Party Plurality 
 1.Presidencies 2.Others 3.Presidencies 4.Other 5.Presidencies 6.Others 
Distance – F 0.73 
(0.39) 
1.05 
(0.18) 
37.26 
(79.04) 
0.70 
(0.27) 
0.94 
(0.51) 
1.18 
(0.23) 
Distance – M 0.63 
(0.58) 
1.34 
(0.51) 
1.88e-12 
(2.09e-11) 
0.58 
(0.49) 
1.65 
(1.12) 
1.68 
(0.75) 
Plurality Party 1.64 
(0.98) 
0.79 
(0.20) 
6.85e10 
(5.92e10) 
0.33 
(0.18) 
1.27 
(0.73) 
0.91 
(0.28) 
District Deputy 1.21 
(0.55) 
0.75 
(0.16) 
0.40 
(0.29) 
1.09 
(0.38) 
2.06 
(1.33) 
0.66 
(0.20) 
Coordinator 0.32 
(.33) 
1.54 
(0.41) 
 1.31 
(0.54) 
0.63 
(0.67) 
1.83 
(0.66) 
# of Presidencies 1.10 
(0.35) 
 2248.47 
(453.79) 
 1.05 
(0.33) 
 
# of Other Seats  1.00 
(0.05) 
 0.99 
(0.05) 
 1.11 
(0.05) 
PAN 1.34 
(0.91) 
1.05 
(0.29) 
0.56 
(1.63) 
1.18 
(0.59) 
1.14 
(0.87) 
1.16 
(0.41) 
PRD 0.54 
(0.52) 
0.84 
(0.29) 
1.80e-12 
(3.37e-12) 
1.15 
(0.69) 
0.53 
(0.51) 
0.91 
(0.39) 
Minor Party 0.92 
(0.72) 
1.49 
(0.48) 
1.80 
(1.87) 
0.94 
(0.47) 
1.07 
(1.18) 
1.93 
(0.83) 
Baja California I 0.99 
(1.01) 
2.05 
(0.94) 
  0.97 
(1.00) 
4.61 
(2.01) 
Baja California II  2.27 
(0.92) 
   4.51 
(1.81) 
Campeche 0.64 
(0.64) 
     
Guanajuato 0.51 
(0.50) 
1.28 
(0.54) 
1.16 
(3.31) 
1.15 
(0.51) 
  
Estado de Mexico 0.34 
(0.37) 
0.95 
(0.35) 
  0.38 
(0.41) 
1.12 
(0.42) 
Morelos 0.98 
(0.73) 
0.85 
(0.35) 
  0.88 
(0.67) 
1.71 
(0.75) 
Puebla 0.55 
(0.57) 
1.36 
(0.55) 
1.30 
(1.51) 
1.55 
(0.64) 
  
Veracruz 0.40 
(0.27) 
0.35 
(0.18) 
  0.49 
(0.30) 
 
Zacatecas I 0.92 
(0.58) 
1.09 
(0.45) 
    
Zacatecas II       
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.08 
N 1058.00 1058.00 328 374 684.00 684.00 
 
 
TABLE 5.2.  The Probability of Prestige Committee Assignment and its Determinants.  Estimated 
using logit in Stata 10, the table reports the coefficients as odd-ratios.  Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are robust and highlighted/bolded cells indicate statistical significance at  ` < 0.05  levels.  
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 All States Majority Party Plurality 
 7.Presidencies 8.Others 9.Presidencies 10.Other 11.Presidencies 12.Others 
Distance – F 0.95 
(0 .08) 
0.99 
(0.06) 
0.90 
(0.19) 
1.09 
(0.11) 
0.94 
(0.09) 
1.02 
(0.09) 
Distance – M 1.24 
(0.21) 
0.94 
(0.13) 
2.28 
(0.68) 
0.47 
(0.18) 
0.87 
(0.24) 
1.23 
(0.17) 
Plurality Party 0.84 
(0.09) 
1.04 
(0.08) 
0.63 
(0.19) 
1.26 
(0.26) 
0.89 
(0.12) 
0.98 
(0.08) 
District Deputy 1.14 
(0.12) 
0.97 
(0.07) 
1.59 
(0.30) 
0.93 
(0.14) 
0.97 
(0.12) 
0.98 
(0.09) 
Coordinator 0.51 
(0.10) 
0.95 
(0.14) 
0.36 
(0.12) 
0.94 
(0.21) 
0.60 
(0.14) 
0.91 
(0.18) 
# of Presidencies 1.01 
(0.02) 
1.01 
(0.02)  
1.00 
(0.02)  
# of Other Seats 1.00 
(0.00)  
1.00 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
PAN 1.04 
(0.14) 
1.06 
(0.08) 
0.97 
(0.26) 
0.97 
(0.15) 
1.09 
(0.17) 
1.08 
(0.10) 
PRD 1.06 
(0.15) 
0.96 
(0.12) 
1.06 
(0.39) 
1.11 
(0.25) 
1.16 
(0.20) 
0.81 
(0.12) 
Minor Party 1.22 
(0.20) 
1.59 
(0.22) 
0.92 
(0.26) 
2.22 
(0.52) 
1.35 
(0.27) 
1.33 
(0.22) 
Baja California I 1.27 
(0.15) 
2.24 
(0.29)   
1.24 
(0.17) 
1.97 
(0.36) 
Baja California II 1.24 
(0.15) 
1.93 
(0.26)   
1.22 
(0.15) 
1.72 
(0.30) 
Campeche 1.76 
(0.35)   
Guanajuato 0.91 
(0.21) 
1.56 
(0.19) 
0.92 
(0.21) 
0.86 
(0.14) 
Estado de Mexico 0.37 
(0.07)   
0.38 
(0.07( 
Morelos 1.02 
(0.23) 
1.44 
(0.20)   
1.26 
(0.24) 
Puebla 0.81 
(0.15) 
1.87 
(0.22) 
0.83 
(0.19)  
0.62 
(0.13) 
Veracruz 0.62 
(0.12) 
0.70 
(0.11)   
0.61 
(0.12) 
Zacatecas I 1.00 
(0.11) 
1.07 
(0.18)   
Zacatecas II 
 
0.52 
(0.10) 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
N 8274 8274 2679 2679 5595 5595 
 
TABLE 5.3.  The Probability of Non-Prestige Committee Assignment and its Determinants.  
Estimated using logit in Stata 10, the table reports the coefficients as odd-ratios.  Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are robust and highlighted/bolded cells indicate statistical significance at  ` < 0.05  levels. 
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Graphing the predicted probability (y-axis) against the distance from M (x- axis), Figure 
5.1 is noteworthy in several ways.  First, the party median voter is predicted to always be the 
president of a prestige committee.  Although this does not pan out empirically, the data 
strongly supports the curves when controlling for the intervening and contextual variables.  
Second, there is a steep drop-off right around the party median, strongly suggesting that only 
the deputies most representative of the ruling party have any real chance of presiding over a 
prestige committee; this is especially the case in Puebla.  The third feature is the disparity 
between the PRI deputy and her PAN counterpart.  Whereas the probability in Guanajuato 
flattens out after a relatively short distance away from M, it drops precipitously in Puebla down 
to nearly zero; in fact, only a standard deviation away from the party median produces a 
probability of just 4%.  What might this mean?  This dynamic clearly captures the type of party 
each one is.   With Guanajuato, there is far more of a collegial nature to the PAN delegation; 
while the hierarchy is certainly headed by the group’s conservative wing, all members are given 
a relatively equal chance to participate.  Although the probability drops very quickly after just a 
short distance from the party median, it never dips below 50%, remaining at a reasonable 63%.  
Puebla, on the other hand, is run by a PRI that is starkly vertical in its structure; that is, the 
party organization has strict control over their legislators (López Rubí 2007).  The episode 
regarding its coordinator (Chapter 2) is clear evidence of such control.  So within this 
authoritarian approach to partisan politics, we should find a situation where only those most 
loyal to/representative of the party should find themselves in leadership positions, leaving the 
rank-and-file to simply support the policies the former produces. 
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FIGURE 5.1.  Predicted Probability a Deputy Is the President of a Prestige Committee, Majority-
Party States: Guanajuato v. Puebla.  Taking the case of a district deputy who is of average 
distance from both party and legislative median, I compare the probability a PAN deputy in 
Guanajuato is on a prestige committee with the probability a PRI deputy in Puebla is.  The 
difference is stark and informative: although both experience a relatively quick drop-off once 
one is a certain distance from the party median, the PAN deputy does not experience as large of 
a decline as her PRI counterpart. This may in fact indicate differences in how each party 
approaches government: although both exert strong majority control over their respective 
assemblies, the PAN is characterized by a more collegial rapport between its members, while 
the PRI is far more vertical in its orientation like it was during the hegemonic period. 
 
 Despite these inter-party/state differences, the results appear to support hypothesis C.1 
where party distance is expected to have a clear and significant impact on the probability of 
prestige committee assignment, at least in legislatures where a majority party exists.  With 
respect to the other components of the model, the plurality dummy has the strongest effect, by 
far.  According to its reported odds-ratio, the variable virtually guarantees a prestige 
presidency; while this is not to say that every member of a plurality party is likely to be a 
prestige committee president, it does mean that all prestige presidencies will go to a member 
of the plurality.  In fact, according to the data, nine of the 11 prestige presidencies in the 
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majority-party sample are held by majority-party deputies. So while the magnitude of the effect 
is unexpected, the results are certainly not. 
 With respect to other determinants in the majority-party model, the evidence suggests 
that a different dynamic may be at work when looking beyond prestige presidencies.  For 
example, ruling-party affiliation is shown to have a negative effect on the probability a 
legislator is assigned to a non-presidential seat on a prestige committee.  One way to interpret 
this – which is borne out by the power committee presidents have – is that majority parties are 
secure enough in their control over a committee by simply focusing on its presidency.  That is, 
opposition parties are given an opportunity to participate in the policy-making processes, but 
presidents are so powerful that the real decisions are left to the majority party and its agent.   
Second, it appears the effect Distance from M has on non-prestige presidencies is the 
opposite of what we observe in prestige settings:  the farther one is from the majority party 
median, the more likely she is to assume a non-prestige presidency.  This interpretation is in 
keeping with the idea that non-prestige assignments – presidencies or not – have practically no 
influence over the important policy.  Because of that, majority parties are willing to share in the 
resources – likely in the name of ‘consensus’ – and give opposition parties access to these non-
prestige presidencies.  In this way, the opposition can take advantage of the money, staff, 
resources, etc. of committee leadership but do not affect the majority party’s agenda.  A clear 
example of this is the Human Rights committee in Morelos: ostensibly quartered within an 
equipment closet deep inside the legislature, the committee’s office has one computer, and 
two staff members who exclusively ran personal errands for the panel president.  Rather than 
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administer to the citizen needs – which is what the committee is designed to do – its staff was 
largely responsible for picking up dry-cleaning, washing cars, ordering lunch, etc. 
The opposition can also use the panel as a way to gain public exposure.   That is, while 
these non-prestige panels are not policy-relevant, they still provide a ‘soapbox’ and resources 
which the opposition can use to voice their dissent.  Along these lines, the dummy variable for a 
district deputy has a statistically significant, and positive, effect on the probability of a non-
prestige presidency.  Furthermore, while hypotheses C.3 predict a distributive approach for 
prestige assignment, it is not unreasonable to expect the same dynamic at work in non-prestige 
settings: potential candidates can use their authoritative position as committee president to 
effectively campaign all year-round.  It is particularly relevant that we observe an effect on 
presidencies and not on other seats because this indicates how inconsequential the other seats 
are.  District deputies can use the resources a non-prestige presidency affords them for 
electoral reasons, but there is simply not enough exposure or benefits stemming from a regular 
committee seat with no control over resources or the panel agenda.  
The final point is that both Distance from M and minor party affiliation have an effect on 
non-prestige assignment: any one-point movement away from M reduces the odds of 
committee assignment by half; conversely, minor party affiliation increases the odds by a factor 
of two.  What exactly this means, I cannot be sure, especially when these particular seats are 
the least important.  The majority party may use these as payoffs to gain minor party support, 
but why would the former still maintain control over these panels by wasting its more loyal 
members on them?  Although I am not wholly confident in the answer, I suspect it is a way for 
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the ruling party to ensure panel presidents – who are unlikely to be close to the party median – 
do not get carried away in using the position to voice their dissent. 
Looking now to state legislatures where no majority party exists, the results appear to 
be inconclusive such that none of the hypothesized determinants have a statistically significant 
effect; in fact, none approach even the most liberal levels of significance.  Combine this with 
the extremely low values for the Pseudo-R2, the evidence strongly suggests misspecification.162  
Note, the same lack of explanatory power afflicts the other models as well, both for the entire 
sample of cases as well as just majority-party assemblies.  Notably, the one specification that 
does perform relatively well – Pseudo R2 = 0.17 – is model 3, the main model of interest.  It not 
only provides support for the partisan hypothesis of committee selection, but it is far superior 
to all other models which, on average, yield Pseudo R2 = 0 .02. 
Ultimately, what does this analysis tell us?  First, majority-party legislatures are 
expressly dominated by a partisan logic.  This, of course, is to be expected: because majority 
parties are virtually unconstrained in their ability to get what they want, they tend to dominate 
prestige committee presidencies.  Second, the partisan approach does not hold across all types 
of committees/seats in majority-party legislatures.  Specifically, a more distributive approach 
may be at work for non-prestige presidencies.  Although not what I originally hypothesized, the 
relationship between district-seats and committee assignment is well within the realm of 
plausible scenarios: prevented from wielding real policy influence, district deputies are free to 
use non-prestige presidencies – and the exposure and resources associated with them – to 
improve their future electoral prospects.  Third, a spatial approach to committee assignment, 
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admittedly, may not be the most appropriate when considering plurality-party legislatures (or 
even Mexican legislatures in general).  As Aparicio and Langston (2009) find, previous 
experience has a decisive impact on how committee assignments are distributed in the 
Chamber of Deputies.  Itself a plurality-party legislature, the Chamber may simply be a large-
scale version of what occurs at the state-level.  As I note in the Conclusion, incorporating a 
deputy’s background into a model of committee selection will be the next step in my research 
program on state legislatures. 
Having explored committee selection, I now turn my attention to plenary voting: given a 
partisan approach to committee selection in majority-party, we should expect a similar logic 
dominating plenary.   The question now is: how exactly do ruling parties compel rank-and-file 
support of their committee-based decisions? 
 
5.2 Plenary Voting: Agenda Control or Vote Buying? 
 Plenary sessions are largely viewed in Mexico as scripted affairs where the outcomes 
have already been decided behind closed-doors by party leaders.  Given the analysis on 
committee selection, it is clear parties seek out prestige committee presidencies.  With these 
offices, parties can effectively monopolize legislative production; so when a party does enjoy a 
majority and is in a position to take any and all offices, it is interesting to find they devote most 
of their energies towards securing these prized seats and are willing to leave the rest to the 
opposition.  Within this setting, leaders can readily compel rank-and-file support of their 
committee-based agreements, rendering final votes of approval and other plenary activities 
largely meaningless. 
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 Nevertheless, while this story seems straightforward enough, scholars have yet to 
develop a clear understanding of the mechanisms driving legislative voting in Mexico: if parties 
are as powerful as they appear to be, how exactly do they compel rank-and-file support?  The 
underlying assumption dominating many studies of Mexican legislatures is that once a proposal 
reaches the plenary floor, passage is expected to be a guaranteed outcome (see the level of 
unanimity, Figure 2.9).  This, however, ignores the specific strategies ruling parties use to 
compel support.  That is – despite party control – the plenary remains composed of ambitious 
individuals who each have their own political agenda.  In this context, support for the party 
leadership is not automatic.  So if it is not, then how exactly do parties achieve this high level of 
support?  I propose two methods – (1) an inducement approach, relying on vote-buying, and (2) 
agenda control, which arranges the set of voting choices so that deputies have no other 
alternative but to support the party’s position. 
 Using the data on ideological preferences, the following will evaluate three different 
models of legislative voting.  Specifically, I examine which determinants affect the probability a 
legislator votes with the majority on any given vote.  In contrast to the results from the analysis 
of committee selection, the models here present a clear picture of party control: the 
inducement approach dominates. 
5.2.1 Expectations 
 In Chapter 3, I first discuss the prediction that every winning coalition in a legislature 
must include the median voter.  The Median Voter Theorem is relatively straightforward, 
lacking much of the institutional detail needed to account for many legislative settings; 
however, it is a well-established prediction that can serve as a useful baseline for the two party-
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based hypotheses I post next.  Moreover, the growing autonomy of state deputies – what with 
more candidate-based elections and a loosening gubernatorial grip – may suggest that 
legislative voting is increasingly based on individual preferences rather than party pressure.  
That is, parties are expected to weigh heavily on procedural and electorally significant votes 
(Cox and McCubbins 2005).  So while Mexican deputies are free to vote as they wish on matters 
like amendments and non-binding resolutions – thus providing the information I need to 
generate ideal points – they have traditionally been restricted when it came to budgetary bills 
carrying significant consequences for government performance and party success.  Yet, as 
deputies become marginally more independent, party control may no longer be as absolute as 
it was during the hegemonic era: party switching is relatively frequent, strong candidates are 
usually in a position to rally new groups, and deputies now count among the leadership that 
once excluded them.  With that in mind, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis V.3 A deputy likely votes with a majority on budget bills the closer her ideal 
point is the chamber median. 
To model this relationship, I propose the following specification: 
î~ Ñ (ï + ð ∗ YØÙÙÂ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×)ñ ∗ [1 − (ï + ð ∗ YØÙÙÂ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×)]§ñ
V
¤
 
where î = 1 if a deputy votes the same as the winning coalition and 0 otherwise;163 (∙) 
remains the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution; and 
YØÙÙÂ ÕÁÔÓmÖ× = | − |.  The expectation is that as Floor Distance increases, the 
probability of voting with a majority (î = 1) decreases. 
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Turning to the party-based models, I argue there are two ways to compel plenary 
support of what we already know are elite-level agreements drafted in committee: party 
inducements and agenda control.  With respect to the first, Mexican parties are endowed with 
significant resources both within the legislature and out.  Inside, parliamentary coordinators 
control access to funds, personnel, etc.  Although these resources certainly enhance a deputy’s 
ability to conduct legislative business, their real values comes from the personal/electoral 
benefits they provide.  In terms of extra-legislative resources, parties legally control access to 
candidacies and the bulk of campaign funds.  With these resources, parties are well-positioned 
to compel deputy support – both those within the party and defectors in the opposition – using 
a vote-buying strategy.  With this in mind, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis V.1 A deputy likely votes with a legislative majority if she is a member of 
the ruling party. 
To model this relationship, I propose the following specification: 
î~ Ñ (ï + ð ∗ ÜØm½ ÒÓÂÔ)ñ ∗ [1 − (ï + ð ∗ ÜØm½ ÒÓÂÔ)]§ñ
V
¤
 
where ÜØm½ ÒÓÂÔ = 1 if a deputy is a member of the largest party, 0 otherwise.164  The 
expectation is a member of the ruling party should experience a higher level of legislative 
success than those in the opposition.   
 The second model presumes that vote-buying may not be the most economical way to 
assert their power; at the very least, this is not consistent with the approach majority parties 
take to distributing committee assignments.  Instead, a ruling party uses its control over 
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median or is allied with the executive, etc.  In the present sample, however, the largest party also controls the 
governor’s house.  
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agenda-setting bodies – i.e., prestige committees – to draft their legislative proposals in such a 
way that (1) it is acceptable to the party median and (2) the plenary has no other alternative 
but to vote for them.  Note, because party leaders are given authority over the delegation to 
improve the party’s electoral prospects, agenda control should manifest itself primarily on 
votes which have the greatest impact on voters; in Mexico’s case, those are budgetary bills.  
With that in mind, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis V.2 A deputy likely votes with the legislative majority on budgetary bills the 
closer her ideal point is to the ruling party median. 
To model this relationship, I propose the following specification. 
î~ Ñ (ï + ð ∗ ÒÓÂÔ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×)ñ ∗ [1 − (ï + ð ∗ ÒÓÂÔ ÕÁÔÓmÖ×)]§ñ
V
¤
 
where ÒÓÂÔ ÕÁÔÓmÖ× = | − Y|.  The expectation is `(î) increases when Party Distance 
decreases.  
5.2.2 The Model 
 To model these three hypotheses, I adopt a multi-level approach where I assume each 
independent variable enters into the equation at different levels of interaction.  Starting with 
the deputy-level, i, I include in the specification the two factors which a deputy herself 
experiences: Floor Distance (Â), Party Distance (Âz), 
î = ï + ðÂ + ðzÂz + ØÙ½Ô(ò), 
where ØÙ½Ô(ò) ≡ ò~(∙)ñ ∗ [1 − (∙)]§ñ. 
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 The second level moves from the individual to the party level, j, where all of the 
commonalities associated with party affiliation can be felt by the same members.  Here, the 
inducement variable, Ruling Party (Âô), has its effect in the following way: 
ò = ï + ðôÂô + ØÙ½Ô(ò). 
 At the third (legislative period, j) and fourth (state, h) levels, I do not include any 
particular covariates but the two following equations do permit me to control for any 
unexpected variance that is bound to occur at these particular levels.  Unlike the previous 
analysis of committee selection, the multi-level approach precludes the need for contextual 
dummies as all the variance associated with the groupings is already captured by modeling the 
error variances: 
ò = ï + ØÙ½Ô(òµ) 
òµ = ï + ØÙ½Ô(òõ). 
Taking these four levels together leads to an overall model that not only groups 
legislators according to different levels of interaction, but also allows for covariates to enter at 
different points in the decision-making process: 
îµõ = ï + ðÂ + ðzÂz + ðôÂô + ØÙ½Ô(ò), 
where, ò = ò + ò + òµ + òõ. 
 Before proceeding any further, there are three points to make before presenting the 
coefficient estimate for each covariate.  First, I generate an alternative measure of party 
inducement.  That is, the original measure is a rather blunt dichotomous variable indicating 
whether a party enjoys, at a minimum, a plurality of seats.  This measure, however, does not 
account for the possibility that a party’s power grows as its seat share increases until – as a 
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majority party – it gains total control over the legislature.165  To that end, I generate a new 
measure of party inducement, Â̂ô: 
Â̂ô = ÷ 1  ø > 1ø   ø < 1 
where  ø = # Ù Á×ÓÔÁ # Ù Á×ÓÔÁ m××¨×¨ ÙÂ Ó oÓ«ÙÂÔµù .  In this way, I can distinguish 
between deputies who belong to parties which weakly control the legislature (PAN in Morelos; 
PRI in Estado de México), those whose parties almost have a majority (PRI in Veracruz; PAN in 
Baja California; PRD in Zacatecas I), and those whose parties who are clearly in majority control 
(PAN in Guanajuato; PRI in Campeche and Puebla; and PRD in Zacatecas II). 
 A second point is that I generate my spatial variables (Distance from M/F) using two 
operationalizations of, the dependent variable for the vote choice model in Chapter 4.  The 
first assumes all abstentions are ‘nays’, unless otherwise stated.  Although certainly not a 
controversial decision (Heller and Weldon 2001), there is room for uncertainty.  To remedy 
that, I also generate ideal points under the assumption that all abstentions are missing 
observations (i.e., they carry no information about a legislator’s preferences for a given vote). 
 My final point refers back to the earlier discussion on roll call votes as a basis for 
measuring legislative preference (Chapter 4).  One of the frequent criticisms throughout the 
course of this project is how I use the roll call votes to generate ideal points yet the dependent 
variable for this analysis is derived from the same set of votes.  If the two samples were exactly 
the same, this would create serious complications as the models would be severely biased in 
favor of a clear systematic relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
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 Assuming all voting decisions are by majority rule.  To my knowledge, all roll call votes on committee bills in 
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FIGURE 5.2.  Comparing the Effect of Different Roll Call Votes on Ideal Point Estimates 
(Zacatecas I).  I graph ideal points generated using only votes budgetary bills as a funciton of a 
ideal points generated using the entire sample of votes.  The dotted line indicates a 1:1 
relationship between x- and y-values.  The lack of correspondence between the two measures 
(as indicated by the diagonal line) indicates each one taps into a different set of preferences.  
For present purposes, this is sufficient to claim that using RCV-based ideal points to test the 
probability of voting with the majority should not bias the results 
 
For Zacatecas I, Figure 5.1 graphs the ideal points I generated using only votes on 
budgetary bills (y-axis) as a function of ideal points generated using the period’s entire sample 
of votes (x-axis).166  What I find is a lack of a 1:1 relationship – which is more or less repeated in 
the other nine periods – and a clear indication that the two sets of ideal points do not ‘tap’ into 
the same set of preferences.  Moreover, I code abstentions for the dependent variable 
differently when compared to their coding for the vote-choice models in Chapter 4.  Instead of 
indicating dissent, abstentions are counted here as missing observations (or however 
abstentions are tallied for a specific state).  I do this because what a deputy intends her vote to 
mean has no bearing on how it is actually counted.  These two changes to the data – a focus on 
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budget votes and abstentions recoded as missing observations – should greatly limit any bias 
the roll call data may introduce. 
 
Independent Variables Definition Expectation 
/:2: Distance – F 
Mean: 0.73 
Std. Dev: 0.67 
Absolute distance between a 
deputy’s ideal point and the chamber 
median,  |ã:2 − !| 
 
↑ /: ⟹ ↓ -(ú = :) 
/æ2: Distance – P  
Mean: 0.13 
St. Dev: 0.23 
Absolute distance  between a 
deputy’s ideal point and the ruling 
party median, |ã:2 − ,| 
 
↑ /æ ⟹ ↓ -(ú = :) 
/çû: Plurality Party - Dichotomous 
Mean: 0.49 
St. Dev: 0.50 
 
1 = if a member of the largest party; 0 
otherwise 
 
↑ /ç ⟹ ↑ -(ú = :) 
/¼çû: Plurality Party – Discrete 
Mean: 0.69 
St. Dev: 0.29 
/¼ç] =  : 27 ü] > 1ü] 27 ü] < 1 
↑ /ç ⟹ ↑ -(ú = :) 
Levels of Interaction Variables  
(1) Deputy (i) /:2, /æ2  
(2) Party (j) /ç], /¼ç]  
(3) Legislative Period (k)   
(4) State (h)   
Dependent Variables Sample of Budget Bills167  
Baja California I 531  
Baja California II 570  
Campeche 211  
Guanajuato 329  
Estado de México 84  
Morelos 183  
Puebla 145  
Veracruz 130  
Zacatecas I 357  
Zacatecas II 310  
 
Table 5.4.  Variables and Hypothetical Expectations of a Model of Plenary Voting. 
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 Budget Bills are defined as those emanating from prestige committees with jurisdiction over tax revenue, 
appropriations, or oversight.   
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In Table 5.4, I summarize the variables used in this analysis and their hypothesized effect 
on the probability of voting with the majority. 
5.2.3 Discussion 
In Table 5.5, there are two main points to make before exploring the results more 
carefully.  First, the discrete form of the Ruling Party variable does not perform well at all 
whereas its dichotomous counterpart performs as exactly as what one should expect.  This is 
somewhat surprising given the idea that not all ‘pluralities are the same’.   In other words, I fully 
expected this covariate to capture any of the differences between weak pluralities (Estado de 
México and Morelos) and solid majorities (Campeche, Guanajuato, and Puebla).  However, 
what the results clearly show that what matters for a group to wield any influence is it must be 
the largest party, regardless how large its advantage is over the rest of the party delegations.  
This may have something to do with the fact that every plurality in the sample is supported by a 
co-partisan in the governor’s office.  Perhaps the discrete form of the Ruling Party variable will 
be more suited for samples where governors do not belong to the same party as the legislative 
plurality (e.g., Aguascalientes, LX). 
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  1.Abstentions as 
'Nays' 
2.Abstentions as  
Missing 
3.Abstentions as  
'Nays' 
4.Abstentions as  
Missing 
Distance – F 
 
 
-0.28 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.30 
(0.12) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
Distance – M 
 
 
-0.36 
(0.12) 
-0.69 
(0.11) 
-0.35 
(0.12) 
-0.66 
(0.11) 
Ruling Party – Dichotomous 
 
 
  1.33 
(0.62) 
1.05 
(0.62) 
Ruling Party – Discrete 
 
 
0.71 
(0.50) 
0.83 
(0.44) 
  
Constant 
 
 
3.82 
(0.33) 
3.99 
(0.33) 
3.90 
(0.31) 
4.13 
(0.32) 
Log Likelihood -9599.9061 -9595.1956 -9596.3129 -9591.4100 
Observations 61121 61121 61121 61121 
Random-effects 
Parameters 
    
State: Identity     
St. Dev (Constant) 0.85 
(0.23) 
0.88 
(0.23) 
0.85 
(0.22) 
0.90 
(0.23) 
      
Party: Independent     
St. Dev (Ruling Party) 1.65 
(0.35) 
1.41 
(0.31) 
1.75 
(0.51) 
1.81 
(0.50) 
St Dev (Constant) 0.33 
(0.19) 
0.33 
(0.16) 
0.48 
(0.12) 
0.396 
(0.10) 
      
Legislator: Independent     
St. Dev (Distance – F) 0.00 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.04) 
St. Dev (Distance – M) 0.12 
(0.02) 
0.11 
(0.03) 
0.12( 
0.02) 
0.10 
(0.03) 
St. Dev (Constant) 0.00 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
0.00( 
0.08) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
 
Table 5.5.  The Probability of Voting with the Majority and its Determinants.  Estimated using 
xtmelogit in Stata 10. Log likelihoods are based on Laplacian estimation.  Substantive effects 
reported as slope coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.  Highlighted and bolded cells 
indicate statistical significance at ` < 0.05  levels. 
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The second point is the strength of the relationship between Party Distance and the 
probability of legislative success: across all four models, this covariate has a strongly significant 
effect on the dependent variable that is in the expected negative direction.  This is an important 
clue in evaluating which of the three explanations perform best.  The robustness of Party 
Distance certainly contributes to the idea that the agenda-control model of partisan control is 
the best of all three.  There, is, however, a small hitch: the other competing variables all 
perform as expected, especially in the model of interest (#3) where abstentions are coded as 
‘nays’ for ideal points and the dichotomous form of Ruling Party is used.  To better explore how 
the models perform look to Figures 5.2 – 5.11 where I graph the predicted probability a 
legislator votes with the majority as a function of ideological position; specifically, I graph the 
predicted probabilities for each member of the major parties across the ten legislative periods.  
In comparing these graphs with the curves featured in Chapter 3 (MVT: Figure 3.1; Inducement: 
Figure 3.2; Cartel: Figure 3.4), one would immediately notice an apparent similarity between 
the graphs here and the relationship plotted in Figure 3.4.  That is, there is a significant drop-off 
in the level of legislative success in the ‘roll zone’ (opposite the majority-side of the floor 
median) while deputies within the ‘block-out zone (majority-side of the floor median) all 
experience a relatively uniform level of success.  However, this last point makes me question 
whether the cartel model actually holds.   
If one refers to the ideal point distributions plotted in Figures B.26 – B.35, there is very 
little overlap – if any – between the ruling party and the opposition.  Because of this, one can 
easily identify in the figures below where the ruling party generally is on the graph.  With this 
information, one can see that the patterns here may actually support the Inducement approach 
178 
 
where legislative success for members of the ruling party is high vis-à-vis the opposition, they 
experience a uniform level of success, and success does not depend on distance from any of the 
median positions.  In fact, aside from Zacatecas II, those around the ruling party median all 
experience the same level of success.  In contrast, the cartel model predicts the probability of 
voting with the majority decreases the farther one goes from the ruling party median.   
The story these graphs tell us is that ruling parties use their access to resources to ‘buy’ 
deputies within their respective delegations.  Whether they support the bill or not is 
inconsequential (hence the lack of variation around M) so long as the party provides them with 
the inducements to vote in favor of the group’s preferred choice.168  Opposition deputies, 
however, are not susceptible to those inducements – whether because ruling parties do not 
offer them the benefits or because they cannot effectively sanction opposition deputies – and 
will vote for the bill according to their preferences.  For ruling parties with a majority share of 
seats, the real question is making sure deputies are present when votes occur.169  With respect 
to plurality-party legislature, where no majority party exists, the largest group still experiences 
a relatively high and uniform level of legislative success.  How is this possible if the opposition 
can theoretically form a coalition and overturn any of the plurality’s decisions?  The ruling party 
avoids this in two ways: first, they have the governor on their side to compel support from 
opposition deputies; second, many of the minor parties can be bought off – in many cases, 
literally – to help the plurality form a true majority coalition.   
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 Inducements can be either positive (benefits) or negative (sanctions). 
169
 Scattered throughout the stenographic records of legislative sessions are occasions when the Mesa president – 
who is usually a member of the ruling party – suspends the session for a ‘lack of quorum’ until she can secure 
enough members from the deputy. 
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According to this story, there are two different processes at work.  First, party leaders 
use their power over prestige committee presidencies to draft policy, doing so with little regard 
for the ideological positions of rank-and-file deputies.  This is in stark contrast to the cartel 
model which expects party leaders to draft policy and arrange the agenda in such a way that 
the plenary prefers the party’s position to all other alternatives.  Separately, party leaders use 
their access to resources to compel ruling party deputies to support all the policies their leaders 
push forth.  Under party inducement, legislative support does not depend on the policies the 
ruling party produces; the group’s rank-and-file – content with the benefits they receive – will 
vote the party line every time a bill as important as a budget proposal reaches the plenary floor. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Success in Baja California (XXVII).  Using the 
slope coefficients obtained for Model 3 in Table 5.5, I generated predicted probabilities voting 
with the majority for each legislator. The x-axis is a deputy’s ideological position within the 
policy space and the y-axis is the probability of legislative success. Focusing on the major parties 
(PAN, PRI), the curve here approximates the relationship graphed in Figure 3.2 where the 
highest level of success is observed for all members of the ruling party. 
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Figure 5.4. Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Success in Baja California (XXVIII).  Using the 
slope coefficients obtained for Model 3 in Table 5.5, I generated predicted probabilities voting 
with the majority for each legislator. The x-axis is a deputy’s ideological position within the 
policy space and the y-axis is the probability of legislative success. Focusing on the major parties 
(PAN, PRI), the curve here approximates the relationship graphed in Figure 3.2 where the 
highest level of success is observed for all members of the ruling party.  
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Figure 5.5. Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Success in Campeche (LVIII).  Using the slope 
coefficients obtained for Model 3 in Table 5.5, I generated predicted probabilities voting with 
the majority for each legislator. The x-axis is a deputy’s ideological position within the policy 
space and the y-axis is the probability of legislative success. Focusing on the major parties (PAN, 
PRI), the curve here approximates the relationship graphed in Figure 3.2 where the highest level 
of success is observed for all members of the ruling party. 
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Figure 5.6. Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Success in Guanajuato (LIX).  Using the slope 
coefficients obtained for Model 3 in Table 5.5, I generated predicted probabilities voting with 
the majority for each legislator. The x-axis is a deputy’s ideological position within the policy 
space and the y-axis is the probability of legislative success. Focusing on the major parties (PAN, 
PRI, PRD), the curve here approximates the relationship graphed in Figure 3.2 where the highest 
level of success is observed for all members of the ruling party. 
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Figure 5.7. Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Success in Estado de México (LV).  Using the 
slope coefficients obtained for Model 3 in Table 5.5, I generated predicted probabilities voting 
with the majority for each legislator. The x-axis is a deputy’s ideological position within the 
policy space and the y-axis is the probability of legislative success. Focusing on the major parties 
(PAN, PRI, PRD), the curve here approximates the relationship graphed in Figure 3.2 where the 
highest level of success is observed for all members of the ruling party. 
  
M
F
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
184 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Success in Morelos (XLIX).  Using the slope 
coefficients obtained for Model 3 in Table 5.5, I generated predicted probabilities voting with 
the majority for each legislator. The x-axis is a deputy’s ideological position within the policy 
space and the y-axis is the probability of legislative success. Focusing on the major parties (PAN, 
PRI, PRD), the curve here approximates the relationship graphed in Figure 3.2 where the highest 
level of success is observed for all members of the ruling party. 
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Figure 5.9. Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Success in Puebla (LVI).  Using the slope 
coefficients obtained for Model 3 in Table 5.5, I generated predicted probabilities voting with 
the majority for each legislator. The x-axis is a deputy’s ideological position within the policy 
space and the y-axis is the probability of legislative success. Focusing on the major parties (PAN, 
PRI), the curve here approximates the relationship graphed in Figure 3.2 where the highest level 
of success is observed for all members of the ruling party. 
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Figure 5.10. Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Success in Veracruz (LX).  Using the slope 
coefficients obtained for Model 3 in Table 5.5, I generated predicted probabilities voting with 
the majority for each legislator. The x-axis is a deputy’s ideological position within the policy 
space and the y-axis is the probability of legislative success. Focusing on the major parties (PAN, 
PRI, PRD), the curve here approximates the relationship graphed in Figure 3.2 where the highest 
level of success is observed for all members of the ruling party. 
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Figure 5.11. Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Success in Zacatecas (LVII).  Using the slope 
coefficients obtained for Model 3 in Table 5.5, I generated predicted probabilities voting with 
the majority for each legislator. The x-axis is a deputy’s ideological position within the policy 
space and the y-axis is the probability of legislative success. Focusing on the major parties (PAN, 
PRI, PRD), the curve here approximates the relationship graphed in Figure 3.2 where the highest 
level of success is observed for all members of the ruling party. 
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Figure 5.12. Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Success in Zacatecas (LVIII).  Using the slope 
coefficients obtained for Model 3 in Table 5.5, I generated predicted probabilities voting with 
the majority for each legislator. The x-axis is a deputy’s ideological position within the policy 
space and the y-axis is the probability of legislative success. Focusing on the major parties (PAN, 
PRI, PRD), the curve here is expected to approximate the relationship graphed in Figure 3.2, 
however, it is obvious that this is not the case empirically.  In fact, both the chamber and party 
medians experience lower levels of legislative success than other deputies in the legislature.  I 
have not been able to produce an explanation for this unexpected pattern. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The analyses presented here, although informative, produce a rather cynical view of 
legislative life in Mexican states.  First off, ruling parties are quite subtle in controlling 
committee proposals: rather than take over every panel, the centralized nature of legislative 
rules allows the ruling party to dominate policy while still giving the opposition access to 
resources. In this way, the ruling party can appear magnanimous in the public eye and builds up 
political confidence in its group.  Second, party leaders use what resources they have to 
effectively ‘buy’ off fellow co-partisans in the assembly.  The former only seeks to get its own 
policies pushed through while the latter is expressly concerned with gaining more benefits and 
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electoral resources.  In this setting, legislators care little about the impact policy has on the lives 
of everyday citizens. 
This is not to say that every deputy or that every party is out to satisfy their own ends, 
blatantly disregarding the public’s welfare.  In fact, as I traveled through the country, many 
deputies were genuinely concerned with helping their fellow citizens and sought to do so as 
best they could.  The trouble is that many of these institutions are ingrained into the political 
system such that it is near-impossible to displace them, especially when so many have a vested 
interest in keeping these party-based institutions. 
Moving away from the normative aspect, this analysis has contributed to our 
understanding of Mexican legislatures by opening – albeit partially – the black box of 
committee deliberation and plenary control.  This is undeniably a first in the literature and 
serves as a perfect platform for further research.  In the concluding chapter, I suggest several 
new avenues for future research to improve what we know about these emerging institutions. 
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Towards the end of Chapter 2, I asked if legislative life in 21st century Mexico is any different 
from what it was under one-party rule.   In fact, I first asked this loaded question very early on 
in the project while having breakfast with several priístas at a busy café in central Puebla.  
Although I was certainly hesitant to mention such a charged topic, especially with members of 
the former hegemon sitting right across the table from me, I was interested to learn their 
perspective on how things have changed since the opposition gained power.  Nevertheless, I 
was still surprised at the candor and simplicity of José Alarcón’s response, himself a former 
deputy in local and federal legislatures: “No.  There is absolutely no difference between now 
and then.  The people have changed but the machine remains the same.”170 
 If the empirical analysis here has proven anything, it has proven Licenciado Alarcón 
correct: although far more parties now participate in government, this growing pluralism does 
not seem to translate into greater power for individual deputies.  In fact, legislative 
organization may be geared towards the party more than it was in the past as only coordinators 
can serve on today’s governing bodies – unlike the Gran Comisiones of the hegemonic era 
which mostly seated rank-and-file deputies. 
 Looking specifically to the regression models in Tables 5.2 and 5.5, the slope coefficients 
and predicted probabilities all appear to indicate that legislative politics is party politics.  That 
is, in the committee selection models (Table 5.2) there is overwhelming evidence to suggest 
that parties have a tremendous amount of influence over the most important seats on the most 
                                                                 
170
 Interview: Alarcón Hernandez (Puebla), Spanish translation: “No. No hay ninguna diferencia.  Ha cambiado el 
equipo, pero la maquina sigue como mismo.” 
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important committees.   Ruling parties not only reward members of their own party with high-
end assignments, they give special attention to those closest to the group’s median voter.  
Note, this is not to say other dynamics are not at work.  For example, a distributive logic seems 
to govern the assignment of non-prestige presidencies: although I originally predicted district 
deputies to seek out seats on prestige committees because of the influence these panels have 
over policy, the pressing concern for these ambitious politicians seems to be less about policy 
influence and more about electoral exposure, which is what the presidency of any committee 
(prestige or not) gives them.  We just happen to see a relationship between district seats and 
non-prestige presidencies because ruling parties are willing to forfeit these less valuable 
assignments in exchange for their control over more consequential ones. 
 With respect to plenary voting, I hypothesized that party control can manifest itself over 
important bills in two ways, inducements or agenda control.  Looking only to the slope 
coefficients, there is no clear evidence to refute any of the hypothesized relationship as the 
main model finds all three variables – distance from M, distance from F, and the ruling party 
dummy – to have a statistically significant effect in the predicted direction.  To get a more 
discriminating perspective then, I generated predicted probabilities for each deputy and plotted 
them as a function of ideological position.  What I initially find is that those on the non-plurality 
side of the floor median (the side opposite to where the ruling party median is) are all unlikely 
to vote with the majority, with that probability decreasing the farther a deputy is from F; on the 
ruling-party side, however, those surrounding the party median tend to experience a high 
probability of success.  Now, I originally concluded this pattern indicates a cartel approach to 
party pressure but there was one troubling detail about the pattern that did not correspond 
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with model: there was no relationship between the probability of voting with the majority and 
distance from M.  Instead,  every deputy on the ruling-party side of F experienced a relatively 
uniform level of legislative success; combine this with the fact that there is very little overlap 
between the parties, one can safely assume that all of those on the ruling-party side of F all 
belong to the ruling party.  If this is the case, then the graphs actually support the inducement 
approach because only this model predicts that ruling party legislators will have a 
comparatively high level of success while opposition legislators will all be unlikely to vote with 
the majority.  A relatively straightforward approach to party control, the inducement approach 
appears to be perform so well because of the small size of Mexican state legislatures, making 
vote-buying far more efficient than in assemblies large than, say, 100 seats. 
 In these two stories about committee selection and plenary voting, the ruling party 
exerts its influence clearly and directly.  Two caveats, however, are worth mentioning.  First, 
party effects over committee selection only manifest themselves when majority-party 
legislatures are considered; when plurality-party legislatures are considered, the effects 
disappear.  In fact, all hypothesized effects disappear completely, suggesting that another, non-
spatial approach might be appropriate, e.g., one which focuses on previous experience 
(Aparicio and Langston 2009).  Second, the strategy to use inducements seems to be shared by 
every single ruling party in nine of the ten legislative periods.  That is, I originally considered the 
Mexican case due to variation in economic development and party control.  The reality, 
however, is that there is no difference.  Across all types of states and all types of parties – 
leftist, conservative, centrist, majority, plurality, etc. – every one exhibited the same predicted 
relationship between voting with the majority and partisan affiliation.  These two points speak 
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directly to Alarcon’s point:  when parties are in a position to definitively control a legislature 
(like when a majority party is in place), they exert considerable influence over the relevant 
committee in much the same way, regardless if one is PRI or PAN; likewise, all three major 
parties use vote-buying to compel legislative support. Although similar to the approach the PRI 
adopted during its hegemonic period, it is nevertheless surprising the find such consistency 
across the sample.  While I would like to avoid trite/cliché statements, it certainly seems the 
parties ‘took a page’ from the PRI ‘book’; that is, the hegemonic approach to governing has 
proven rather successful in asserting party control over the legislature, helping the PRI stay in 
power for over seven decades – even longer if one considers states like Puebla and Campeche.  
Naturally, any party that is in a position to assert control over the legislature, it will follow the 
PRI’s lead because, institutionally speaking, parties know no other way to conduct legislative 
business.  Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that this will change in near future. 
 And yet, how does my earlier assertion that legislators are more autonomous fit with 
this party-dominated picture?  Referring back to the point I made in Chapter 2, the premium on 
consensus drives many deputies to voice their dissent away from the public eye irrespective of 
how ‘important’ they are to the party or how much electoral support they enjoy.  Additionally, 
the line separating the state party organization and the legislative delegation – unlike in the 
United States – is blurred by the fact that many deputies today have now assumed high-ranking 
positions within the party; in this way, deputies are positioned to assert their autonomy, albeit 
in an unobservable way.  Parties prefer to keep their affairs ‘within the family’ so that any 
display of legislative independence will be muted and/or dealt with behind closed-doors. 
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6.1 Future Avenues of Research 
 Having conducted a rather detailed analysis of political behavior in Mexican state 
legislatures – as well as providing new information on legislative organization, deriving new 
theoretical expectations, and generating a wholly original set of preference-based variables – I 
now proceed with a brief discussion of possible avenues of future research. 
 The first is perhaps the most obvious: apply the hypothesis tests used to evaluate 
plenary voting in the state legislatures to the Chamber of Deputies.  As far as I am aware, only 
González (2007) has used roll call data to estimate ideal points for individual federal deputies; 
unfortunately, a massive data loss prevents me from presently including an analysis of the 
national assembly.  Additionally the Chamber is an interesting example for three reasons.  First, 
its significance is not as doubtful as state legislatures.  That is, I spent considerable effort 
arguing in Chapter 2 that state legislatures are worth studying; with respect to the Chamber of 
Deputies, there is no need to make these claims as it is undeniable that the assembly plays a 
critical role in decision-making.  Key votes on energy and electoral reforms over the past year 
clearly demonstrate that fact.  Second, unlike the average state legislature, the Chamber 
produces an abundance of non-unanimous roll call votes; in this way, one has enough 
observations to generate ideal points using just a single subset of votes (as opposed to all of 
them), and then use these estimates to model an entirely different sample of votes.  Third, 
agenda control is more likely to be observed as a strategy of party control as the Chamber is an 
extremely large assembly with over 500 seats!  In this setting, it would prove to be highly 
inefficient to try and buy off every deputy; then again, it may also not be as costly if parties only 
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seek the support of a minimum winning coalition.  Nevertheless, even the smallest winning 
coalition still requires 251 votes that parties must win over to their side. 
 A second avenue is to model committee composition as a function of time.  That is, 
unlike in the United States Congress where assignments are relatively fixed, Mexican 
legislatures are frequently changing panel membership.  And yet, as frequent as these changes 
are, we know very little as to why they occur.  Of course there is the reason of deputies leaving 
office and substitutes assuming their legislative seat; with different people now in the chamber, 
party leaders must account for this and change committee assignments in order to ensure 
continued party control.  But beyond this somewhat trivial case, changes in committees still 
occur and seemingly at random points during the legislative period.  This present analysis 
adopts a rather static approach, looking only to committee assignments as they stand at the 
beginning of the period (see Chapter 5, footnote 1); obviously party control does not stop once 
committee assignments are approved, but why these changes occur is unknown in the 
literature, both at federal and state levels. 
 Third, there is the matter of party-switching.  Although not a wholly frequent event, it 
does occur with some regularity.  For example, in the present set of ten legislative periods, 
Fransciso Brown of Campeche (LVIII) ran under the PRI banner but did not belong to the party’s 
legislative delegation; Moisés Marín of Veracruz (LX) was affiliated with a PRD coalition but 
joined the PRI delegation instead; and deputies Sosa Muñiz and Maya Doro from Estado de 
México (LV) both changed their affiliation from PAN to PRI and PT to PAN, respectively.  
According to Poole (2005: 163), these situations provide us with the conditions to conduct a 
“natural experiment” in which we determine the extent to which party pressures influence 
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legislative preferences.  That is, if party pressures do affect preferences, then we should 
observe a nontrivial change in the switcher’s roll call behavior; if party does not, they any 
change should be, at best, negligible.   Not only does such a test providesan indication of party 
strength, it also helps evaluate the utility of using roll call votes as a way to generate 
preferences: if there is indeed a non-trivial change, then perhaps roll-call based approaches 
may not be the most appropriate if what they tap are not individual preferences but rather the 
extent to which parties control their delegations.171 
 Finally, there is the issue of treating committee stages and plenary approval as two 
separate processes.  As Londregan (1999) argues, the proposals legislators vote on in the 
plenary are not exogenously determined but instead follow directly from what the party 
dictates  in committee.  While it may be true that party leaders draft policy and deputies 
approve whatever is placed in front of them – constituting two separate affairs – the potential 
for selection bias still exists.   In other words, if parties did not decide which committee 
proposals reach the plenary, perhaps we might observe fewer partisan effects on a deputy’s 
vote.  Similarly, it may only be necessary to model the connection between the two stages for 
budgetary bills discharged form prestige committees as the evidence clearly supports the idea 
that there is a distinct effect on this particular subset of legislation. 
 
 Although there are many other ways to extend this research – e.g., examine voting in 
the relatively new Legislative Assembly of the Federal District, the exact contribution minor 
parties make to ruling party coalitions, etc. – the point I am making here is that the study of 
                                                                 
171
 If roll call-based approaches are inappropriate, then perhaps a one based on co-sponsorship may yield more 
valid measures (Aleman et al. 2009). 
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legislative life in Mexican states is a fruitful area of research.  It not only helps us better 
understand politics specific to the country, but it can also provide a platform for studying 
phenomenon that has confounded researchers elsewhere.  Moreover, with the information 
presented here freely available, no longer are scholars grasping in the dark when it comes sub-
national politics.  While only a minor contribution relative to the rest of the literature, this 
analysis is nonetheless an excellent jumping point for detailed and theoretically informed 
analyses in the future.  In this way, we not only advance our scholarly understanding of the 
world around us, but, in some small measure, it can help citizens make better decisions about 
the leaders they select as they now know what drives legislative processes: the party. 
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Abbreviation Party Name 
PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
PAN Partido Acción Nacional 
PRD Partido de la Revolución Democrática 
PVEM Partido Verde Ecologista de México 
PT Partido del Trabajo 
PCD Convergencia (por la Democracia) 
PRS Partido de la Revolución Socialista 
PDCD Partido del Centro Democrático (de Tlaxcala) 
PNA Nueva Alianza 
PS Partido Socialista 
PAS Partido Alianza Social 
PD Partido Demócrata 
PJS Partido Justicia Social 
PSN Partido Sociedad Nacionalista 
PAC Partido Alianza Ciudadana 
ASD Partido Alternativa Socialdemócrata 
MEP Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo 
PARM Partido Autentico de la Revolución Mexicana 
PPS Partido Popular Socialista 
PRV Partido Revolucionario Veracruzano 
DSSPN Democracia Social Partido Político Nacional 
PEC Partido Esperanza Ciudadana 
PLM Partido Liberal Mexicano 
FC Fuerza Ciudadana 
MP México Posible 
PBS Barzonista Sinaloense 
APSI Alianza por San Ignacio 
CP Conciencia Popular 
ASLP Alianza por San Luis Potosí 
NPP Nava Partido Político 
PY Partido Yucateco 
PAY Partido Alianza por Yucatán 
PCM Partido Civilista Morelense 
PEBC Partido Estatal de Baja California 
PES Partido Encuentro Social 
PR Partido Republicano 
PCC Partido Cardenista Coahuilense 
PUDC Partido Unidad Democrática de Coahuila 
PL Partido de la Libertad 
PDG Partido Duranguense 
ADC Asociación por la Democracia Colimense 
 
TABLE A.1.  Mexican State Parties Active between 1999 and 2008. Sources: State electoral institutes. 
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Location Interview Subject Office 
Pachuca, Hidalgo Irma Beatriz Chávez Ríos Deputy, LIX 
8/22/2007 – 9/1/2007 Jorge Malo Lugo Deputy, LIX 
 Julio Menchaca Salazar Deputy, LIX 
 Sabino Arteaga Rodríguez Dirección Archivo y Biblioteca, 
Congreso 
 Jorge Luis López del Castillo Secretario de Servicios Legislativos, 
Congreso 
 Juan Manuel Menes Alaguno Director de Estudios Legislativos, 
Congreso 
 Antonio Carabanes Lozada Secretario de Asuntos Electorales, 
PAN 
 Martha Hernández Rojo Coordinadora de Relaciones Publicas 
e Imágenes, PRI 
 José Orozco Martínez Secretario de Acción Nacional, PRI 
   
Tlaxcala, Tlaxcala  Faustino Blas Domínguez Méndez Deputy, LVIII 
9/2/2007 – 9/10/2007 Germán Morales Morales Deputy, LVIII 
 Pedro Tecuapacho Rodríguez Deputy, LVIII 
   
Morelia, Michoacán Ana Lucia Medina Galindo Deputy, LXX 
9/19/2007 – 9/29/2007 Manuel Duarte Ramírez Deputy, LXX 
 Juan Manuel Belmonte Political Columnist, La Opinión de 
Michoacán 
 Herminio Sánchez de la Barquera y 
Arroyo 
Universidad Vasco de Quiroga 
 Ofelia Martínez Alvarado Coordinadora, Secretaria de 
Desarrollo  
Social, Gobierno Federal 
   
Zacatecas. Zacatecas Emma Lisset López Murillo Deputy, LIX 
9/30/2007 – 10/9/2007 Felipe Andrade Haro Presidente del Comisión Estatal de 
Servicio  
Electoral, PRD 
 Arturo Ortiz Méndez Secretario General, PRD 
 Lilia Pérez Robles Secretaria General, PRI 
 
 
TABLE A.2  Interview Subjects in Eleven Mexican States, 2007 – 2008.  Project supported by the National 
Science Foundation and Rice University. 
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Location Interview Subject Office 
San Luis Potosí, San Luis Potosí Victoria Labastida Aguirre Deputy, LVIII 
10/10/2007 – 10/20/2007 Juan Pablo Escobar Deputy, LVIII 
 Juan Pablo Colunga López Secretario de Servicios 
Parlamentarios, Congreso 
 David Hernández Secretario de Acción de 
Gobierno, PAN 
 Aurelio Gancedo Rodríguez Secretario General, PRI 
 José San Luis Rubio Carrero Secretario Particular a 
Deputy Escobar 
 Julio Cesar Contreras El Colegio de San Luis 
 Alfonso Martin Magaña Subdirector Jurídica de 
Secretario de Gobierno 
Estatal 
Toluca, Estado de México Eruviel Ávila Villegas Deputy, LVI 
11/4/2007 – 11/14/2007 Ana Lilia Herrera Anzaldo Deputy, LVI 
 Domitilo Posadas Hernández Deputy, LVI 
 Alfonso Macedo Aguilar Coordinador General de la 
Biblioteca "Dr. José María 
Luis Mora", Congreso 
 Javier Domínguez Morales Secretario de Asuntos 
Parlamentarios, Congreso 
 Andrés Rivera Toribio Secretario General, PRD 
 Horacio Jiménez Representante Propietario 
del Partido  
Convergencia, IEEM 
 Juan Carlos Villarreal Martínez Director General, IEEM 
   
Guanajuato, Guanajuato Luis Alberto Camarena  Rougon Deputy, LX 
11/15/2007 – 11/23/2007 Víctor Arnulfo Montes de la Vega Deputy, LX 
 Salvador Márquez Lozornio Deputy, LX 
 José Gerardo de los Cobos Silva Deputy, LX 
 Rubén Arellano Rodríguez Deputy, LX 
 Mayra Angélica Enríquez 
Vanderkam 
Deputy, LX 
 Juan Huerta Montero Deputy, LX 
 José Julio González Garza Deputy, LX 
 Arturo Navarro Navarro Secretario General, Congreso 
 Humberto Alonso Bravo Director de Comunicación,  
Congreso 
 
TABLE A.2, cont.  Interview Subjects in Eleven Mexican States, 2007 – 2008.  Project supported by the 
National Science Foundation and Rice University. 
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Location Interview  Subject Office 
Chihuahua, Chihuahua Ricardo Yáñez Herrera Deputy, LXII 
11/24/2007 – 12/4/2007 María Ávila Serna Deputy, LXII 
 Neil Martin Pérez Campos Secretario de Servicios 
Parlamentarios y Vinculación 
Ciudadanía, Congreso 
 Alberto Rodríguez Núñez Asesor, Secretaria de Servicios 
Jurídicos Legislativos, Congreso 
   
Mérida, Yucatán Patricia del Socorro Gamboa Wong Deputy, LVIII 
1/6/2008 – 1/19/2008 Enrique Castillo Ruiz Deputy, LVIII 
 José Jacinto Sosa Novelo Oficial Mayor, LVII 
 Miguel Ángel Ceballos Quintal Coordinador de la Unidad Jurídica, 
Congreso 
 Luis Octavio Montoya Martínez Presidente, PAN; Deputy, LVII 
 Omar Corzo Olan Secretario de Acción Electoral, PRI 
   
Puebla, Puebla María Leonor Apolonia Popocatl 
Gutiérrez 
Deputy, LVII; Deputy LV 
1/20/2008 – 2/2/2008 José Porfirio Alarcón Hernández Representante Acreditado del PRI, 
IEEP; Federal Deputy, LIX 
 Leonardo Eli Abarca Salvatori Jefe de Departamento de 
Informática  
Legislativa, Congreso 
 Jorge Mora Acevedo Secretario General, Congreso 
 Rafael Micalco Méndez Presidente, PAN; Deputy, LVI 
 Octavio Mercada Villagrán Secretario General Adjunto a la 
Presidencia, PRI 
   
Cuernavaca, Morelos Emma Margarita Alemán Olvera Deputy, L 
2/3/2008 – 2/13/2008 Gabriel Gutiérrez Albarrán Deputy, L 
 Jorge Toledo Bustamante Deputy, L 
 Jaime Tovar Enríquez Deputy, L 
 Víctor Manuel Espinoza Bravo Director de Procesos Legislativos 
 
TABLE A.2, cont.  Interview Subjects in Eleven Mexican States, 2007 – 2008.  Project supported by the 
National Science Foundation and Rice University. 
 
  
218 
 
State Session District 
Seats 
Total 
Seats 
Majority Executive Unity 
Aguascalientes                  LVIII: 2001 – 2004 18 27  PAN 2 No 
Baja California                 XVII: 2001 – 2004 16 25  PAN 1* No 
Baja California Sur             XI: 2002 – 2005 15 20 PRD PRD 2 Yes 
Campeche                        LVII: 2000 – 2003 21 35 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Chiapas                         LXI: 2001 – 2004 26 40 PRI PAN 1* No 
Chihuahua                       LX: 2001 – 2004 22 33 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Coahuila de Zaragoza            LV: 2000 – 2003 20 32 PRI PRI 1 Yes 
Colima                          LIII: 2000 – 2003 16 24 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Durango                         LXII: 2001 – 2004 15 25 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Guanajuato                      LVIII: 2000 – 2003 22 36 PAN PAN 1 Yes 
Guerrero                        LVI: 1999 – 2002 28 46 PRI PRI 1* Yes 
Hidalgo                         LVII: 1999  – 2002 18 29 PRI PRI 1 Yes 
Jalisco                         LVI: 2001 – 2004 20 40 PAN PAN 1 Yes 
México                          LIV: 2000 – 2003 45 75  PRI 1 No 
Michoacán de Ocampo             LXIX: 2002 – 2005 24 40  PRD 1* No 
Morelos                         XLVIII: 2000 – 2003 18 30 PAN PAN 1 Yes 
Nayarit                         XXVI: 1999 – 2002 18 30  PAN 1 No 
Nuevo León                      LXIX: 2000 – 2003 26 42 PAN PAN 2 Yes 
Oaxaca                          LVIII: 2001 – 2004 25 42 PRI PRI Yes 
Puebla                          LV: 2002 – 2005 26 41 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Querétaro Arteaga               LVIII: 2000 – 2003 15 25  PAN 2 No 
Quintana Roo                    X: 2002 – 2005 15 25 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
San Luis Potosí                 LVI: 2000 – 2003 15 27 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Sinaloa                         LVII: 2001 – 2004 24 40 PRI PRI 1 Yes 
Sonora                          LVI: 2001 – 2004 21 33  PRI 2 No 
Tabasco                         LVII: 2001 – 2004 18 31 PRI PRI 1 Yes 
Tamaulipas                      LVIII: 2002 – 2005 19 32 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Tlaxcala                        LVII: 2002 – 2005 19 32  PRD 2 No 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave LIX: 2000 – 2004 24 45 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Yucatán                         LVI: 2001 – 2004 15 25  PAN 1* No 
Zacatecas                       LVII: 2001 – 2004 18 30  PRD 2 No 
 
TABLE A.3.  Summary of 32 Mexican State Legislatures, Period 1.  The third column lists the number of 
total district seats; the fourth is the total number seats (district + list); the fifth column identifies the 
majority party, if any exists; the sixth column lists the governor’s party, indicating whether the governor 
is in the first half of her term (e.g. PAN 1) or the second (e.g. PAN 2);172 and the sixth asks if the same 
party controls both a legislative majority and the governor’s office.  Highlighted rows represent state 
legislative periods which were included in the sample.  Sources: CIDAC, IMO, state electoral institutes. 
  
                                                                 
172
 An asterisk indicates the party ran as a coalition during that period’s election. 
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State Session District 
Seats 
Total 
Seats 
Majority Executive Unity 
Aguascalientes                  LIX: 2004 – 2007 18 27 PAN PAN 1 Yes 
Baja California                 XVIII: 2004 – 2007 16 25  PAN 2 No 
Baja California Sur             XII: 2005 – 2008 16 21 PRD PRD 1* Yes 
Campeche                        LVIII: 2003 – 2006 21 35 PRI PRI 1 Yes 
Chiapas                         LXII: 2004 – 2007 26 40  PAN 2* No 
Chihuahua                       LXI: 2004 – 2007 22 33 PRI PRI 1* Yes 
Coahuila de Zaragoza            LVI: 2003 – 2006 20 34 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Colima                          LIV: 2003 – 2006 16 25 PRI PRI 1 Yes 
Durango                         LXIII: 2004 – 2007 15 25 PRI PRI 1 Yes 
Guanajuato                      LIX: 2003 – 2006 22 36 PAN PAN 2 Yes 
Guerrero                        LVII: 2002 – 2005 28 46  PRI 2 No 
Hidalgo                         LVIII: 2002 – 2005 18 29 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Jalisco                         LVII: 2004 – 2007 20 40  PAN 2 No 
México                          LV: 2003 – 2006 45 75  PRI 2* No 
Michoacán de Ocampo             LXX: 2005 – 2008 24 40  PRD 2* No 
Morelos                         XLIX: 2003 – 2006 18 30  PAN 2 No 
Nayarit                         XXVII: 2002 – 2005 18 30 PRI PAN 2 No 
Nuevo León                      LXX: 2003 – 2006 26 44  PRI 1* No 
Oaxaca                          LIX: 2004 – 2007 25 42 PRI PRI 1* Yes 
Puebla                          LVI: 2005 – 2008 26 41 PRI PRI 1 Yes 
Querétaro Arteaga               LIX: 2003 – 2006 25 35  PAN 1 No 
Quintana Roo                    XI: 2005 – 2008 15 25  PRI 1* No 
San Luis Potosí                 LVII: 2003 – 2006 15 27  PAN 1 No 
Sinaloa                         LVIII: 2003 – 2006 24 40 PRI PRI 2* Yes 
Sonora                          LVII: 2003 – 2006 21 31 PRI PRI 1* Yes 
Tabasco                         LVIII: 2004 – 2007 21 35  PRI 2 No 
Tamaulipas                      LIX: 2005 – 2008 19 32 PRI PRI 1* Yes 
Tlaxcala                        LVIII: 2005 – 2008 19 32  PAN 1* No 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave LX: 2004 – 2007 30 50  PRI 1* No 
Yucatán                         LVII: 2004 – 2007 15 34 PAN PAN 2 Yes 
Zacatecas                       LVIII: 2004 – 2007 18 30 PRD PRD 1 Yes 
 
TABLE A.4.  Summary of 32 Mexican State Legislatures, Period 2.  The third column lists the number of 
total district seats; the fourth is the total number seats (district + list); the fifth column identifies the 
majority party, if any exists; the sixth column lists the governor’s party, indicating whether the governor 
is in the first half of her term (e.g. PAN 1) or the second (e.g., PAN 2);173 and the sixth asks if the same 
party controls both a legislative majority and the governor’s office.  Highlighted rows represent state 
legislative periods which were included in the sample.  Sources: CIDAC, IMO, state electoral institutes. 
 
  
                                                                 
173
 An asterisk indicates if the party ran as a coalition during that period’s election. 
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State Session District 
Seats 
Total 
Seats 
Majority Executive Unity 
Aguascalientes                  LX: 2007 – 2010 18 27 PRI PAN 2* No 
Baja California                 XIX: 2007 – 2010 16 25  PAN 1* No 
Baja California Sur             XII: 2008 – 2011 16 21  PRD 2* No 
Campeche                        LIX: 2006 – 2009 21 35  PRI 2 No 
Chiapas                         LXIII: 2007 – 2010 24 40  PRI * No 
Chihuahua                       LXII: 2007 – 2010 22 33  PRI 2* No 
Coahuila de Zaragoza            LVII: 2006 – 2009 20 35 PRI PRI 1 Yes 
Colima                          LV: 2006 – 2009 16 25  PRI 2 No 
Durango                         LXIV: 2007 – 2010 17 30 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Guanajuato                      LX: 2006 – 2009 22 36 PAN PAN 1 Yes 
Guerrero                        LVIII: 2005 – 2008 28 46  PRD 1* No 
Hidalgo                         LXIX: 2005 – 2008 18 29 PRI PRI 1* Yes 
Jalisco                         LVIII: 2007 – 2010 20 40 PAN PAN 1 Yes 
México                          LVI: 2006 – 2009 45 75  PRI 1* No 
Michoacán de Ocampo             LXIX: 2008 – 2011 24 40  PRD 1* No 
Morelos                         XLX: 2006 – 2009 18 30  PAN 1 No 
Nayarit                         XXVIII: 2005 – 2008 18 30 PRI PRI 1* Yes 
Nuevo León                      LXXI: 2006 – 2009 26 42 PAN PRI 2* Yes 
Oaxaca                          LX: 2007 – 2010 25 42 PRI PRI 2 Yes 
Puebla                          LVII: 2008 – 2011 26 41 PRI PRI 2* Yes 
Querétaro Arteaga               LX: 2006 – 2009 25 35 PAN PAN 2 Yes 
Quintana Roo                    XII: 2008 – 2011 15 25 PRI PRI 2* Yes 
San Luis Potosí                 LVIII: 2006 – 2009 15 27 PAN PAN 2* Yes 
Sinaloa                         LXI: 2006 – 2009 24 40 PRI PRI 1* Yes 
Sonora                          LVIII: 2006 – 2009 21 33  PRI 2* No 
Tabasco                         LIX: 2007 – 2010 21 35 PRI PRI 1 Yes 
Tamaulipas                      LX: 2008 – 2011 19 32 PRI PRI 2* Yes 
Tlaxcala                        LIX: 2008 – 2011 19 32  PAN 2* No 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave LXI: 2007 – 2010 30 50 PRI PRI 2* Yes 
Yucatán                         LVIII: 2007 – 2010 15 25 PRI PRI 1* Yes 
Zacatecas                       LIX: 2007 – 2010 18 30  PRD 2* No 
 
TABLE A.5.  Summary of 32 Mexican State Legislatures, Period 3.  The third column lists the number of 
total district seats; the fourth is the total number seats (district + list); the fifth column identifies the 
majority party, if any exists; the sixth column lists the governor’s party, indicating whether the governor 
is in the first half of her term (e.g. PAN 1) or the second (e.g., PAN 2);174 and the sixth asks if the same 
party controls both a legislative majority and the governor’s office.  Current as of August 2008.  Sources: 
CIDAC, IMO, state electoral institutes. 
 
  
                                                                 
174
 An asterisk indicates if the party ran as a coalition during that period’s election. 
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State Per Capita Income 
(2004 – 2006) 
2007 U.N. Human 
Development Index 
Aguascalientes                  87.85 0.83 
Baja California                 94.14 0.83 
Baja California Sur             89.98 0.83 
Campeche                        122.79 0.83 
Chiapas                         29.00 0.72 
Chihuahua                       103.60 0.83 
Coahuila de Zaragoza            100.17 0.84 
Colima                          71.06 0.81 
Distrito Federal                187.33 0.88 
Durango                         65.55 0.80 
Guanajuato                      53.69 0.78 
Guerrero                        39.70 0.74 
Hidalgo                         41.77 0.76 
Jalisco                         69.96 0.81 
México                          51.71 0.79 
Michoacán de Acampo             40.93 0.76 
Morelos                         64.16 0.80 
Nayarit                         43.30 0.77 
Nuevo León                      134.35 0.85 
Oaxaca                          32.75 0.73 
Puebla                          50.90 0.76 
Querétaro Artigas               83.89 0.81 
Quintana Roo                    107.41 0.83 
San Luis Potosí                 58.03 0.77 
Sinaloa                         55.88 0.78 
Sonora                          86.94 0.83 
Tabasco                         47.84 0.78 
Tamaulipas                      82.40 0.82 
Tlaxcala                        38.32 0.77 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave 44.68 0.75 
Yucatán                         58.96 0.78 
Zacatecas                       40.96 0.77 
 
TABLE A.6.  Level of Economic Development in Mexican States.  The second column is the average per 
capita income (state GDP) between 2004 and 2006; the third is the U.N. Human Development Index, 
which in addition to economic indicators, also includes standard of living indicators.  Sources: Instituto 
Nacional Estadística y Geografía; Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo – México. 
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State  Electoral Parties Legislative Parties 
 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Aguascalientes 3.59 2.56 4.59 
 
1.93 2.62 
Baja California 2.97 2.64 2.45 2.29 2.32 2.04 
Campeche 3.39 3.40 3.80 2.38 2.48 2.72 
Chihuahua 2.60 2.09 2.59 2.43 1.91 2.32 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 2.40 3.25 2.75 2.32 2.39 2.33 
Colima 3.18 3.31 2.90 2.58 2.46 2.29 
Durango 3.20 2.81 2.54 
   Guanajuato 2.40 3.81 2.37 2.09 2.83 2.07 
Guerrero 2.37 3.14 3.63 
 
2.83 3.16 
Hidalgo 2.90 2.92 2.87 2.16 2.16 1.55 
Jalisco 2.78 2.63 2.53 
   México 3.53 3.86 3.47 3.27 3.36 3.20 
Michoacán de Ocampo 3.04 3.38 3.73 2.51 2.75 3.20 
Morelos 3.46 5.19 4.33 2.38 4.31 3.29 
Nayarit 2.30 3.30 3.15 1.80 2.47 2.20 
Nuevo León 2.66 2.58 3.11 
 
2.21 2.46 
Puebla 3.36 3.15 3.72 2.31 2.16 2.24 
Querétaro Arteaga 2.76 2.97 3.09 
   Quintana Roo 4.39 3.07 3.11 2.57 2.93 1.99 
San Luis Potosí 3.09 3.08 3.09 2.22 2.48 2.38 
Sinaloa 3.32 2.68 2.57 2.69 2.37 2.07 
Sonora 3.05 2.94 2.82 
  
2.45 
Tamaulipas 2.57 2.47 2.44 2.44 2.30 1.99 
Tlaxcala 5.31 5.66 5.92 3.14 3.99 3.71 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave 4.17 3.15 3.10 2.34 2.57 2.31 
Yucatán 2.58 2.50 2.53 2.16 2.29 2.25 
Zacatecas 4.24 3.12 4.76 3.16 2.54 3.93 
 
TABLE A.7.  Effective Number of Parties for 27 Mexican States, 1999 – 2008. Calculated using Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979) measure:  = ∑ 	
 , where n is the number of parties and p the percentage of seats 
party i holds.   Sources: State electoral institutes; stenographic versions of legislative proceedings 
(specific citations available upon request). 
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State (Session) Prestige Non-Prestige 
Baja California (XVII) Legislación y Puntos Constitucionales 
Hacienda y Administración 
Vigilancia de Contaduría Mayor de hacienda 
Vigilancia de Oficialia Mayor 
Desarrollo Urbano 
Transporte 
Para la Reforma  del Estado 
Asuntos Fronterizos 
Justicia 
Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca 
Seguridad Pública 
Trabajo y Previsión Social 
Educación y Cultura 
Juventud y Deporte 
Desarrollo Social 
Fortalecimiento Municipal 
Turismo 
Editorial, Informática y Relaciones Públicas 
Ecología, Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 
Salud, Bienestar Social y Desarrollo Humano 
Infraestructura Portuaria 
Reglamentos y Prácticas Parlamentarias 
Desarrollo Económico 
Derechos Humanos, Asuntos Indígenas y 
Equidad y Género 
Baja California (XVIII) Legislación y Puntos Constitucionales 
Estudios Hacendarios y Presupuesto 
Fiscalización del Gasto Público 
Reforma del Estado 
Vigilancia de Administración y Finanzas 
Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca 
Asuntos Fronterizos 
Comunicaciones Sociales y Relaciones Públicas 
Derechos Humanos 
Desarrollo Social 
Desarrollo Urbano 
Educación, Cultura, Ciencia y Tecnología 
Asistencia Social, Asuntos Indígenas y Grupos 
Vulnerables 
Fortalecimiento Municipal 
Desarrollo Económico y Asuntos Portuarios 
Justicia 
Juventud y Deporte 
Planeación para el Desarrollo Legislativo 
Salud, Bienestar Social y Desarrollo Humano 
Seguridad Publica 
Trabajo y Previsión Social 
Vialidad y Transporte 
Infraestructura y Vivienda 
Desarrollo Sostenible 
Turismo 
 
TABLE A.8: Standing Committees in Eight Mexican State Legislatures.  Sources: Stenographic versions of 
daily proceedings (Diarios/Semanarios de Debate) for each state legislature. 
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State (Session) Prestige Non-Prestige 
Campeche (LVIII) Puntos Constitucionales y Gobernación 
Finanzas, Hacienda Pública, Control 
Supuestal y Contable Patrimonio del 
Estado y de los Municipios 
Vigilancia 
Desarrollo Social 
Fomento y Desarrollo Agropecuario y Forestal 
Desarrollo Industrial, Fomento Económico y Desarrollo 
Turístico 
Desarrollo Urbano Comunicación y Obras Públicas 
Salud, Preservación del Medio Ambiente y Recursos 
Naturales 
Educación, Cultura y Deporte 
Procuración e Impartición de Justicia, Seguridad Pública, 
Protección Civil y Derechos Humanos 
Fomento y Desarrollo Pesquero 
Fortalecimiento Municipal 
Equidad y Género, Atención a Grupos Vulnerables y Etnias 
Indígenas 
Guanajuato (LIX) Gobernación y Puntos Constitucionales 
Hacienda y Revisora de la Contaduría 
Mayor de Hacienda 
Justicia 
Desarrollo Económico y Social 
Asuntos Electorales 
Educación, Cultura y Asuntos Editoriales 
Fomento Agropecuario 
Obra Pública y Desarrollo Urbano 
Salud Pública 
Seguridad Pública y Comunicaciones 
Derechos Humanos 
Administración 
Gestoría, Información y Quejas 
Asuntos Municipales 
Deporte y Asuntos de la Juventud 
Medio Ambiente y Ecología 
Equidad y Género 
Aguas 
Responsabilidades 
 
TABLE A.8, cont. Standing Committees in Eight Mexican State Legislatures.  Sources: Stenographic 
versions of daily proceedings (Diarios/Semanarios de Debate) for each state legislature. 
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State (Session) Prestige Non-Prestige 
Estado de México (LV) Gobernación y Puntos Constitucionales 
Planificación y Finanzas Públicas 
Legislación y Administración Municipal 
Procuración y Administración de Justicia 
Trabajo, Previsión y Seguridad Social 
Educación, Cultura, Ciencia y Tecnología 
Desarrollo Urbano 
Planificación Demográfica 
Desarrollo Agropecuario y Forestal 
Protección Ambiental 
Desarrollo Económico, Industrial, Comercial y Minero 
Comunicación y Transportes 
Derechos Humanos 
Salud, Asistencia y Bienestar Social 
Seguridad Pública y Tránsito 
Asuntos Electorales 
Patrimonio Estatal y Municipal 
Desarrollo Turístico y Artesanal 
Asuntos Metropolitanos 
Inspección de la Contaduría General de Glosa 
Asuntos Indígenas 
Protección Civil 
Para la Protección e Integración al Desarrollo de las 
Personas con Discapacidad 
Seguimiento de Programas de Apoyo Social del Estado y 
Municipios del Estado de México 
De Límites Territoriales del Estado de México y sus 
Municipios 
Administración 
Estudios Legislativos 
De la Mujer 
De la Juventud y el Deporte 
Comunicación Social 
Morelos (XLIX) Puntos Constitucionales y Legislación 
Hacienda, Presupuesto y Cuenta Pública 
Gobernación y Gran Jurado 
Educación y Cultura 
Ciencia y Tecnología 
Reglamentos y Prácticas Parlamentarias 
Justicia y Derechos Humanos 
Trabajo y Previsión Social 
Asuntos de Seguridad Pública 
Planeación para el Desarrollo y Asentamientos Humanos 
Industria, Comercio, Servicios y Turismo 
Salud, Deporte y Bienestar Social 
Desarrollo Agropecuario 
Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 
Asuntos Indígenas 
Participación Ciudadana 
Vigilancia 
Adquisiciones 
Radio y Televisión 
 
TABLE A.8, cont. Standing Committees in Eight Mexican State Legislatures.  Sources: Stenographic 
versions of daily proceedings (Diarios/Semanarios de Debate) for each state legislature. 
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State (Session) Prestige Non-Prestige 
Puebla (LVI) Gobernación, Justicia y Puntos Constitucionales 
Hacienda Pública y Patrimonio Estatal 
Desarrollo Rural 
Desarrollo Social 
Comunicaciones y Transportes 
Salud y Grupos con Discapacidad Diferenciada 
Educación, Cultura y Deporte 
Trabajo y Previsión Social 
Derechos Humanos 
Equidad y Género 
Asuntos Indígenas 
Instructora 
Seguridad Pública y Protección Civil 
Desarrollo Económico y Turismo 
Desarrollo Urbano y Medio Ambiente 
Migración y Asuntos Internacionales 
Asuntos Municipales 
Administración del Patrimonio y de los Recursos 
Materiales 
Archivo y Biblioteca 
Asuntos Editoriales y Crónica Parlamentaria 
Gestoría y Quejas 
Informática 
Comunicación Social 
Inspectora del Órgano de Fiscalización Superior 
Veracruz (LX) Gobernación 
Hacienda del Estado 
Hacienda Municipal 
Justicia y Puntos Constitucionales 
Administración y Presupuesto 
Asuntos Indígenas 
Comunicaciones 
Derechos Humanos y Atención a Grupos Vulnerables 
Desarrollo Agropecuario, Rural Forestal, Pesca y 
Alimentación 
Desarrollo Económico 
Desarrollo Regional 
Desarrollo y Fortalecimiento Municipal 
Editorial, Biblioteca y Archivo 
Educación y Cultura 
Equidad, Género y Familiar 
Gestoría y Quejas 
Instructora 
Juventud y Deporte 
Límites Territoriales Intermunicipales 
Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Aguas 
Organización Política y Procesos Electorales 
Protección Civil 
Salud y Asistencia 
Seguridad Pública y Procuración de Justicia 
Trabajo y Previsión Social 
Vigilancia 
 
TABLE A.8, cont. Standing Committees in Eight Mexican State Legislatures.  Sources: Stenographic 
versions of daily proceedings (Diarios/Semanarios de Debate) for each state legislature. 
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State (Session) Prestige Non-Prestige 
Zacatecas (LVII) Puntos Constitucionales 
Planeación, Patrimonio y Finanzas 
Gobernación 
Primera de Hacienda 
Segunda de Hacienda 
Justicia 
Obras Públicas y Desarrollo Urbano 
Desarrollo Agropecuario 
Salud y Asistencia Social 
Industria, Comercio y Servicios 
Turismo 
Seguridad Pública 
Prevención y Readaptación Social 
Deporte 
Asuntos de la Juventud 
Derechos Humanos 
Participación Ciudadana 
Asuntos Electorales 
Fortalecimiento Municipal 
Ciencia y Tecnología 
Discapacitados y Tercera Edad 
Biblioteca y Archivo 
Asuntos Diversos 
Educación y Cultura 
Desarrollo Social 
Equidad entre los Géneros 
Atención a Menores 
Asuntos Migratorios y Tratados Internacionales 
Ecología y Medio Ambiente 
Editorial 
Zacatecas (LVIII) Puntos Constitucionales 
Planeación 
Gobernación 
Primera de Hacienda 
Segunda de Hacienda 
Justicia 
Educación y Cultura 
Obras Públicas y Desarrollo Urbano 
Desarrollo Agropecuario 
Industria, Comercio y Servicios 
Participación Ciudadana 
Vigilancia 
Salud 
Seguridad Pública 
Prevención y Readaptación Social 
Deportes 
Asuntos de la Juventud 
Derechos Humanos 
Asuntos Electorales 
Fortalecimiento Municipal 
Ciencia y Tecnología 
Equidad entre los Géneros 
Discapacitados y Tercera Edad 
Asuntos Migratorios 
Ecología y Medio Ambiente 
Biblioteca y Archivo 
Editorial 
Asuntos Diversos 
Desarrollo Social 
Atención a Menores 
Turismo 
 
TABLE A.8, cont. Standing Committees in Eight Mexican State Legislatures.  Sources: Stenographic 
versions of daily proceedings (Diarios/Semanarios de Debate) for each state legislature. 
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State Legislatures Roll Call Availability Source 
Baja California 2001 to the present Diarios de Debate: 
http://www.congresobc.gob.mx/diariodebates/ 
Campeche 2003 to the present Direct correspondence with Legislative Transparency 
Department 
Coahuila 2000 to the present For internal use only 
Estado de México 2003 to the present Legislative Transparency Department: 
http://www.cddiputados.gob.mx/POLEMEX/transpar
encia/ 
Guanajuato 2004 to the present Diarios de Debate: 
http://www.congresogto.gob.mx/SesionesD/Sesione
s.htm 
Guerrero 2002 to the present Only available after referencing the physical archives 
directly 
Jalisco 2001 to the present Only available after referencing the physical archives 
directly 
Michoacán 2004 to the present Diario de Debate: 
http://www.congresomich.gob.mx/diario_debates.p
hp 
Morelos 2003 to the present Semanario de Debates: 
http://www.congresomorelos.gob.mx/acceso_info/ 
Nuevo León 2008 to the present Votaciones: http://www.congreso-
nl.gob.mx/potentiaweb/portal/genera/VistasV2_1/Pl
antillasV2/congreso.asp?Portal=2 
Puebla 2004 to the present Votaciones: 
http://www.congresopuebla.gob.mx/home_votacion
es.php; 
http://www.congresopuebla.gob.mx/web/legislatura
56/home.php 
San Luis Potosí 2006  to the present Legislative Transparency Department: 
http://148.235.65.21/web3/transparencia/csp/ListSe
siones.aspx 
Sinaloa 2003 to the present Only available after referencing the physical archives 
directly 
Tlaxcala 2004 to the present Only available after referencing the physical archives 
directly 
Veracruz 2004 to the present Diarios de Debate: 
http://www.legisver.gob.mx/nDiario.php 
Yucatán 2007 to the present Only available after referencing the physical archives 
directly 
Zacatecas 2001 to the present Only available after referencing the physical archives 
directly 
 
TABLE A.9.  Current Roll Call Vote Availability in Mexican State Legislatures.   
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Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Acosta Fregoso Enrique PRI 1 -1.309 -1.529 -1.085 
Alvarado González Arturo PAN 1 1.060 0.853 1.277 
Araiza Regalado José Antonio PAN 1 1.048 0.851 1.253 
Avilés Muñoz Raquel PAN 1 1.045 0.836 1.268 
Castro Trenti Fernando Jorge PRI 0 -1.065 -1.268 -0.863 
Cortez Mendoza Jesús Gerardo PAN 1 1.093 0.901 1.295 
Ferreiro Velazco José Alfredo PRI 1 -0.821 -1.000 -0.655 
Hidalgo Silva Marcelino PRI 0 -0.894 -1.091 -0.709 
Martín Navarro María Rosalba PVEM 1 -0.381 -0.528 -0.222 
Morán Díaz Leopoldo PAN 1 1.067 0.849 1.287 
Osuna Aguilasocho Nicolás PRI 0 -1.062 -1.272 -0.848 
Paniagua Figueroa Luz Argelia PAN 1 1.060 0.856 1.285 
Quintero Pena Ismael PRI 0 -0.976 -1.167 -0.808 
Ramos García Everardo PRI 1 -0.898 -1.082 -0.716 
Rodríguez Jacobo Ricardo PAN 1 1.028 0.827 1.227 
Rosales Hernández José de Jesús Martín PAN 1 1.110 0.884 1.333 
Rueda Gómez Francisco PAN 1 1.070 0.873 1.279 
Ruiz Raúl Felipe PAN 1 1.008 0.825 1.189 
Ruiz Uribe Jesús Alejandro PRD 0 -1.033 -1.268 -0.834 
Salazar Acuña Edmundo PRI 0 -0.986 -1.202 -0.800 
Salazar Castro Juan Manuel PRI 0 -0.997 -1.186 -0.806 
Sánchez Medrano Laura PAN 1 -0.084 -0.255 0.075 
Suarez Córdova Héctor Edgardo PRI 0 -1.061 -1.255 -0.873 
Terrazas Silva Juan PAN 1 1.003 0.816 1.214 
Zavala Márquez Catalino PRD 0 -0.025 -0.192 0.145 
 
Median 
Floor: -0.084 PAN (Plurality): 1.060 
PRI: [-0.986, -0.976]  
 
TABLE A.10.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Baja California (XXVII: 2001 – 2004).  The 
sixth and seventh columns correspond with a 95% credible interval.  Source: Diarios de Debate.  
230 
 
Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Abarca Macklis Silvano PAN 1 1.082 0.841 1.338 
Aldrete Haas Guillermo Aurelio PRI 1 -0.668 -0.945 -0.413 
Astorga Othon Carlos Alberto PAN 1 1.048 0.796 1.309 
Barbosa Ochoa Iván Alonso PRI 1 -0.947 -1.205 -0.716 
Blake Mora José Francisco PAN 1 1.092 0.820 1.342 
Castillo Burgos Rosa María PAN 1 0.902 0.674 1.147 
Chávez Colecio Urbano PAN 1 1.009 0.782 1.261 
Correa Acevedo Abraham PRD 0 -0.171 -0.408 0.058 
Gallegos Gil Adrian Roberto PVEM 0 -0.390 -0.616 -0.160 
González Solís Gilberto Daniel PAN 0 1.022 0.803 1.253 
Jiménez Ruiz Carlos Enrique PRI 1 -1.091 -1.352 -0.850 
Lemus Zendejas Miguel PAN 1 1.090 0.849 1.337 
López Mendoza Elías PRI 0 -1.039 -1.273 -0.809 
López Moreno Raúl PAN 1 1.073 0.825 1.321 
Luna Pineda Elvira PAN 1 0.877 0.612 1.122 
Madrigal Magaña Mario Desiderio PRI 0 -0.722 -1.177 -0.321 
Magaña Mosqueda Ricardo PAN 1 0.881 0.651 1.136 
Mendivil Acosta René Adrian PRI 1 -1.166 -1.437 -0.931 
Montano Quintana Carlos Alberto PRI 1 -0.882 -1.119 -0.642 
Núñez Verdugo Jorge PEBC 0 -0.384 -0.598 -0.177 
Palafox Granados Jaime Xicotencatl PRD 0 -1.537 -1.879 -1.213 
Pons Agundez Manuel PAN 1 0.992 0.745 1.243 
Rodríguez Hernández Antonio PAN 1 1.039 0.800 1.282 
Saúl Guakil David PRI 0 -1.021 -1.288 -0.768 
Silva Sánchez (suplente) José Obed PRI 0 -1.223 -1.559 -0.907 
Valencia Roque Eligio PRI 0 -0.866 -1.141 -0.610 
 
Median 
Floor: -0.171  PAN (Plurality): [1.022, 1.039] 
PRI: [-1.021, -0.947] 
 
TABLE A.11.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Baja California (XXVIII: 2004 – 2007).  The 
sixth and seventh columns correspond with a 95% credible interval.  Note, suplentes are not included 
when identifying median positions.  Source: Diarios de Debate.  
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Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Brown Gantus Francisco Gilberto PRI 1 -0.314 -0.699 0.052 
Celorio Pedrero Enrique PRI 1 -0.329 -0.715 0.033 
Cervera Cetina Dulce María PRI 1 -0.450 -0.839 -0.078 
Chan Talango Luís Alberto PRI 1 -0.357 -0.754 0.025 
Cobos Toledo Aurora de Díos PRI 1 -0.354 -0.727 -0.018 
Cocón Collí Jorge Antonio PRI 1 -0.374 -0.736 0.006 
Concha Chávez Eligeny Noémi PRI 1 -0.357 -0.763 -0.001 
del Rio Ávila Rita Dolores PRI 1 -0.335 -0.689 0.037 
Duarte Quijano Margarita Nelly PCD 0 -2.030 -2.536 -1.592 
Espinosa Rebolledo Rita Margarita PAN 1 1.359 0.879 1.857 
Gamboa Vela Socorro del Carmen PAN 0 1.194 0.798 1.618 
Gómez María del Carmen PAN 1 0.909 0.530 1.313 
González Flores Alberto Ramón PRI 1 -0.408 -0.798 -0.034 
González López Enrique Iván PAN 1 1.098 0.694 1.536 
González Navarrete Juan Manuel PAN 1 1.330 0.886 1.818 
Guerrero del Rivero Vicente PRI 1 -0.364 -0.715 0.018 
Lara Cahuich José Antonio PRI 1 -0.352 -0.731 0.001 
López Solís Onesimo Dario PAN 0 1.174 0.813 1.652 
Manzanero Carrillo Hiram Alonso PAN 0 1.665 1.148 2.223 
Martínez Rocha Arturo PRI 0 -0.381 -0.801 0.036 
Montejo González Miguel Ángel PAN 0 1.123 0.756 1.559 
Montero Rosado José Luis PRI 1 -0.352 -0.747 0.030 
Novelo Lara Marta Irene PRI 1 -0.405 -0.772 -0.051 
Ocampo Calderón Pedro Jesús PAN 0 0.430 0.097 0.773 
Ostoa Ortega Aníbal PCD 0 -1.914 -2.359 -1.506 
Pacheco Castro Carlos Oznerol PRI 1 -0.333 -0.721 0.042 
Palmer Abreu Diana PAN 1 0.728 0.396 1.083 
Pérez Hernández Roger PRI 0 -0.363 -0.754 -0.007 
Portela Chaparro Francisco Eustaquio PAN 0 1.199 0.757 1.657 
Pozos Lanz Raúl Aarón PRI 1 -0.352 -0.744 0.031 
Razo Santiago Fernando Enrique PRI 1 -0.359 -0.764 0.049 
Richaud Lara Manuel Antonio PCD 0 -1.727 -2.147 -1.302 
Tzeek Moo Aquileo PAN 0 0.575 0.235 0.894 
Uriostegui Uriostegui José Concepción PRD 0 -1.741 -2.175 -1.311 
Vela Rosado Elizabeth PAN 0 1.168 0.785 1.578 
 
Median 
Floor: -0.335 PRI (Majority): -0.357 
PAN: 1.168 
 
TABLE A.12.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Campeche (LVIII: 2003 – 2006).  The sixth and 
seventh columns correspond with a 95% credible interval.  Source: Diarios de Debate. 
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Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Aguilar Camarillo Mario PT 0 -0.559 -0.817 -0.311 
Alcocer Flores Juan PAN 1 0.608 0.245 1.013 
Alfaro García Lorena del Carmen PAN 1 0.604 0.240 1.034 
Andrade Quesada Humberto PAN 1 0.616 0.255 1.013 
Arredondo García Arcelia PAN 1 0.541 0.174 0.962 
Cabrera Cano Martin Odilón PRI 1 -0.057 -0.353 0.243 
Cano Estrada Alberto PRI 1 -0.009 -0.280 0.257 
Carbajo Zúñiga Gabino PRI 1 -0.076 -0.364 0.216 
Castañón Márquez María de la Consolación PRI 0 0.008 -0.274 0.290 
Centeno Castro  J. Nabor PAN 1 0.636 0.127 1.236 
Chávez de la Peña Verónica PVEM 0 -0.334 -0.587 -0.084 
Chávez Muñoz (suplente) Andrea Leticia PAN 1 0.474 -0.008 1.086 
Contreras Pérez Carolina PRD 0 -3.029 -3.369 -2.668 
Duran Villalpando Francisco José PAN 1 0.604 0.243 1.009 
García Sainz Arena Alejandro R. PVEM 0 -0.304 -0.557 -0.037 
Huerta Aboytes José PRI 0 -0.066 -0.375 0.229 
Lemus López Antonino PRI 0 -0.019 -0.293 0.256 
López Guitron Xavier Jacobo Alvarado PRI 0 -0.022 -0.322 0.281 
Medina Lopez Víctor Manuel PAN 1 0.612 0.249 1.049 
Morales Torres José de Jesús PAN 1 0.630 0.276 1.019 
Nieto Montoya José Luis PRD 1 -1.563 -1.859 -1.299 
Ortega Vieyra José Armando Camilo PRI 0 -0.031 -0.301 0.255 
Pérez González María Guadalupe PAN 1 0.613 0.258 1.003 
Ramírez Escamilla Baldomero PRD 0 -2.577 -2.914 -2.230 
Rangel Segovia Alejandro PRI 0 -0.048 -0.359 0.225 
Robles Hernández Carlos Alberto PAN 1 0.610 0.251 1.027 
Rodríguez Vázquez Marco Antonio PAN 1 0.437 0.108 0.810 
Rojas Navarrete Maria Eugenia PAN 1 0.515 0.145 0.921 
Ruiz Velatti Carlos PAN 1 0.616 0.256 1.004 
Salgado Flores Patricio Javier PAN 1 0.607 0.272 1.000 
Samano Arreguín Daniel PAN 1 0.645 0.282 1.049 
Scheffler Ramos Carlos Ernesto PRD 0 -2.987 -3.357 -2.650 
Stefanonni Mazzocco Martin PAN 1 0.644 0.250 1.083 
Torres Gómez Artemio PAN 1 0.600 0.211 1.025 
Torres Graciano Fernando PAN 0 0.606 0.255 0.999 
Ugalde Cardona Fernando PAN 1 0.576 0.199 1.029 
Villagrán Godoy Gabriel PVEM 0 -0.122 -0.460 0.234 
 
Median 
Floor: [0.437, 0.515] PAN (Majority): 0.608 
PRI: -0.031 
PRD: [-2.987, -2.577] 
 
TABLE A.13.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Guanajuato (LIX: 2003 – 2006).  The sixth and 
seventh columns correspond with a 95% credible interval.  Note, suplentes are not included when 
identifying median positions.  Source: Diarios de los Debates.  
233 
 
Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Acosta Dávila Constantino PAN 1 -0.728 -2.033 0.362 
Aguilar Castillo Ricardo PRI 1 -0.423 -1.459 0.420 
Alarcón Bárcena Gonzalo PAN 1 -0.542 -1.715 0.518 
Alcalde Virgen Moisés PAN 1 -0.573 -1.592 0.352 
Alcántara Núñez (suplente) Jesús Sergio PRI 1 -0.611 -1.746 0.315 
Alcántara Pérez Gabriel PRI 1 -0.521 -1.476 0.331 
Almaraz Calderón Felipe Bernardo PRI 1 -0.416 -1.263 0.327 
Álvarez Colín Jorge PRI 1 -0.446 -1.359 0.331 
Apolonio Javier Jerónimo PRI 1 -0.440 -1.310 0.351 
Arredondo Ibarra Salvador PAN 1 -0.632 -1.672 0.245 
Benítez Treviño Víctor Humberto PRI 1 -0.315 -1.453 0.658 
Borja Texocotitla Felipe PRI 1 -0.590 -1.550 0.249 
Cárdenas Monroy Oscar Gustavo PRI 1 -0.333 -1.420 0.567 
Castañeda Rodríguez Germán PAN 0 -0.835 -1.826 0.057 
Chávez Palacios María Elena Lourdes PAN 0 -0.305 -1.113 0.400 
Colín de la O Paulino PRI 1 -0.612 -1.617 0.247 
Colín Guadarrama María Mercedes PRI 1 -0.428 -1.337 0.359 
Corral Romero María del Carmen PAN 0 -0.560 -1.662 0.411 
Cortes Ramírez Carlos Filiberto PRI 1 -0.353 -1.300 0.518 
Cortez Vargas (suplente) Lucina PRI 1 -0.274 -1.560 0.915 
Enríquez Romo Armando Javier PAN 0 -0.911 -2.086 0.170 
Flores Guadarrama Ángel PAN 1 -0.785 -1.810 0.054 
Flores Morales Francisco Cándido PRI 1 -0.512 -1.473 0.256 
Flores Pimentel Salomón Pedro PRI 1 -0.440 -1.305 0.414 
García Ramírez Bertha María del Carmen PAN 0 -0.798 -1.820 0.148 
Germán Olivares Sergio Octavio PAN 0 -0.806 -1.919 0.139 
González Calderón Martha Hilda PRI 1 -0.393 -1.291 0.454 
González Pereda Raymundo PRI 1 -0.548 -1.423 0.281 
Inzunza Armas Jorge Ernesto PAN 0 -0.800 -1.887 0.131 
Liceaga García Roberto PAN 0 -0.818 -1.882 0.084 
Maya Pineda José Livio PRI 1 -0.417 -1.317 0.304 
Morales Gil J. Jesús PRI 1 -0.449 -1.348 0.269 
Muñoz Serna Rogelio PRI 1 -0.399 -1.226 0.359 
Olivares Monterrubio Alejandro PRI 1 -0.405 -1.340 0.318 
Rojas González Urbano Faustino PRI 1 -0.421 -1.394 0.342 
Rubí Salazar José Adán Ignacio PRI 1 -0.459 -1.332 0.287 
Ruiz Flores Felipe PRI 1 -0.412 -1.216 0.307 
Talavera López Raúl PRI 1 -0.410 -1.313 0.361 
Vallejo Tinoco (suplente) Ariel PRI 1 -0.302 -1.578 0.871 
 
TABLE A.14.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Estado de México (LV: 2003 – 2006).  The 
sixth and seventh columns correspond with a 95% credible interval.  Note, suplentes are not included 
when identifying median positions.  Source: Diario de Debates. 
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Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Alva Olvera Maribel Luisa PRD 0 1.522 0.745 2.416 
Arreola Calderón Juan Dario PRD 0 1.334 0.489 2.281 
Ávila Loza Bacilio PRD 0 1.370 0.583 2.222 
Barragán Pacheco José Francisco PT 0 0.962 0.247 1.802 
Cándido Velasco Ildefonso PRD 1 1.506 0.742 2.475 
del Valle Miranda José Federico PRD 1 1.611 0.797 2.607 
García Martínez Elena PRD 0 1.338 0.644 2.089 
González Bautista Gildardo PRD 1 1.299 0.240 2.412 
Gutiérrez Vázquez José Cipriano PRD 0 1.338 0.524 2.158 
Hernández González Maurilio PRD 0 1.333 0.582 2.180 
Hernández Rodríguez Conrado PRD 1 1.573 0.687 2.557 
Huazo Cedillo Porfiria PRD 0 1.525 0.580 2.585 
Maawad Robert Luís Xavier PAN 1 -0.659 -1.962 0.501 
Maya Doro Luis PT 0 0.411 -0.283 1.056 
Medina Flores Julieta Graciela PRD 0 1.297 0.556 2.130 
Medina Vega José Antonio PAN 1 -0.799 -1.836 0.044 
Moctezuma Lule María Cristina PVEM 0 -0.524 -1.524 0.290 
Olvera Higuera Edgar Armando PAN 1 -0.680 -1.919 0.392 
Parra Noriega Luis Gustavo PAN 0 -0.818 -1.865 0.104 
Pérez Soria Armando PRD 1 1.377 0.573 2.285 
Portilla Diéguez Manuel PVEM 0 -0.130 -1.367 0.999 
Rivera Escalona Javier PRD 0 1.439 0.670 2.359 
Rodríguez Aguirre Felipe PRD 1 1.531 0.621 2.476 
Rojo Ramírez Aurelio PRD 1 1.409 0.641 2.319 
Samperio Montano Juan Ignacio PCD 0 -0.491 -1.490 0.425 
San Martin Hernández Juan Manuel PRD 1 1.315 0.562 2.155 
Sánchez Gómez Juan Rodolfo PAN 1 -0.538 -1.806 0.475 
Sandoval Silvera Mario PAN 0 -0.705 -1.908 0.266 
Sondón Saavedra Víctor Hugo PAN 1 -0.484 -1.532 0.474 
Sosa Muñiz Víctor Javier PAN 1 -0.459 -1.799 0.717 
Ulloa Pérez Emilio PRD 1 1.458 0.459 2.605 
Urbina Montes de Oca Gonzalo PAN 0 -0.672 -1.686 0.172 
Valdez Portiocarrero Felipe PCD 0 -0.424 -1.263 0.330 
Vela González Joaquín Humberto PT 0 0.959 0.165 1.739 
Velázquez Vieyra Rogelio PRD 1 1.509 0.715 2.413 
Viejo Plancarte Francisco Javier PVEM 0 -0.444 -1.483 0.406 
Vives Chavarría Pablo Cesar PVEM 0 -0.375 -1.506 0.467 
Zepeda Martínez Leticia PAN 0 -0.792 -1.689 0.024 
 
Median 
Floor: -0.440 PRI (Plurality): -0.512 
PAN: -0.792 
PRD: 1.439 
 
TABLE A.14, cont.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Estado de México (LV: 2003 – 2006).   
  
235 
 
Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Giles Sánchez Jesús PAN 1 -1.473 -2.702 -0.452 
Juárez Guadarrama Pedro PAN 1 -0.995 -1.625 -0.396 
López Sánchez Javier PAN 1 -0.995 -1.675 -0.424 
Barenque Otero Hugo Alejandro PAN 1 -0.978 -1.591 -0.452 
Iragorri Duran Enrique PAN 1 -0.966 -1.623 -0.413 
Pineda Barrera Miguel Ángel PAN 1 -0.961 -1.524 -0.471 
Cisneros Ortiz Luís Ángel PAN 1 -0.960 -1.572 -0.430 
Sandoval Palazuelos Salvador PAN 1 -0.960 -1.543 -0.432 
Santibáñez Rivera Eleuterio PAN 1 -0.953 -1.576 -0.451 
Álvarez Cisneros Jaime PCD 0 -0.821 -1.405 -0.254 
Aragón Zamora (suplente) Antonio PAN 1 -0.799 -1.547 -0.149 
Lugo Delgado Kenia PCD 0 -0.678 -1.172 -0.244 
Nolasco Vázquez Juan PRD 1 -0.248 -0.688 0.165 
Salgado Brito Juan PRI 0 0.034 -0.405 0.478 
Becerril Straffon Rodolfo PRI 0 0.070 -0.385 0.529 
Porras Rodríguez Manuel PRI 1 0.072 -0.406 0.486 
Rodríguez Montero Francisco Tomas PRD 1 0.151 -0.336 0.603 
Iragorri Montoya Raúl PVEM 0 0.182 -0.237 0.631 
Sandoval Alarcón Ignacio PRI 1 0.324 -0.086 0.722 
Vences Camacho Oscar Julián PRD 0 0.341 -0.104 0.775 
López Ruvalcaba Guillermo PRD 0 0.345 -0.048 0.750 
González Nájera Rosalio PVEM 0 0.353 -0.100 0.757 
Xoxocotla Cortez Cecilio PRI 1 0.411 -0.013 0.832 
Beltrán Díaz Francisco PRI 1 0.430 0.011 0.838 
Estrada González Faustino Javier PVEM 0 0.449 -0.177 1.014 
Rebolledo Hernández Gustavo PRI 1 0.667 0.227 1.135 
Rodríguez Báez Bertha PRD 0 0.918 0.494 1.391 
García Jaimes Andrés PRD 1 0.967 0.540 1.384 
Pedraza Flores Anacleto PRD 1 1.472 0.987 1.939 
Sánchez Cortes Maricela PRI 0 2.204 1.679 2.719 
Demedicis Hidalgo Fidel PRD 0 2.397 1.880 2.946 
 
Median 
Floor: [0.072, 0.151] PAN (Plurality): -0.966 
PRI: [0.324, 0.411] 
PRD: [0.345, 0.918] 
 
TABLE A.15.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Morelos (XLIX: 2003 – 2006).  The sixth and 
seventh columns correspond with a 95% credible interval.  Note, suplentes are not included when 
identifying median positions.  Source: Semanario de los Debates. 
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Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Aguilar Hernández Juan PVEM 0 -0.092 -0.427 0.211 
Alejo Domínguez Hugo PRI 1 -0.355 -0.709 -0.031 
Alonso Granados Héctor Eduardo PRI 1 -0.273 -0.695 0.111 
Anguiano Martínez Oscar PAN 0 1.714 1.395 2.055 
Atanacio Luna Raymundo PRI 1 -0.577 -1.008 -0.217 
Bravo Jiménez (suplente) Juan de Dios PRI 0 -0.630 -1.237 -0.113 
Cantorán Espinosa Cutberto PRI 1 -0.550 -0.986 -0.172 
Cazares García Miguel PRD 0 0.649 0.413 0.892 
Ceballos López Miguel Ángel PRI 1 -0.607 -1.051 -0.199 
Chávez Alvarado María Belén PAN 0 1.730 1.408 2.098 
Cid Palacios Edith PRI 1 -0.679 -1.166 -0.266 
de la Llata Mier Juan Raúl PRI 1 -0.659 -1.128 -0.211 
de la Sierra Arámburo Nancy PRI 1 -0.646 -1.159 -0.206 
Díaz de Rivera Hernández Augusta Valentina PAN 1 1.935 1.583 2.303 
Espinosa Torres José Juan PCD 0 0.448 0.171 0.707 
García García José Raymundo Froylán PAN 0 1.256 1.001 1.553 
Gómez Cortes María de los Ángeles Elizabeth PAN 0 1.869 1.539 2.215 
González Juárez Maricela PAN 0 1.736 1.395 2.112 
González Morales José Alberto PRI 1 -0.749 -1.235 -0.347 
González Ortega Zenorina PRI 1 -0.715 -1.198 -0.312 
Gutiérrez Ramos Jorge PAN 0 1.138 0.890 1.418 
 
TABLE A.16.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Puebla (LVI: 2004 – 2007).  The sixth and 
seventh columns correspond with a 95% credible interval.  Note, suplentes are not included when 
identifying median positions.  Source: Versiones Estenográficas.. 
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Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Hernández Medina Claudia PRI 1 -0.509 -0.949 -0.137 
Hernández Reyes Mariano PT 0 0.349 0.097 0.604 
Hidalgo Villafañe Oscar Roberto PRI 1 -0.703 -1.138 -0.298 
Huerta Espinosa Rodolfo PRD 0 0.277 0.007 0.531 
Jasso Valencia María del Rosario Leticia PRI 0 -0.522 -0.983 -0.130 
Jiménez Hernández Blanca Estela PRI 1 -0.639 -1.106 -0.233 
Lechuga Castelán (suplente) Carlos PRI 1 -0.683 -1.345 -0.184 
León Castañeda José Gaudencio PAN 1 1.777 1.451 2.151 
Lezama Prieto Eliseo PAN 1 1.568 1.271 1.861 
Martagón López Ramón Daniel PRI 1 -0.723 -1.170 -0.285 
Martínez Martínez Juan Antonio PRI 1 -0.619 -1.043 -0.229 
Merlo Talavera María Isabel PRI 1 -0.481 -0.902 -0.113 
Micalco Méndez Rafael Alejandro PAN 0 1.551 1.245 1.854 
Morales Martínez Fernando PRI 1 -0.619 -1.106 -0.185 
Morales Méndez Álvaro PRI 0 -0.758 -1.233 -0.310 
Moreno Valles Rosas Rafael PRI 0 -0.838 -1.596 -0.198 
Oaxaca Carreón Alejandro PRI 1 -0.532 -0.932 -0.171 
Olivares Flores Pericles PRI 1 -0.624 -1.052 -0.239 
Rendón Vargas Fausto PRI 1 -0.710 -1.168 -0.308 
Sánchez Valencia María Norma PRI 1 -0.648 -1.086 -0.250 
Vite Vargas José Enrique PRI 1 -1.146 -2.069 -0.375 
Zanatta Vidaurri Rosalio PRI 1 -0.710 -1.158 -0.310 
 
Median 
Floor: -0.532 PRI (Majority): [-0.646, -0.639] 
PAN: [1.714, 1.730] 
 
TABLE A.16, cont.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Puebla (LVI: 2004 – 2007).  
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Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Aguirre Ochoa Samuel PRI 0 -0.568 -1.083 -0.063 
Calleja y Arroyo Ricardo PRI 1 -0.620 -1.026 -0.181 
Callejas Arroyo Juan Nicolás PRI 0 -0.556 -0.958 -0.173 
Chiunti Hernández Juan René PRI 1 -0.677 -1.113 -0.236 
Fernández Garibay Justo José PRI 0 -0.677 -1.097 -0.270 
Garay Cabada Marina PRI 1 -0.631 -1.040 -0.187 
García Guzmán Ricardo PRI 1 -0.770 -1.273 -0.326 
Guillen Serrano Gilberto PRI 1 -0.672 -1.107 -0.251 
Lagos Martínez Silvio Edmundo PRI 1 -0.546 -0.939 -0.153 
Luna Hernández Rosa PRI 0 -0.514 -0.932 -0.129 
Marín García Moisés PRI 0 -0.632 -1.061 -0.217 
Merlín Castro Gladys PRI 1 -0.660 -1.098 -0.206 
Montaño Guzmán José Alejandro PRI 0 -0.570 -1.014 -0.156 
Montiel Montiel Marcelo PRI 1 -0.669 -1.118 -0.256 
Nava Iñiguez Francisco Javier PRI 0 -0.700 -1.120 -0.271 
Oliva Meza José Luís PRI 1 -0.655 -1.123 -0.226 
Pérez Pardave Humberto PRI 1 -0.613 -1.043 -0.196 
Porras Davíd Guadalupe Josephine PRI 1 -0.646 -1.089 -0.210 
Atilano Moreno (suplente) Abundio PRI 1 0.228 -1.155 1.840 
Rodríguez Cruz Miguel PRI 0 -0.587 -0.996 -0.163 
Tejeda Cruz Tomás PRI 0 -0.669 -1.146 -0.221 
Valencia Morales Ignacio Enrique PRI 1 -0.538 -0.930 -0.132 
Yunes Zorrilla José Francisco PRI 1 -0.833 -1.315 -0.359 
Baltazar Montes (suplente) Manlio Fabio PRI 1 0.040 -0.715 0.822 
Batalla Herver Blanca Arminda PAN 1 0.759 0.274 1.274 
Ramírez Santiago (suplente) Esteban PAN 1 1.104 -0.448 2.760 
Beltrami Mantecón Claudia PAN 1 0.894 0.405 1.437 
Cambranis Torres Enrique PAN 0 0.846 0.343 1.385 
Chao y Fernández Germán Antonio PAN 1 0.883 0.402 1.452 
 
TABLE A.17.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Veracruz (LX: 2004 – 2007).  The sixth and 
seventh columns correspond with a 95% credible interval.  Note, suplentes are not included when 
identifying median positions.  Source: Diarios de los Debates. 
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Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Abascal Amador (suplente) Luis PAN 1 1.182 -0.342 2.886 
Chedraui Obeso Irma PAN 0 0.845 0.382 1.364 
de la Vequia Bernardi Ramiro PAN 1 0.838 0.330 1.369 
Duck Núñez Edgar Mauricio PAN 1 0.875 0.281 1.500 
Fernández Morales Francisco PAN 1 0.760 0.200 1.356 
Flores Aguayo Uriel PRD 0 -2.308 -2.886 -1.754 
García Duran Atanasio PRD 1 -1.333 -1.857 -0.860 
García Vázquez Cesar Ulises PRD 0 -0.702 -1.116 -0.257 
Grajales Jiménez Alfredo Valente PAN 0 0.875 0.354 1.480 
Kuri Ceja William Charbel PAN 1 0.841 0.367 1.414 
Lobato Calderón Cinthya Amaranta PCD 1 -0.517 -1.018 0.008 
Lobeira Cabeza Juan Enrique PAN 1 0.502 0.032 0.985 
López Gómez Sara María PAN 0 0.933 0.476 1.446 
López San Millán (suplente) Silvia PAN 1 1.140 -0.499 2.847 
Mantilla Trolle Agustín Bernardo PRD 0 -2.033 -2.650 -1.448 
Martínez Ballesteros (suplente) Jorge Luis PAN 1 0.908 -0.314 2.466 
Melo Escudero Lilia PAN 1 0.882 0.378 1.413 
Méndez Mahe Sergio PAN 1 0.905 0.352 1.493 
Monge Villalobos Silvia Isabel PAN 1 0.806 0.087 1.601 
Ortiz Solís Sergio PAN 0 0.915 0.354 1.503 
Osorio Medina José Alfredo PAN 1 0.702 0.187 1.239 
Patraca Bravo Martha Beatriz PRD 0 -1.552 -2.146 -0.971 
Pérez Silva (suplente) Cristina Elvira PAN 0 1.106 -0.418 2.805 
Pontón Villa (suplente) María del Carmen PAN 0 0.857 0.199 1.595 
Retureta Díaz (suplente) Raúl PAN 1 1.138 -0.410 2.922 
Saldaña Moran Julio PAN 1 0.763 0.052 1.558 
Solís Aguilar José Adrian PRD 1 -1.852 -2.387 -1.322 
Vázquez García Daniel Alejandro PAN 1 0.866 0.357 1.442 
Yunes Márquez Miguel Ángel PAN 0 0.906 0.360 1.534 
 
Median 
Floor: -0.556 PRI (Majority): [-0.646, -0.632] 
PAN: [0.846, 0.866] 
PRD: [-1.852, -1.552] 
 
TABLE A.17, cont.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Veracruz (LX: 2004 – 2007).  
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Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Aguilar Contreras Alfonso PRI 1 -0.289 -0.847 0.221 
Arce Pantoja Joel PAN 0 -0.668 -1.335 -0.065 
Arreola Ortega Pablo Leopoldo PT 0 -0.336 -0.879 0.193 
Barajas Romo Elías PCD 0 -3.366 -3.943 -2.767 
Escobedo Domínguez José PRD 1 0.562 -0.090 1.203 
Fajardo Frías (suplente) Jorge PRD 0 0.944 0.013 1.912 
Flores Chávez Marco Vinicio PRI 1 -0.301 -0.875 0.289 
Flores Sandoval Francisco PRI 0 -0.382 -0.921 0.151 
García Medina Laura PRD 1 1.060 0.489 1.639 
González Esparza Santos Antonio PRD 1 1.206 0.560 1.839 
Hernández Escobedo Carlos Enrique PAN 0 -1.476 -2.067 -0.853 
Hernández Hernández María Guadalupe PRD 1 -0.065 -0.617 0.526 
Hernández Peña Joel PRI 1 -0.343 -0.882 0.186 
Hernández Zúñiga Gumaro Elías PRI 1 -0.301 -0.835 0.263 
Martínez Castillo Rubén PRI 1 -0.387 -0.896 0.157 
Martínez Flores Pedro PAN 1 -0.787 -1.332 -0.269 
Mendoza Villalpando Javier PRD 1 0.739 0.108 1.342 
Miramontes Rodríguez Leonicio PRD 1 0.801 0.222 1.390 
Murillo Murillo Ismael PRI 1 -0.207 -0.731 0.298 
Oropeza Muñoz Lorena Esperanza PAN 0 -0.766 -1.356 -0.157 
Pastor Alvarado Héctor Zirahuen PRD 1 0.896 0.317 1.446 
Pérez Rico Carlos PRI 0 -0.542 -1.036 -0.067 
Pinedo Rojas Filomeno PT 0 -0.402 -0.939 0.145 
Pinto Núñez Carlos PRD 0 0.693 0.043 1.310 
Rivera Herrera Otilio PRD 0 1.045 0.458 1.694 
Rivera Sánchez Miguel PRD 1 0.894 0.339 1.492 
Rodríguez Santoyo Raúl PRI 0 -0.164 -0.718 0.395 
Salinas Alatorre Patricia PRD 0 0.298 -0.568 1.235 
Uribe Rodríguez J. Jesús PRD 1 0.894 0.366 1.476 
Valadez González Roberto PRD 1 1.157 0.567 1.815 
Varela González Leodegario PRI 1 -0.405 -0.918 0.113 
 
Median 
Floor: [-0.301, -0.289] PRD (Plurality): 0.894 
PRI: [-0.343, -0.301] 
PAN: [-0.787, -0.766] 
 
TABLE A.18.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Zacatecas (LVII: 2001 – 2004).  The sixth and 
seventh columns correspond with a 95% credible interval.  Note, suplentes are not included when 
identifying median positions.  Source: Diarios de los Debates. 
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Last Name 
 
First Name 
 
Party 
 
District 
Deputy 
Ideal 
 
2.5% 
 
97.5% 
 
Alvarado Campa Carlos PRI 0 -0.124 -0.585 0.299 
Ambriz Valdez Juan Francisco PT 0 -0.199 -0.586 0.172 
Bernal Frausto Federico PAN 0 -1.326 -1.769 -0.908 
Buerba Sauri Sara Guadalupe PRD 1 0.963 0.483 1.428 
Cabral Bañuelos Román PRI 0 -0.368 -0.800 0.057 
Castañeda Muñoz Constantino PT 1 -0.905 -1.461 -0.364 
Chávez Sánchez José PRD 1 0.679 0.309 1.071 
Cruz Arteaga Humberto PRD 1 1.040 0.549 1.556 
de la Cruz Ramírez Manuel de Jesús PRD 0 0.923 0.456 1.378 
de la Torre Barrientos Sonia PAN 1 -1.929 -2.451 -1.464 
de León Mojarro Pedro PRD 1 0.945 0.440 1.497 
del Real Sánchez José de Jesús PRI 0 -0.364 -0.835 0.102 
Gómez López Juan Antonio PRI 1 -0.921 -1.901 -0.069 
González Acosta Adán PT 1 -0.809 -1.232 -0.383 
González Navarro Aquiles PRD 1 0.008 -0.364 0.408 
Goytia Robles Pedro PRD 0 0.691 0.306 1.123 
Herrera Chávez Samuel PRD 1 0.933 0.491 1.394 
Lozano Martínez Juan Carlos PRI 1 -0.328 -0.768 0.077 
Lugo Dávila Aida Alicia PRD 1 0.889 0.443 1.341 
Márquez Sánchez Vicente PRI 1 -0.521 -0.900 -0.136 
Monreal Martínez Octavio PCD 0 -0.074 -0.518 0.381 
Oliva Barrón Gerardo PRD 1 0.771 0.295 1.242 
Ortiz Martínez José Luis PRD 1 0.933 0.446 1.489 
Padilla Estrada Jesús PRD 1 0.995 0.332 1.635 
Ríos Moncada Ruth Araceli PRD 1 0.940 0.547 1.423 
Rodríguez García Martina PRD 0 0.961 0.522 1.396 
Torres Juárez (suplente) Hilario PRI 1 -0.286 -0.829 0.269 
Vanegas Méndez José Antonio PAN 0 -2.178 -2.647 -1.710 
Vázquez Lujan Lidia PT 0 -0.699 -1.089 -0.310 
Zamudio Macías Martha Angélica PRD 1 0.990 0.478 1.523 
Zapata Fraire Raquel PAN 0 -1.629 -2.093 -1.191 
 
Median 
Floor: [-0.074, 0.008] PRD (Majority): 0.933 
PRI: -0.368 
PAN: [-1.929, -1.629] 
 
TABLE A.19.  Ideal Point Estimates via Bayesian Estimation, Zacatecas (LVIII: 2004 – 2007).  The sixth and 
seventh columns correspond with a 95% credible interval.  Note, suplentes are not included when 
identifying median positions.  Source: Diarios de los Debates. 
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Acosta Fregoso PRI -0.951 pass pass 
Castro Trenti PRI -0.387 pass pass 
Ferreiro Velazco PRI 0.166 pass pass 
Hidalgo Silva PRI 0.453 pass pass 
Osuna Aguilasocho PRI 0.186 pass pass 
Quintero Peña PRI -0.280 pass pass 
Ramos García PRI -0.010 pass pass 
Salazar Acuña PRI 2.047 pass pass 
Salazar Castro PRI -0.090 pass pass 
Suarez Córdova PRI 1.907 pass pass 
Alvarado González PAN 0.344 pass pass 
Araiza Regalado PAN -0.193 pass pass 
Avilés Muñoz PAN 0.141 pass pass 
Cortez Mendoza PAN 0.611 pass pass 
Morán Díaz PAN -1.521 pass pass 
Paniagua Figueroa PAN 2.905 pass pass 
Rodríguez Jacobo PAN -0.580 pass pass 
Rosales Hernández PAN -0.063 pass pass 
Rueda Gómez PAN -1.289 pass pass 
Ruiz PAN 0.455 pass pass 
Sánchez Medrano PAN 2.373 pass pass 
Terrazas Silva PAN -0.116 pass pass 
Ruiz Uribe PRD -0.810 pass pass 
Zavala Márquez PRD -2.561 pass pass 
Martín Navarro PVEM -0.535 pass pass 
 
TABLE A.20.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, Baja 
California (XXVII Legislature).  The third column is the Z-score reported by the Geweke diagnostic, where 
smaller values indicate a higher probability the Markov chain has converged.  The fourth and fifth 
columns reports tests about the ability of the chain to produce the mean estimate of the parameter. 
243 
 
Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Aldrete Haas PRI -0.981 pass pass 
Barbosa Ochoa PRI -0.894 pass pass 
Jiménez Ruiz PRI 2.107 pass pass 
López Mendoza PRI -0.147 pass pass 
Madrigal Magaña PRI -0.475 pass pass 
Silva Sánchez (suplente) PRI -0.120 pass pass 
Mendivil Acosta PRI -0.770 pass pass 
Montaño Quintana PRI 0.996 pass pass 
Saúl Guakil PRI 0.515 pass pass 
Valencia Roque PRI 0.727 pass pass 
Abarca Macklis PAN 0.356 pass pass 
Astorga Othon PAN 0.374 pass pass 
Blake Mora PAN -1.744 pass pass 
Castillo Burgos PAN 0.711 pass pass 
Chávez Colecio PAN -0.043 pass pass 
González Solís PAN 0.301 pass pass 
Lemus Zendejas PAN 1.014 pass pass 
López Moreno PAN 0.023 pass pass 
Luna Pineda PAN -0.538 pass pass 
Magaña Mosqueda PAN 0.675 pass pass 
Pons Agundez PAN 0.193 pass pass 
Rodríguez Hernández PAN -0.606 pass pass 
Correa Acevedo PRD -1.530 pass pass 
Palafox Granados PRD -0.711 pass pass 
Gallegos Gil PVEM -0.763 pass pass 
Núñez Verdugo PEBC 1.669 pass pass 
 
TABLE A.21.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, Baja 
California (XXVIII Legislature).  The third column is the Z-score reported by the Geweke diagnostic, 
where smaller values indicate a higher probability the Markov chain has converged.  The fourth and fifth 
columns reports tests about the ability of the chain to produce the mean estimate of the parameter. 
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Brown Gantus PRI -0.324 pass pass 
Celorio Pedrero PRI -0.004 pass pass 
Cervera Cetina PRI 0.416 pass pass 
Chan Talango PRI -0.147 pass pass 
Cobos Toledo PRI -0.463 pass pass 
Cocón Collí PRI -1.544 pass pass 
Concha Chávez PRI 0.862 pass pass 
del Rio Ávila PRI -0.319 pass pass 
González Flores PRI -0.426 pass pass 
Guerrero del Rivero PRI -1.044 pass pass 
Lara Cahuich PRI 0.188 pass pass 
Martínez Rocha PRI 2.421 pass pass 
Montero Rosado PRI 0.075 pass pass 
Novelo Lara PRI 0.326 pass pass 
Pacheco Castro PRI 0.314 pass pass 
Pérez Hernández PRI 0.162 pass pass 
Pozos Lanz PRI 0.436 pass pass 
Razo Santiago PRI 1.122 pass pass 
Espinosa Rebolledo PAN -0.110 pass pass 
Gamboa Vela PAN -0.131 pass pass 
Gómez PAN -0.594 pass pass 
González López PAN -1.033 pass pass 
González Navarrete PAN 0.342 pass pass 
López Solís PAN -2.087 pass pass 
Manzanero Carrillo PAN -0.464 pass pass 
Montejo González PAN 1.433 pass pass 
Ocampo Calderón PAN -1.843 pass pass 
Palmer Abreu PAN 2.387 pass pass 
Portela Chaparro PAN 0.008 pass pass 
Tzeek Moo PAN 0.161 pass pass 
Vela Rosado PAN 0.515 pass pass 
Uriostegui Uriostegui PRD 0.380 pass pass 
Duarte Quijano PCD -1.257 pass pass 
Ostoa Ortega PCD 1.362 pass pass 
Richaud Lara PCD -1.351 pass pass 
 
TABLE A.22.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, 
Campeche (LVIII Legislature).  The third column is the Z-score reported by the Geweke diagnostic, where 
smaller values indicate a higher probability the Markov chain has converged.  The fourth and fifth 
columns reports tests about the ability of the chain to produce the mean estimate of the parameter. 
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Cabrera Cano PRI -0.999 pass fail 
Cano Estrada PRI 0.215 pass fail 
Carbajo Zúñiga PRI 1.549 pass fail 
Castañón Márquez PRI -0.198 pass fail 
Huerta Aboytes PRI 2.291 pass fail 
Lemus López PRI 0.186 pass fail 
López Guitron PRI -0.624 pass fail 
Ortega Vieyra PRI -1.754 pass fail 
Rangel Segovia PRI 1.574 pass fail 
Alcocer Flores PAN -1.180 pass pass 
Alfaro García PAN 0.670 pass pass 
Andrade Quesada PAN 0.058 pass pass 
Arredondo García PAN -1.229 pass pass 
Centeno Castro PAN 2.117 pass pass 
Chávez Muñoz (suplente) PAN -0.455 pass pass 
Duran Villalpando PAN -0.595 pass pass 
Medina López PAN 0.152 pass pass 
Morales Torres PAN 0.865 pass pass 
Pérez González PAN 0.984 pass pass 
Robles Hernández PAN -2.398 pass pass 
Rodríguez Vázquez PAN -2.500 pass pass 
Rojas Navarrete PAN 2.513 pass pass 
Ruiz Velatti PAN -0.085 pass pass 
Salgado Flores PAN -1.574 pass pass 
Samano Arreguin PAN 0.517 pass pass 
Stefanonni Mazzocco PAN -0.824 pass pass 
Torres Gómez PAN 0.157 pass pass 
Torres Graciano PAN -0.439 pass pass 
Ugalde Cardona PAN 0.249 pass pass 
Contreras Pérez PRD 0.814 pass pass 
Nieto Montoya PRD 0.049 pass pass 
Ramírez Escamilla PRD 0.547 pass pass 
Scheffler Ramos PRD -2.094 pass pass 
Chávez de la Peña PVEM 0.156 pass pass 
García Sainz Arena PVEM -0.038 pass pass 
Villagrán Godoy PVEM -0.336 pass pass 
Aguilar Camarillo PT -1.332 pass pass 
 
TABLE A.23.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, 
Guanajuato (LIX Legislature).  The third column is the Z-score reported by the Geweke diagnostic, where 
smaller values indicate a higher probability the Markov chain has converged.  The fourth and fifth 
columns reports tests about the ability of the chain to produce the mean estimate of the parameter. 
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Aguilar Castillo PRI 0.731 pass pass 
Cortez Vargas PRI -0.507 pass fail 
Alcántara Pérez PRI 0.319 pass pass 
Almaraz Calderón PRI -0.875 pass pass 
Álvarez Colín PRI 0.482 pass pass 
Apolonio PRI 0.817 pass pass 
Benítez Treviño PRI -0.100 pass fail 
Vallejo Tinoco (suplente) PRI 0.258 pass fail 
Borja Texocotitla PRI -0.770 pass pass 
Cárdenas Monroy PRI -1.257 pass fail 
Colín de la O PRI -0.046 pass pass 
Colín Guadarrama PRI 0.532 pass pass 
Cortes Ramírez PRI 1.692 pass pass 
Flores Morales PRI -0.979 pass pass 
Flores Pimentel PRI 0.746 pass pass 
González Calderón PRI 2.038 pass pass 
González Pereda PRI 0.675 pass pass 
Maya Pineda PRI -1.881 pass pass 
Morales Gil PRI 0.011 pass pass 
Muñoz Serna PRI 0.496 pass pass 
Olivares Monterrubio PRI 0.046 pass pass 
Alcántara Núñez (suplente) PRI -1.114 pass pass 
Rojas González PRI -0.767 pass pass 
Rubí Salazar PRI -0.212 pass pass 
Ruiz Flores PRI -0.055 pass pass 
Talavera López PRI 0.882 pass pass 
Acosta Dávila PAN 1.334 pass pass 
Alarcón Bárcena PAN 0.669 pass pass 
Alcalde Virgen PAN 0.727 pass pass 
Arredondo Ibarra PAN -0.591 pass pass 
Castañeda Rodríguez PAN -0.483 pass pass 
Chávez Palacios PAN -2.328 pass pass 
Corral Romero PAN 0.337 pass pass 
Enríquez Romo PAN -2.283 pass pass 
Flores Guadarrama PAN -0.384 pass pass 
García Ramírez PAN -1.880 pass pass 
Germán Olivares PAN 1.266 pass pass 
Inzunza Armas PAN 1.008 pass pass 
Liceaga García PAN 3.016 pass pass 
 
TABLE A.24.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, Estado 
de México (LV Legislature).  The third column is the Z-score reported by the Geweke diagnostic, where 
smaller values indicate a higher probability the Markov chain has converged.  The fourth and fifth 
columns reports tests about the ability of the chain to produce the mean estimate of the parameter. 
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Maawad Robert PAN 0.496 pass pass 
Medina Vega PAN -0.286 pass pass 
Olvera Higuera PAN 0.092 pass pass 
Parra Noriega PAN -0.498 pass pass 
Sánchez Gómez PAN -0.245 pass pass 
Sandoval Silvera PAN 0.421 pass pass 
Sondón Saavedra PAN -0.804 pass pass 
Sosa Muñiz PAN -2.067 pass pass 
Urbina Montes de Oca PAN -0.201 pass pass 
Zepeda Martínez PAN 0.933 pass pass 
Alva Olvera PRD -1.481 pass pass 
Arreola Calderón PRD 0.809 pass pass 
Ávila Loza PRD 1.260 pass pass 
Cándido Velasco PRD 0.925 pass pass 
del Valle Miranda PRD 0.791 pass pass 
García Martínez PRD 0.985 pass pass 
González Bautista PRD -1.369 pass pass 
Gutiérrez Vázquez PRD 0.633 pass pass 
Hernández González PRD 0.698 pass pass 
Hernández Rodríguez PRD -0.901 pass pass 
Huazo Cedillo PRD 0.758 pass pass 
Medina Flores PRD 0.530 pass pass 
Pérez Soria PRD 0.655 pass pass 
Rivera Escalona PRD 0.104 pass pass 
Rodríguez Aguirre PRD -0.937 pass pass 
Rojo Ramírez PRD -1.760 pass pass 
San Martin Hernández PRD -0.327 pass pass 
Ulloa Pérez PRD 0.110 pass pass 
Velázquez Vieyra PRD 0.314 pass pass 
Moctezuma Lule PVEM -1.079 pass pass 
Portilla Diéguez PVEM -1.522 pass fail 
Viejo Plancarte PVEM -1.107 pass pass 
Vives Chavarría PVEM 1.096 pass pass 
Barragán Pacheco PT 0.935 pass pass 
Maya Doro PT 1.325 pass pass 
Vela González PT -0.580 pass pass 
Samperio Montano PCD 0.061 pass pass 
Valdez Portiocarrero PCD 1.067 pass pass 
 
TABLE A.24, cont.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, 
Estado de México (LV Legislature). 
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Becerril Straffon PRI 0.004 pass fail 
Beltrán Díaz PRI 1.262 pass pass 
Porras Rodríguez PRI -0.060 pass fail 
Rebolledo Hernández PRI 0.506 pass pass 
Salgado Brito PRI 0.705 pass fail 
Sánchez Cortes PRI -0.866 pass pass 
Sandoval Alarcón PRI 0.907 pass pass 
Xoxocotla Cortez PRI 1.316 pass pass 
Barenque Otero PAN 0.905 pass pass 
Cisneros Ortiz PAN 0.495 pass pass 
Giles Sánchez PAN 2.042 pass pass 
Aragón Zamora (suplente) PAN -0.307 pass pass 
Iragorri Duran PAN -0.734 pass pass 
Juárez Guadarrama PAN 1.123 pass pass 
López Sánchez PAN -0.040 pass pass 
Pineda Barrera PAN -1.175 pass pass 
Sandoval Palazuelos PAN -1.369 pass pass 
Santibáñez Rivera PAN -1.200 pass pass 
Demedicis Hidalgo PRD 0.406 pass pass 
García Jaimes PRD -0.087 pass pass 
López Ruvalcaba PRD -0.557 pass pass 
Nolasco Vázquez PRD -0.927 pass pass 
Pedraza Flores PRD -0.492 pass pass 
Rodríguez Báez PRD 0.899 pass pass 
Rodríguez Montero PRD -1.292 pass fail 
Vences Camacho PRD 0.042 pass pass 
Estrada González PVEM 0.188 pass pass 
González Nájera PVEM 1.853 pass pass 
Iragorri Montoya PVEM -1.662 fail fail 
Álvarez Cisneros PCD -0.609 pass pass 
Lugo Delgado PCD -0.648 pass pass 
 
TABLE A.25.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, 
Morelos(XLIX Legislature).  The third column is the Z-score reported by the Geweke diagnostic, where 
smaller values indicate a higher probability the Markov chain has converged.  The fourth and fifth 
columns reports tests about the ability of the chain to produce the mean estimate of the parameter. 
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Alejo Domínguez PRI 0.058 pass pass 
Alonso Granados PRI 1.601 pass pass 
Atanacio Luna PRI -0.702 pass pass 
Cantorán Espinosa PRI 0.043 pass pass 
Ceballos López PRI -0.924 pass pass 
Cid Palacios PRI 0.306 pass pass 
de la Llata Mier PRI -2.990 pass pass 
de la Sierra Aramburo PRI 0.903 pass pass 
González Morales PRI 0.443 pass pass 
González Ortega PRI 3.802 fail fail 
Hernández Medina PRI 0.069 pass pass 
Hidalgo Villafane PRI 1.212 pass pass 
Jasso Valencia PRI -2.025 pass pass 
Jiménez Hernández PRI -0.558 pass pass 
Martagón López PRI 0.667 pass pass 
Martínez Martínez PRI -0.269 pass pass 
Merlo Talavera PRI 0.360 pass pass 
Morales Martínez PRI -1.052 pass pass 
Morales Méndez PRI -1.918 pass pass 
Moreno Valles Rosas PRI -1.616 pass pass 
Bravo Jiménez (suplente) PRI 2.170 pass pass 
Oaxaca Carreón PRI 0.713 pass pass 
Olivares Flores PRI -0.056 pass pass 
Rendón Vargas PRI -0.400 pass pass 
Sánchez Valencia PRI -0.620 pass pass 
Vite Vargas PRI 1.251 pass pass 
Lechuga Castelán (suplente) PRI 0.811 pass pass 
Zanatta Vidaurri PRI -1.875 pass pass 
Anguiano Martínez PAN 0.557 pass pass 
Chávez Alvarado PAN -0.942 pass pass 
Díaz de Rivera Hernández PAN -0.127 pass pass 
García García PAN 0.510 pass pass 
Gómez Cortes PAN 0.008 pass pass 
González Juárez PAN -0.971 pass pass 
Gutiérrez Ramos PAN 1.845 pass pass 
León Castañeda PAN 1.124 pass pass 
Lezama Prieto PAN -0.759 pass pass 
Micalco Méndez PAN 0.092 pass pass 
Cazares García PRD 0.445 pass pass 
Huerta Espinosa PRD -0.135 pass pass 
Aguilar Hernández PVEM 0.955 pass fail 
Hernández Reyes PT -0.848 pass pass 
Espinosa Torres PCD 0.734 pass pass 
 
TABLE A.26.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, Puebla 
(LVI Legislature).   
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Aguirre Ochoa PRI 0.669 pass pass 
Calleja y Arroyo PRI 0.387 pass pass 
Callejas Arroyo PRI -0.623 pass pass 
Chiunti Hernández PRI -1.098 pass pass 
Fernández Garibay PRI 1.025 pass pass 
Garay Cabada PRI 0.117 pass pass 
García Guzmán PRI -0.554 pass pass 
Guillen Serrano PRI -1.293 pass pass 
Lagos Martínez PRI 0.749 pass pass 
Luna Hernández PRI 1.525 pass pass 
Marín García PRI -1.112 pass pass 
Merlín Castro PRI -1.415 pass pass 
Montano Guzmán PRI -0.172 pass pass 
Montiel Montiel PRI 1.139 pass pass 
Nava Iñiguez PRI 1.039 pass pass 
Oliva Meza PRI 1.284 pass pass 
Pérez Pardave PRI 0.030 pass pass 
Porras Davíd PRI -0.193 pass pass 
Atilano Moreno (suplente) PRI 0.870 pass fail 
Rodríguez Cruz PRI 1.269 pass pass 
Tejeda Cruz PRI -1.078 pass pass 
Valencia Morales PRI 0.284 pass pass 
Yunes Zorrilla PRI -0.427 pass pass 
Baltazar Montes (suplente) PRI -1.271 pass fail 
Batalla Herver PAN -1.614 pass pass 
Ramírez Santiago (suplente) PAN 1.017 pass pass 
Beltrami Mantecón PAN 0.023 pass pass 
Cambranis Torres PAN 0.504 pass pass 
Chao y Fernández PAN -0.315 pass pass 
Chedraui Obeso PAN -1.780 pass pass 
de la Vequia Bernardi PAN -1.006 pass pass 
Duck Núñez PAN -1.564 pass pass 
Martínez Ballestros (suplente) PAN 0.317 pass pass 
Fernández Morales PAN 0.181 pass pass 
Grajales Jiménez PAN 0.229 pass pass 
Pérez Silva (suplente) PAN -1.322 pass pass 
Pontón Villa (suplente) PAN -0.481 pass pass 
Kuri Ceja PAN -0.701 pass pass 
Abascal Amador (suplente) PAN -1.221 pass pass 
Lobeira Cabeza PAN 0.136 pass pass 
López Gómez PAN -1.719 pass pass 
 
TABLE A.27.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, Veracruz 
(LX).  The third column is the Z-score reported by the Geweke diagnostic, where smaller values indicate 
a higher probability the Markov chain has converged.  The fourth and fifth columns reports tests about 
the ability of the chain to produce the mean estimate of the parameter.  
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Melo Escudero PAN -1.082 pass pass 
Méndez Mahe PAN 1.453 pass pass 
Monge Villalobos PAN 0.725 pass pass 
Retureta Díaz (suplente) PAN 0.583 pass pass 
Ortiz Solís PAN -0.550 pass pass 
Osorio Medina PAN 1.476 pass pass 
Saldaña Moran PAN 1.619 pass pass 
López San Millán (suplente) PAN 1.958 pass pass 
Vázquez García PAN -0.952 pass pass 
Yunes Márquez PAN -0.653 pass pass 
Flores Aguayo PRD 1.672 pass pass 
García Durán PRD 0.625 pass pass 
García Vázquez PRD -2.523 pass pass 
Mantilla Trolle PRD -0.951 pass pass 
Patraca Bravo PRD -0.664 pass pass 
Solís Aguilar PRD 2.011 pass pass 
Lobato Calderón PCD -0.981 pass pass 
 
TABLE A.27, cont.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, 
Veracruz (LX Legislature).  
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-Width 
Aguilar Contreras PRI -0.667 pass pass 
Flores Chávez PRI -0.353 pass pass 
Flores Sandoval PRI 2.432 pass pass 
Hernández Pena PRI 0.339 pass pass 
Hernández Zúñiga PRI -0.666 pass pass 
Martínez Castillo PRI -0.079 pass pass 
Murillo Murillo PRI -0.772 pass pass 
Pérez Rico PRI 0.601 pass pass 
Rodríguez Santoyo PRI -1.522 pass fail 
Varela González PRI -1.912 pass pass 
Arce Pantoja PAN 1.347 pass pass 
Hernández Escobedo PAN -0.815 pass pass 
Martínez Flores PAN -0.944 pass pass 
Oropeza Muñoz PAN 0.965 pass pass 
Escobedo Domínguez PRD -0.355 pass pass 
García Medina PRD -0.909 pass pass 
González Esparza PRD -1.008 pass pass 
Hernández Hernández PRD -0.265 pass fail 
Mendoza Villalpando PRD -0.099 pass pass 
Miramontes Rodríguez PRD -0.415 pass pass 
Pastor Alvarado PRD -0.736 pass pass 
Pinto Núñez PRD 0.080 pass pass 
Rivera Herrera PRD 1.515 pass pass 
Rivera Sánchez PRD 1.573 pass pass 
Salinas Alatorre PRD 0.080 pass fail 
Fajardo Frías (suplente) PRD 0.959 pass pass 
Uribe Rodríguez PRD -1.121 pass pass 
Valadez González PRD -0.275 pass pass 
Arreola Ortega PT 0.474 pass pass 
Pinedo Rojas PT 1.894 pass pass 
Barajas Romo PCD -0.259 pass pass 
 
TABLE A.28.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, 
Zacatecas (LVII Legislature).  The third column is the Z-score reported by the Geweke diagnostic, where 
smaller values indicate a higher probability the Markov chain has converged.  The fourth and fifth 
columns reports tests about the ability of the chain to produce the mean estimate of the parameter. 
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Legislator Party Z Stationarity Half-width 
Alvarado Campa PRI 0.133 pass fail 
Cabral Bañuelos PRI 0.240 pass pass 
del Real Sánchez PRI -0.372 pass pass 
Gómez López PRI 0.188 pass pass 
Torres Juárez (suplente) PRI -0.011 pass pass 
Lozano Martínez PRI 0.030 pass pass 
Márquez Sánchez PRI -0.872 pass pass 
Bernal Frausto PAN -0.280 pass pass 
de la Torre Barrientos PAN -0.280 pass pass 
Vanegas Méndez PAN 0.442 pass pass 
Zapata Fraire PAN -0.709 pass pass 
Buerba Sauri PRD 0.383 pass pass 
Chávez Sánchez PRD -1.569 pass pass 
Cruz Arteaga PRD -0.271 pass pass 
de la Cruz Ramírez PRD -1.576 pass pass 
de León Mojarro PRD -0.566 pass pass 
González Navarro PRD -0.381 pass fail 
Goytia Robles PRD 1.901 pass pass 
Herrera Chávez PRD -0.625 pass pass 
Lugo Dávila PRD -0.282 pass pass 
Oliva Barrón PRD 1.042 pass pass 
Ortiz Martínez PRD 1.290 pass pass 
Padilla Estrada PRD 0.086 pass pass 
Ríos Moncada PRD 0.850 pass pass 
Rodríguez García PRD -0.265 pass pass 
Zamudio Macías PRD -0.339 pass pass 
Ambriz Valdez PT 1.022 pass pass 
Castañeda Muñoz PT 0.369 pass pass 
González Acosta PT -1.429 pass pass 
Vázquez Lujan PT -0.896 pass pass 
Monreal Martínez PCD 1.051 pass fail 
 
TABLE A.28.  Convergence Diagnostics for the Posterior Distribution of the Ideal Point Estimate, 
Zacatecas (LVIII Legislature).  The third column is the Z-score reported by the Geweke diagnostic, where 
smaller values indicate a higher probability the Markov chain has converged.  The fourth and fifth 
columns reports tests about the ability of the chain to produce the mean estimate of the parameter. 
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES 
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FIGURE B.1.  Party Representation on Prestige Committees, Baja California (XVII); plurality party: PAN. 
The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Baja California (XVII). 
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FIGURE B.2.  Party Representation on Non-Prestige Committees, Baja California (XVII); plurality party: 
PAN.  The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line 
indicate over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios 
de Debate, Baja California (XVII). 
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FIGURE B.3.  Party Representation on Prestige Committees, Baja California (XVIII); plurality party: PAN.  
The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Baja California (XVIII). 
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FIGURE B.4.  Party Representation on Non-Prestige Committees, Baja California (XVIII); plurality party: 
PAN.  The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line 
indicate over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios 
de Debate, Baja California (XVIII). 
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FIGURE B.5.  Party Representation on Prestige Committees, Campeche (LVIII); majority party: PRI.  The 
dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Campeche (LVIII). 
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FIGURE B.6.  Party Representation on Non-Prestige Committees, Campeche (LVIII); majority party: PRI.  
The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Campeche (LVIII). 
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FIGURE B.7.  Party Representation on Prestige Committees, Guanajuato(LIX); majority party: PAN.  The 
dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Guanajuato (LIX). 
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FIGURE B.8.  Party Representation on Non-Prestige Committees, Guanajuato(LIX); majority party: PAN.  
The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Guanajuato (LIX). 
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FIGURE B.9.  Party Representation on Prestige Committees, Estado de México (LV); plurality party: PRI.  
The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Estado de México (LV). 
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FIGURE B.10.  Party Representation on Non-Prestige Committees, Estado de México (LV); plurality party: 
PRI.  The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line 
indicate over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios 
de Debate, Estado de México (LV). 
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FIGURE B.11.  Party Represntation on Prestige Committees, Morelos (XLIX); plurality party: PAN.  The 
dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Semanarios de 
Debate, Morelos (XLIX). 
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FIGURE B.12.  Party Represntation on Non-Prestige Committees, Morelos (XLIX); plurality party: PAN.  
The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Semanarios de 
Debate, Morelos (XLIX). 
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FIGURE B.13.  Party Representation of Prestige Committees, Puebla (LVI); majority party: PRI.  The 
dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Puebla (LVI). 
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FIGURE B.14.  Party Representation of Non-Prestige Committees, Puebla (LVI); majority party: PRI.  The 
dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Puebla (LVI). 
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FIGURE B.15.  Party Represntation on Prestige Committees, Veracruz (LX); plurality party: PRI.  The 
dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Veracruz (LX). 
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FIGURE B.16.  Party Represntation on Non-Prestige Committees, Veracruz (LX); plurality party: PRI.  The 
dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Veracruz (LX). 
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FIGURE B.17.  Party Representation on Prestige Committees, Zacatecas (LVII); plurality party: PRD.  The 
dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Zacatecas (LVII). 
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FIGURE B.18.  Party Representation on Non-Prestige Committees, Zacatecas (LVII); plurality party: PRD.  
The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Zacatecas (LVII). 
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FIGURE B.19.  Party Represntation on Prestige Committees, Zacatecas (LVIII); majority party: PRD.  The 
dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Zacatecas (LVIII). 
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FIGURE B.20.  Party Represntation on Non-Prestige Committees, Zacatecas (LVIII); majority party: PRD.  
The dotted line represents a 1:1 relationship between x and y such that all points above this line indicate 
over-representation while points under the line indicate under-representation.  Source: Diarios de 
Debate, Zacatecas (LVIII). 
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Figure B.21.  Discrimination Parameters:  Significant v. Insignificant (upper panel: Baja California XXVII; 
lower panel: Baja California XXVIII).  Discrimination values are graphed as a function of the proportion of 
dissenting votes.  Generally speaking, when d = 1 and insignificant parameters cluster around the low 
end of the range (where low values indicate large margins of victory), then one can confidently claim the 
policy space is unidimensional. 
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Figure B.22.  Discrimination Parameters:  Significant v. Insignificant (upper panel: Campeche LVIII; lower 
panel: Guanajuato LIX).  Discrimination values are graphed as a function of the proportion of dissenting 
votes.  Generally speaking, when d = 1 and insignificant parameters cluster around the low end of the 
range (where low values indicate large margins of victory), then one can confidently claim the policy 
space is unidimensional. 
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Figure B.23.  Discrimination Parameters:  Significant v. Insignificant (upper panel: Estado de México LV; 
lower panel: Morelos XLIX).  Discrimination values are graphed as a function of the proportion of 
dissenting votes.  Generally speaking, when d = 1 and insignificant parameters cluster around the low 
end of the range (where low values indicate large margins of victory), then one can confidently claim the 
policy space is unidimensional. 
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Figure B.24.  Discrimination Parameters:  Significant v. Insignificant (upper panel: Puebla LVI; lower 
panel: Veracruz LX).  Discrimination values are graphed as a function of the proportion of dissenting 
votes.  Generally speaking, when d = 1 and insignificant parameters cluster around the low end of the 
range (where low values indicate large margins of victory), then one can confidently claim the policy 
space is unidimensional. 
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Figure B.25.  Discrimination Parameters:  Significant v. Insignificant (upper panel: Zacatecas LVII; lower 
panel: Zacatecas LVIII).  Discrimination values are graphed as a function of the proportion of dissenting 
votes.  Generally speaking, when d = 1 and insignificant parameters cluster around the low end of the 
range (where low values indicate large margins of victory), then one can confidently claim the policy 
space is unidimensional. 
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Median 
Floor: -0.084 PAN (Plurality): 1.060 
PRI: [-0.986, -0.976]  
 
 
FIGURE B.26.  Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates, Baja California (XXVII).  Floor median positions are 
denoted by black diamonds, while majority/plurality party medians are denoted by blue diamonds.   
Vertical lines extending from each point’s poles are the 95% credible intervals. 
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Median 
Floor: -0.171  PAN (Plurality): [1.022, 1.039] 
PRI: [-1.021, -0.947] 
 
FIGURE B.27.  Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates, Baja California (XXVIII).  Floor median positions are 
denoted by black diamonds, while majority/plurality party medians are denoted by blue diamonds.  
Vertical lines extending from each point’s poles are the 95% credible intervals. 
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Median 
Floor: -0.335 PRI (Majority): -0.357 
PAN: 1.168 
 
FIGURE B.28.  Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates, Campeche (LVIII).  Floor median positions are 
denoted by black diamonds, while majority/plurality party medians are denoted by blue diamonds.  
Vertical lines extending from each point’s poles are the 95% credible intervals. 
  
PRI**
PAN
-3.000
-2.000
-1.000
0.000
1.000
2.000
3.000
283 
 
 
Median 
Floor: [0.437, 0.515] PAN (Majority): 0.608 
PRI: -0.031 
PRD: [-2.987, -2.577] 
 
FIGURE B.29.  Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates, Guanajuato (LIX).  Floor median positions are 
denoted by black diamonds, while majority/plurality party medians are denoted by blue diamonds.  
Vertical lines extending from each point’s poles are the 95% credible intervals. 
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Median 
Floor: -0.440 PRI (Plurality): -0.512 
PAN: -0.792 
PRD: 1.439 
 
FIGURE B.30.  Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates, Estado de México (LV).  Floor median positions are 
denoted by black diamonds, while majority/plurality party medians are denoted by blue diamonds.  
Vertical lines extending from each point’s poles are the 95% credible intervals. 
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Median 
Floor: [0.072, 0.151] PAN (Plurality): -0.966 
PRI: [0.324, 0.411] 
PRD: [0.345, 0.918] 
 
FIGURE B.31.  Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates, Morelos (XLIX).  Floor median positions are denoted 
by black diamonds, while majority/plurality party medians are denoted by blue diamonds.  Vertical lines 
extending from each point’s poles are the 95% credible intervals. 
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Median 
Floor: -0.532 PRI (Majority): [-0.646, -0.639] 
PAN: [1.714, 1.730] 
 
FIGURE B.32.  Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates, Puebla (LVI).  Floor median positions are denoted by 
black diamonds, while majority/plurality party medians are denoted by blue diamonds.  Vertical lines 
extending from each point’s poles are the 95% credible intervals. 
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Median 
Floor: -0.556 PRI (Majority): [-0.646, -0.632] 
PAN: [0.846, 0.866] 
PRD: [-1.852, -1.552] 
 
FIGURE B.33.  Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates, Veracruz (LX).  Floor median positions are denoted 
by black diamonds, while majority/plurality party medians are denoted by blue diamonds.  Vertical lines 
extending from each point’s poles are the 95% credible intervals. 
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 Median 
Floor: [-0.301, -0.289] PRD (Plurality): 0.894 
PRI: [-0.343, -0.301] 
PAN: [-0.787, -0.766] 
 
 
FIGURE B.34.  Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates, Zacatecas (LVII).  Floor median positions are denoted 
by black diamonds, while majority/plurality party medians are denoted by blue diamonds. Vertical lines 
extending from each point’s poles are the 95% credible intervals. 
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Median 
Floor: [-0.074, 0.008] PRD (Majority): 0.933 
PRI: -0.368 
PAN: [-1.929, -1.629] 
 
FIGURE B.35.  Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates, Zacatecas (LVIII).  Floor median positions are 
denoted by black diamonds, while majority/plurality party medians are denoted by blue diamonds.  
Vertical lines extending from each point’s poles are the 95% credible intervals. 
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FIGURE B.36.  Comparing the Effect of Different Roll Call Votes on Ideal Point Estimates: Baja California, 
XXVII (top panel) and Baja California, XXVIII (lower panel).  I graph ideal points generated using only 
votes on budgetary bills as a function of a ideal points generated using the entire sample of votes.  The 
dotted line indicates a 1:1 relationship between x- and y-values. 
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FIGURE B.37.  Comparing the Effect of Different Roll Call Votes on Ideal Point Estimates: Campeche, LVIII 
(top panel) and Guanajuato, LIX (lower panel).  I graph ideal points generated using only votes on 
budgetary bills as a function of a ideal points generated using the entire sample of votes.  The dotted 
line indicates a 1:1 relationship between x- and y-values. 
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FIGURE B.38.  Comparing the Effect of Different Roll Call Votes on Ideal Point Estimates: Estado de 
México, LV (top panel) and Morelos, XLIX (lower panel).  I graph ideal points generated using only votes 
on budgetary bills as a function of a ideal points generated using the entire sample of votes.  The dotted 
line indicates a 1:1 relationship between x- and y-values. 
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FIGURE B.39.  Comparing the Effect of Different Roll Call Votes on Ideal Point Estimates: Puebla, LVI (top 
panel) and Veracruz, LX (lower panel).  I graph ideal points generated using only votes on budgetary bills 
as a function of a ideal points generated using the entire sample of votes.  The dotted line indicates a 1:1 
relationship between x- and y-values. 
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FIGURE B.40.  Comparing the Effect of Different Roll Call Votes on Ideal Point Estimates: Zacatecas, LVII 
(top panel) and Zacatecas, LVIII (lower panel).  I graph ideal points generated using only votes on 
budgetary bills as a function of a ideal points generated using the entire sample of votes.  The dotted 
line indicates a 1:1 relationship between x- and y-values. 
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